China's Price
MR. ATTLEE has been to America and returned ; General Wu Hsiu-chuan has been to America and returned to China ; but whatever object these journeys had, it is becoming plain that little progress has been made towards finding a peaceful solution to the Korean war. It was generally assumed in the Far East that the object of Mr. Attlee's visit was to impress upon the President the British point of view, and to make plain Britain's reluctance to see the Korean imbroglio degenerate into "an endless war with China." To judge from the joint corn- muniqud and subsequent events, this object was very imperfectly achieved. It has been made plain that Britain and the U.S. do not agree upon Chinese representation in the U.N. ; that Britain does not support American policy in Formosa ; and that, while both Powers declare that China must not obtain the " fruits of aggres- sion," they both support a policy of seeking a peaceful end to the Korean war How these two latter statements can conceivably be reconciled has never been made plain.
On the Chinese side it has now become clear that Peking, having gained what the Chinese Press describes as " a heroic victory over the forces of American aggression," has raised its price. In a speech made at the celebration of this victory in Peking on December 24th, Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army, declared that China still hoped for a peaceful solution, but required that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea ; that " American forces should evacuate Formosa " ; and that China should be given her lawful seat in the U.N. organisation. At the same time reports from the front suggest that a new offensive directed against Seoul is about to start. The impasse has thus grown worse ; the efforts of the Cease-Fire Com- mittee have apparently failed, and the endless war with China from which British and European opinion shrinks is hardly to be avoided.
A few days ago, at a social party in Hong Kong, a group of well-known Chinese residents were discussing the situation. All were men of wealth and position—none, one would think, likely to be attracted by the Communist ideal. Yet one said, with the warm approval of the rest, "Today, for the first time in my life, I feel proud to be Chinese." Proud, because for the first time in history a Chinese army had met and defeated the forces of a first-class Western Power. When Chu Teh talks of the " heroic victory," he unquestionably voices the feelings of the whole Chinese nation irrespective of social class. Unless we take stock of this fact and its implications, we shall fatally misconceive the situation in the Far East today. Whatever misgivings many Chinese may have felt when intervention in Korea first became known, whatever fears that Mao Tse-tung was being beguiled by the Russians into pulling chestnuts from the fire, all these fears have been overcome in a tide of emotion and new: found pride. The claim of Peking that intervention was a necessary act to save Manchuria from imminent threat of invasion is universally accepted by Chinese opinion. The charge that China is committing aggression against U.N. forces is dismissed as a dishonest quibble.
This is a situation which offers very little prospect of swift or easy solution. Chinese opinion is inflamed to a point at which it would be impossible for the Peking Government to withdraw either its forces or its demands. American opinion is almost, if not quite, as firm in opposition to any concession to " aggression." Both sides over-simplify the crisis. To the Americans the action of China is Russian-inspired, and no account of Chinese national sentiment is taken. To the Chinese the forces of the U.N. are " American imperialists," and no admission of the presence of other troops or of the support of other nations is made in the Chinese Press. It may be thought strange that, when British policy has been openly exerted to find a middle course, the Chinese should not
only ignore this aspect of the situation, but even refrain from exploiting it as a means of dividing the democratic front. It would seem that China is so confident of herself that the simple line of " resistance to American aggression " Is felt to be all that is needed to rally national support.
It can hardly be doubted, however, that the Chinese leaders are well aware of the diplomatic disarray of the democracies. They know that a wide cleavage between the British and American view has opened, and could not be closed by the Attlee-Truman dis- cussions. They know, too, that India and the Middle Asian States take an even more divergent view of the Korean crisis. Knowing that these States will not support an American initiative to declare China an " aggressor," and knowing that the European nations are mortally afraid of seeing America's resources " bogged down in war with China," the Chinese are consciously playing the tough line in the belief that they cannot lose whatever be the outcome.
This belief must seem unfounded and reckless to the European observer. Yet it is perhaps a valid and hard calculation of realities as seen in China. If the impasse continues, the Chinese armies, already in occupation of Northern Korea, the essential buffer-zone which protects Manchuria, can remain in Korea indefinitely. They must be quartered somewhere, and Korea, a region of similar climate not far from their homes, is as good as any other. The U.N. forces, on the other hand, are not at home in Korea, and look forward to the day when they can leave this distant and inhospitable peninsula. A stalemate is perhaps the most desirable development for the Chinese, but even the prospect of war does not unduly dis- may them. War with China would become the Third World War. The main weight of American power would be directed against Russia, not China. The defence of Europe would take priority, and much of the Asiatic territories which the West now controls would have to be forthwith abandoned. China would at once be able to occupy all Korea, drive the French out of Indo-China, take Hong Kong and threaten Malaya. China would get the spoils ; Russia would take the knocks. This aspect of the world crisis is one reason why China sees no danger in clinging to the Russian alliance. Whether the Russians have quite reckoned with the policy of their new ally remains obscure.
Consequently the Chinese see very well that the European objection to an endless war with China will probably in the end prevail over American impulsiveness. For the war with China would not be endless ; it would end quickly enough, as far as active fighting is concerned, with the elimination of European power on the mainland of the Far East. On the other hand, the alternative to endless war with China is likely to be endless concessions. If the Chinese terms for ending the Korean war are accepted, it is hardly likely that the question of Indo-China will be allowed to sleep, and quite doubtful whether China would not soon be pre- senting demands concerning Malaya.
Americans who recognise this dilemma conclude that the Third World War has in fact begun, and cannot now be confined to any limited area. British opinion is very unwilling to draw this con- clusion. Britain, after all, is target for tonight. British opinion in the Far East still clings to the belief that, if the conduct of negotiations could be left to Britain, a solution could be found ;
this is why the results of Mr. Attlee's visit to Washington have caused such disappointment. The argument of British observers in the Far East runs on the lines that a corollary to Mr. Acheson's doctrine of building tip " positions of strength " must be the abandonment of "positions of weakness." North Korea was cer- tainly such a position, into which the U.N. forces should never have strayed. Formosa, it is argued, is, at any rate morally, a position of weakness. The protection afforded by American policy to the rEgime of Chiang Kai-shek stultifies the whole standpoint of the democracies in the Far East. In the name of democracy a deplor- able and Fascist regime, hated by the natives of the island, is kept in power in Formosa. As long as this protection lasts, no settle- ment with China will be possible.
As the British observer moves south along the coast of Asia ho feels less certain where to draw the line. Hong Kong has not been publicly threatened by the Chinese Government, and is under no present military pressure. Perhaps Hong Kong can be left out of the discussion. Indo-China is a more embarrassing problem. No one living in the Far East can pretend that there is any genuine support for the French-sponsored regime. But the only alternative policy to the present would be outright concession to Communism.
Britain would certainly like to assert that Malaya is not in the category of positions of weakness Malaya must be held. But to argue thus while favouring concession in Korea, surrender in Formosa and withdrawal in Indo-China is not very convincing to foreigners. The underlying stresses of the conflicting policies in the Far East are thus coming to the surface. It is getting more and more difficult to talk in terms of democratic rights and national freedoms ; more and more difficult to deny that strategic considera- tions, with the possibility of another war, are the real basis for American attitudes in Korea and Formosa. and for British reserva- tions on the subject of Malaya and South-East Asia. The Chinese say, " Let the water flow and the stones %%ill appear." The water of the Korean war is already exposing many stones.
The position of the Chinese is therefore one of great strength, and their conduct is proportionately intransigent. Yet there are also positions of weakness on the Chinese side. Economically, China needs peace, not war. The American embargo in its present hastily-conceived form does China little harm ; most of the luxury goods which Hong Kong can no longer obtain from the U.S. were already forbidden imports into China The Communist Government there did not allow its citizens to waste foreign exchange on nylons, " sun-kist " oranges and typewriters. But a real embargo or blockade of China could do real harm, and would force China into entire dependence on Russia. This has not so far been the case. China has been spending her foreign exchange in Europe and the West, and her imports of essential_ machinery and materials have come from countries outside the Iron Curtain. War with China, endless or not; would mean blockade of China's coast—a blockade which China cannot break. Such a measure would not destroy the regime or cause widespread famine, but it would arrest the modernisation of the economy and thus frustrate one of the prime objects of Communist policy.
There remains one other potential weakness on the Chinese side, the enigma of Russian policy. It cannot really suit Russia that she should be involved in a desperate war because China refuses com- promise in Korea. If Europe shrinks from war on account of Korea or China, can Russia think such a quarrel really worth the terrible cost that must be paid ? It is more than possible that China, not perhaps fully consulted over the original North Korean invasion of the South (as the unpreparedness of the propaganda department in Peking seemed to show), had later to be persuaded to take a hand. Having done so, and gained a victory which may well have been more complete than Russia expected, China is now calling the tune. There is much evidence to show that Russia under- estimated the power and efficiency of the Chinese Communists during the late war, and even doubted their ability to overthrow the Kuomintang in the years that followed Western under- estimation of the fighting power of the People's Liberation Army may not have been confined to the democratic side of the Iron Curtain.
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