NORTH AFRICA'S FUTURE
By L. JAMES
THE five major political units along the 2,000 miles of the North African coast from Morocco to Egypt are on the threshold of either a greater measure of independence or complete indepen- dence from European control. The protracted negotiations over the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 have made the Egyptian issue the best known. Technically, of course, Egypt has been independent since 1922, but it has been a partial independence, in that Great Britain has been accorded rights and privileges not normally given by a sovereign State to a foreign Power. The present demand for the complete withdrawal of British troops may be con- sidered either unwise or ungrateful, but it is certainly demanded by the overwhelming majority of Egyptians.
Britain has no real alternative in Egypt but to withdraw and make the best defence arrangements that Egyptian nationalism in its present extravagant mood will permit. The Egyptian claim to the Sudan is in a different category ; it would be interesting to see it examined by U.N.O. Withdrawal from Egypt is perilously near imperial suicide for the British Commonwealth ; there is no real alternative base from which the Suez Canal can be defended. Evacuation implies a completely new approach to Mediterranean strategy. As far as the defence of Egypt is concerned, there is no hope that Egyptian forces will be able to defend Egypt without foreign assistance. Neither in quality nor quantity can Egypt hope to have forces equal to this task in the next decades. We perhaps ought to add that orthodox conceptions of strategy are apt to be a little academic in the world of atomic bombs.
The fate of Libya is destined to cause some difficulties, whatever decision is eventually applied. To give Libya an independent status, as Mr. Bevin has suggested, can only strengthen those forces in the Arab world seeking to obtain complete freedom from European control. Britain has stated that she would not allow Italy to return to Africa, and so the French suggestion that Italy should administer the colony under some form of U.N.O. trustee- ship is not one that can be readily accepted by the British Govern- ment. Although we stated early in the war that our participation was not undertaken with any thought of territorial aggrandisement, Dominion feeling, particularly in South Africa, favours Britain taking on the administration of the whole or part of Libya under a trusteeship system. Egypt has expressed a hope that Cyrenaica should come under her trusteeship, or alternatively wants to see the colony put under the control of the Arab League. In practice the latter might be the same as the former.
France is not unwilling to assume some kind of trusteeship over Tripolitania, and the Soviet Government has also expressed a willing- ness to accept responsibility. The American view that it might be put under some form of international administration raises inter- esting issues. If international administration of the area is to be anything like that in Germany and Austria, characterised by serious tensions, rivalries and chaos, it ought to be eschewed and treated like a plague. Obviously, however, it would not be conducted on a zonal basis. The solution to the Libyan problem is to give the colony independence. Refusal will scarcely serve to stem the current that seeks Arab independence everywhere in North Africa an the Middle East.
In addition to the difficult problem of searching for a new con- stitution, the French have the further problem of trying to work out a better relationship between the homeland and the colonies. When the present constitution was being debated, the original Article providing for the right of secession was thought by many to be too, drastic, and the Article was sent back for revision and later con- sideration. It does indicate, however, that many Frenchmen recog- nise that the old colonial system is dead, and that the granting of a much greater measure of independence is inevitable and cannot be long postponed.
The merits and demerits of independence are widely discussed throughout French North Africa. In all three territories, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, France faces serious difficulties, and only a realist and generous policy will preserve the French connection. The virile nationalism of this region of the Maghreb, as the Arabs call it, is based on a common language (Arabic), a common religion (Islam) and a belief in a common destiny (as part of the pan-Arab movement). This is no new development, but two important factors have emerged during and since the second world war. The first is painful, but has to be faced ; there has been a sharp decline in French prestige owing to the military collapse and the subsequent disputes between French leaders. The secand factor is the increasing importance of the Arab League in North African and Middle East politics. There are rivalries and rifts within its ranks, but it serves to unite the Arab world. The Berbers of French North Africa are not Arabs, although they have been mostly, though by no means completely, Arabicised. Like the Egyptians, they identify themselves with the Arab viewpoint.
French policy in the past has at times been unduly repressive, and has not provided for the political emergence of the Moslem people who make up the vast majority of the North African population. The much-talked-about assimilation policy of France has, in fact, been resisted by the European element, especially in Algeria, where Europeans number about x,000,000 out of the total of over 7,000,000. In this territory (not a colony in the strict sense because it is part of metropolitan France and is administered by the Ministry of the Interior) the European element has been sufficiently strong to prevent the introduction of reforms designed to improve the political rights of the Moslems. Thus in 1936 the proposed reforms of the franchise by the Government of M. Blum reached the stage of being promises, but they did not even get to the stage of being discussed in the French Chamber owing to the opposition of the French colonists. This kind of failure has played its part in embittering Moslem- French relations. So, too, France's apparent unwillingness in the inter-war years to abide by her promises to Syria created a very unfavourable impression on North African nationalists.
Economic difficulties in French North Africa have been increased by drought in two successive years, and these have not helped to achieve political stability. France dealt very harshly with the Con- stantine disturbances of May, 1945, and this has further added to the legacy of bitterness. So far, the more moderate of the two main Moslem parties has achieved the greatest success in Algeria. The Party of the Manifesto led by M. Ferhat Abbas wants indepen- dence for Algeria, but within the new French Union. The Arabian People's Party led by M. Messali Hadj aims at securing complete independence from France.
The goal of all nationalist groups in North Africa is closer relations with the other territories of the Arab world. The French will have to act swiftly in the economic and political fields if they are to offer anything that has any real attraction to the North African Moslems. The proposed measures from Algeria certainly go a long way, and involve a considerable departure from the old colonial system which put the interests of France first and those of the overseas territories second ; but France will find it hard to resist the movement towards a closer association with the Moslem world. France has carried out a civilising mission in North Africa, and her outstanding adminis- trators like Lyautey have great achievements to their credit. But nationalist movements in their youth are always impatient ; their eyes are turned to the future and only rarely to the past (except when they endeavour to re-create the glories of ancient and independent dynasties), and it is unlikely that the economic benefits of the French connection will receive their full share of attention when the talk is of complete independence. In the next decades we are likely to see North Africa completely freed from Europan control. Self- determination will certainly produce this result.
Previous page
