DEFENCE

The trouble with SALT

LAURENCE MARTIN

Professor Martin is defence correspondent of the SPECTATOR With a spate of contradictory, ill-digested and doubtless often unfounded reports emanating from the strategic arms limita- tion talks (sALT) now at last under way in Helsinki, it may be useful to recall briefly what the fuss is all about. The superpowers have found the will to undertake these un- precedented negotiations because they are on the threshold of a new generation of weapons that have disturbing characteristics. Most unsettling in principle is the much maligned anti-ballistic missile (ABM) which, by offering the possibility of effective de- fence even against nuclear attack, under- mines the certainty of retaliation on which deterrence rests. At present, however, tech- nology cannot provide a high level of im- munity against attack by a determined superpower and so it is the multiple in- dividually targettable reentry vehicle (mow) that is causing the most immediate alarm.

The danger here is that hitherto it has always required more than one offensive missile to knock out an enemy retaliatory missile in its hardened silo. Thus, with any- thing approaching equal numbers on both sides, a first strike would fail to eliminate the retaliatory potential. Now, with highly accurate warheads projected in clusters by large missiles, it becomes theoretically pos- sible to reverse the ratios. Thus a leading American official has declared that with rather less than 500 of their large ss9s, if equipped with three warheads of five mega- tons (which each could carry), the Russians could knock out 95 per cent of the 1,000 American Minutemen. The ss9, indeed, looks more and more like a specialised Minuteman killer.

The Americans have so far tried to en- sure that either their bombers or their land- based missiles or their sea-based missiles could alone destroy the Soviet Union. In the face of this 'multiple assured destruction'—a term invented by an American friend of mine attracted to its acronym (MAD)—the ss9 would require strenuous countervailing efforts. But even if we accept that the residual submarine force would make a deliberate first strike unattractive, the new counterforce technology may introduce con- siderable differences in the outcome of war according to who fires first, which may in turn affect calculations in extreme crisis.

Thus the new technology may reintroduce the premium on going first, which has been much reduced during the current generation of weapons. In this respect, incidentally,

the Nixon decision to use ABM to defend the Minutemen appears a much less dan- gerous way of preserving the efficacy of the force than some alternatives, such as firing

on warning—which would increase the risks of preemption—or multiplying the missiles— which would give the Russians real cause for alarm.

It is, indeed, precisely the fact that efforts to preserve retaliatory credibility by multi-

plication of offensive forces inevitably in- crease the sense of insecurity on the other side and sets off a reciprocal reaction that threatens to accelerate the arms race. At present the increases are mostly on the Russian side. Their submarine missile force is making quick strides, while their land- based force will have gone from less than 200 softbased taws at the fall of Khrush- chev to about 1,400 hardened missiles at the end of the current year. Several hun- dred of these are ss9s and the surveillance of silo starts suggests no tapering off. Yet if it is Russia that sets the pace today, the im- plementation of programmes initiated by Mr McNamara for putting rst lay on Poseidon and Minuteman Ill would open a 'warhead gap' in the other direction.

SALT is an effort to see if this process can be delayed or averted, thereby reducing the danger of war and, perhaps, saving a good deal of money. Some relatively meaning. less agreement may well emerge and the fact that it is being sought at all is not without significance for the general climate of relations between the superpowers. But a hard and substantial adjustment of the strategic balance seems a much more re- mote possibility. Even if the will exists, the task of designing any such agreement is technically very difficult indeed.

In the first place, one of the alarming features of the emerging technology is pre- cisely that it makes assessment of the strategic balance much more complicated. The appearance of defensive weapons brings back all the problems of weighing the of- fence against the defence that plagued so many disarmament negotiations in the inter- war years but which temporarily disap- peared in the early missile era. Moreover it must not be forgotten that it is only the belief that the shape of Soviet strategic force, can be unilaterally detected with reasonable accuracy by satellite reconnais- sance that makes an uninspected deal with the Russians conceivable.

Once again, emergent technology could undermine this source of reassurance. While

there is some reason to believe that develop- ment of MIRV could be detected unilater- ally, there is no way short of minute, on the spot detection to tell whether MIRVS have been installed or what their accuracy is. Many experts believe that both Russia and America are beyond the development stage and that the MIRV genie is out of the bottle. This is certainly true of the United States. But in any case it has to be recog- nised that what we face is not one or two pieces of hardware but the infinite fertility of modern military technology. Thus even if those who say that MIRV testing is detect- able are right—and many say they are not— there is no reason to believe that technology will not soon find ways to get round the problem. Thus a really stable agreement would have to deal not merely with the weapons of today and tomorrow but the technological surprise the day after. Every postwar decade has produced at least one major technical breakthrough to upset pre- vious calculations.

Any sign that the Russians were trying to degrade the accuracy of American intel- ligence would therefore dim the prospects for a meaningful agreed limitation. Either an agreement would become impossible or it would have to be set at such high levels of force, in order to provide against sur- prise, that the resultant balance would not be so very different from the spontaneous outcome of national strategic calculation. This, indeed, is the outcome predicted by some of the most knowledgeable American policymakers, who add that even if uni- lateral intelligence retains its present re- liability, the United States will have to take so many precautions against being caught with a leadtime gap' if the Russians broke an agreement that no great economies are to be looked for.

It is very largely because of the difficulties that mobile, landbased missiles present to counting inventories by satellite that the pre- ferred American negotiating packages seek to prohibit such weapons, though the Rus- sians may well point out that the mobile concept promises them more than it does America. Unfortunately there are one or two signs that the Russians do not intend to let such considerations inhibit their weapon procurement. The most difficult practical problem is presented by the little- known fact that the Russians have probably developed a new missile that could be used interchangeably as a medium or long range weapon. This would make counting difficult indeed and would make it impossible to ignore, as was once intended, the 700 or so MRBM sited in western Russia and hitherto incapable of hitting America.

Perhaps more alarming as an index of Russian attitudes are the reports that the Russians have adopted new and deceptive methods of undertaking certain recent mis- sile test firings. Such reports must be treated with caution and it is, of course, always possible that the Russians could be per- suaded of the folly of such methods. But the record of Russian military development is of 'marching to their own drum' and we must remember that if the result of the recent flurry of new strategic developments has been lost immunity for the United Sates, it has been the achievement of some- thing like effective parity for the Russians. The strategic arms business may therefore seem less of a dead end to Soviet military leaders even though they must perceive the looming threat of the coming American multiplication of warheads. Moreover this multiplication depends on the money being forthcoming. Russian strategists may well argue that the present American political climate is inimical to military appropriations and that arms limitation talks can only in- crease Congressional reluctance to author- ise rapid deployment.

For the Atlantic Alliance the Helsinki talks mark a major departure. The United States has long had a private dialogue with Russia but this is the first time that they have got together so formally and so osten- tatiously to the exclusion of their allies. There is no doubt that allied interests are involved both in the strategic balance and in the political implications of any Soviet- American understanding.

European security rests ultimately on American nuclear power; on American will- ingness, in the last resort, to use nuclear weapons first. It is partly in order to make this prospect credible, not least to them- selves, that American military leaders have tried to maintain a margin of superiority over Russia. It may be significant that friend I quoted earlier has his phrase this policy: `confidence of firing first necessary' (COFFIN). As his acronym sugg the quest for confidence by superiority widely regarded as incompatible with s tegic stability between the superpowers.

In fact this confidence has long eroded by the rise in Soviet striking pos SALT will not render the American guaran ineffective, assuming a modicum of co mon sense, for the risks of aggression Europe will remain unacceptably high. SALT will focus attention on facts and lationships more comfortably left in politi obscurity. If the MRBM do have to be tak into consideration, for example, it may be possible to ignore the tactical wea of SACEUR or the French and British natio nuclear forces. While the outcome of su complications would probably be to ma agreement impossible the possibilities f inter-allied friction are obvious.