VIEWPOINT
The road to Pinkville
GEORGE GALE
Before the French collapse in Indochina, the then President Eisenhower had been anxious to intervene in the area, over and beyond the assistance the United States was providing in material and technical training. In 1951 as NATO commander in Paris and concerned at the burden on France of the Indochina war, he believed that 'these losses and costs to the French might be lessened if allies could be brought in to carry part of the load in defending Indochina. Such a development would depend, of course, upon a clear appreciation throughout the Free World that the war was in no sense 5n effort on the part of the French to sustain :heir former domination over the area, but IQ., in fact a clear case of freedom defend- ing itself from Communist aggression.' At the beginning of 1954, with the possibility of French defeat becoming real, Eisenhower and his associates had `concentrated our efforts on attempting to convince the French and the British of the necessity for achieving a coalition which would give moral meaning to intervention . . . ' What Eisenhower wanted, in essence, was, first, British support for intervention, and, second, control over any American forces: 'I let it be known that I would never agree to send our ground troops as mere reinforcements for French units, to be used only as they saw fit.' To Churchill: 'I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground forces on your or our part.' Churchill declined to enter the de- sired coalition.
Now in all this lie the seeds of the American tragedy in Vietnam. Eisenhower desired United States intervention in the area. He desired such intervention to have a 'moral' quality or meaning. He wished also for such intervention not to be that of the United States alone, he sought for a coali- tion. and in fact subsequently accepted instead the South-East Asia Treaty Organi- sation. In general support of his line, he adumbrated the 'domino' theory. And, even before Geneva, in outlining his conditions for military intervention, he proposed imme- diate acceptance of such intervention by Thailand and the Philippines, acceptance by Australia and New Zealand after the forth- coming Australian elections, and the under- standing that the United Kingdom 'would either participate or be acquiescent'. It is interesting, but incidental, to speculate whether indeed a specific British commitment exists to 'either participate or be acquiescent'. It so happened that immediately following Geneva, the need for appreciable ground forces from the United States, or from any- "here else, did not arise. President Diem was Well enough in control in South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh was establishing his rule firmly in the North. But on 1 November 1962 Presi- dent Diem was assassinated. On 22 Novem- ber Kennedy was assassinated. In Kennedy's time at the White House the number of American troops had risen from 2.000 to 16.000. That had been necessary, so it was claimed, in order to prevent the South Viet- namese from losing the war to the Vietcong trained and supplied by Ho Chi Minh. In President Johnson's time, the American trwPis in Vietnam rose from 16,000 to 550,000; and that, it could and has been said, was necessary in order to prevent the United States from losing the war to the Vietcong.
Eisenhower wanted to intervene, but he also wanted his 'moral meaning' to interven- tion, he wanted such intervention to be in a war which was 'a clear case of freedom defending itself from Communist interven- tion' as opposed to a neo-colonial war on the part of France. His domino theory sug- gested that if Indochina went Communist the effect, as he said to Churchill, 'on our and your global strategic position .. . could be disastrous'.
Not since the early days of the Diem regime, if ever, has the civil war in South Vietnam provided 'a clear case of freedom defending itself from Communist interven- tion'. Thus any 'moral meaning' in American intervention has to be sought elsewhere. It has most plausibly been found, indeed, in the domino theory (and not, incidentally, in the 'world policeman' notion of the role of the United States). The domino theory once had much force. Now that Britain is aban- doning her military presence and responsi- bilities in south-east Asia, the domino theory would seem to lack force unless the United States takes up the responsibilities we have cast off, and does so explicitly and formally. I know of no serious demand that the United States should thus act.
There is a variant of the domino theory which is used at times to justify the Ameri- can effort in Vietnam. It is put by Arthur Schlesinger thus: 'Whether we had vital interests in South Vietnam before 1954. the Eisenhower letter [to President Diem] created those interests . . In one shape or another this argument is often used, that the United States must not renege on its pledges or its other allies will cease to trust the pledges they have received. The argument is exceedingly disingenuous. or naïve. It is a function of statesmen to loosen themselves from the bonds of their predecessors. Kennedy had plenty of choice. So had John- son. So has Nixon. These men are not bound. hand and foot, by the letters or other utterances of President Eisenhower. Treaties can and have been denounced. Theories may certainly be discarded. Obligations may be conveniently forgotten.
It will not. I think, avail men much to seek a 'moral meaning' either in such domino theories or, indeed, in the present American presence in Vietnam at all. It is not so much a question of this or that atroc- ity. The entire present American presence in Vietnam has become itself an atrocity. It did not start out that way. It may be im- possible to locate a time and place where it began to become so. But it is an atrocity now. The point is not that British' soldiers in Malaya committed atrocities. The point is that a war is being fought with terrible brutality which cannot be won; and the greater the brutality the greater the inevit- able defeat.
Had the Germans won the last war. I do not doubt that there would not have been lacking those who would have defended their 'final solution' with moral vigour. as being necessary to the state, a requirement of victory. But no one would seriously ad- vance the argument that necessity of state. raison d'etat, determines the American presence in Vietnam now, in its present form. The United States of America is gravely weakened, not strengthened, by that pre- sence. To the extent that a weakening of the United States is a weakening for all who resist communist conspiracies, we are all weakened, not strengthened, by that pre. sence. We must condemn the atrocity that that presence has become, and seek to end it. We must assist, or force, the United States off its terrible hook.
I have one practical suggestion to put for- ward. It would require a diplomatic initia- tive of some skill. It is that Britain, as the United States's most senior and most affec- tionate ally, should seek from as many other of the allies of the United States as possible a joint declaration that none of these allies would regard an American repudiation of obligations to South Vietnam mistakenly entered into by President Eisenhower and mistakenly upheld and extended by his suc- cessors as in any way weakening the force of all and any other American obligations, but would, instead, regard an American withdrawal from Vietnam as both a neces• sary act of state and a humane imperative.
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