IMPRISONMENT FOR INTENT
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] SIR,—I cannot follow up and correct in detail Mr. Gedge's column and a half in your issue of May 19th. You might not thank me. What Mr. Gedge can say, and is perhaps trying to, is that it is not fair to judge a man's present conduct on any consideration of his past record, unless—be it understood–. that record helps him. I think I should agree. Generally speaking evidence of the past is not admissible before convic- tion and Mr. Gedge is quite at liberty to try to get the law altered in those exceptional cases in which it is otherwise.
I think Mr. Gedge has got out of his depth in discussing law and practice with which he is unfamiliar. He is surely unfair to our Courts. Clearly he does not appreciate that intent must be inferred before many crimes are complete, e.g., larceny, false pretences, murder. All honour to him for his enthusiasm, but I take leave to wish him increased accuracy.
I hope that the judgement of me which he expresses is as unfair to me as it would be unworthy of him, if he were to be held accountable for his loose expressions. I am satisfied, however, that in making his imputations he had no unchristian intent. The defendant is discharged.—I am, Sir, &c.,
ALEXANDER COPPERSMITH,
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