POLITICAL RELATIONS OF RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA.
[FROM a CORRESPONDENT.]
When Frederick the Great raised Prussia to the rank of an European Power, this new state was destined by its geographical position to assume the place from which Sweden had been compelled to descend by the arms
and intrigues of Russia. From that moment the interests of Prussia and the ambitious designs of Russia were naturally brought into collision.
Russia accordingly entered the lists of the enemies of Prussia during the
seven-years war which Frederick engaged in for the purpose of consoli- dating the position he had lately taken. At the end of this war, Frederick,
being perfectly isolated, sought and obtained the alliance of the Empress Catherine, who, personally,* owed him everything. He soon, however, perceived (as he himself states in his Memoirs) that the Russian policy only aimed at making Prussia the instrument for the accomplishment of her plans, without offering any reciprocity to Prussia. After the peace of Teschen, the alliance between Russia and Prussia having been already considerably weakened, was completely dissolved ; and at the time of his death Frederick was silently occupied in prepannit obstacles to the designs of Catherine, which aimed at the destruction of Tcrkey in Europe. His successor and the Minister Hertzberg, who had been bequeathed to him by the Great King, and who was initiated in the • The Empress Catherine was a daughter of one of Frederick's Generals, and obtained the hand of the Emperor through the instrumentality of Frederick the Great. plans of Frederick, did not delay in putting them into execution by enter- ing into alliances with England and Holland, and in endeavouring to re- store to Poland her independence. But the French Revolution broke out, and completely upset the policy of Europe. Catherine of Russia preached a crusade against revolutionary France, taking" care, however, not to take any active part in it herself. One of the principal reasons which induced Prussia to sign the treaty of Basle, and to adopt the system of neu- trality which she followed, was the necessity she felt of combating more and more the plans of Russia; which country, from the shores of the Baltic to the Bug, had become the immediate neighbour of Prussia. From 1795 to 1805 the attention of Prussia was essentially directed towards the P.ast, and at the death of the Emperor Paul she was on the point of de- claring war against Russia. In 1805, the Emperor Alexander, by the personal.ascendancy he exercised over the Court of Prussia, succeeded in overthrowing the political system which that Power had hitherto pursued.
The catastrophe of 1806 was the almost immediate result, and Frederick William III completely threw himself into the arms of his Imperial friend; who emphatically declared his readiness to stand or fall with his royal ally. This, however, did not prevent the Emperor of Russia, a few months after—when Napoleon held out to him, at Tilsit, the prospect of incorporating Moldavia and Wallachia, and, perhaps, of further addi- tional territory—from abandoning his Prussian ally, and from enriching himself by the appropriation of a slice of his territory. After the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow, it was in consequence of the defection of General Yorck, and his declaration in favour of Russia, that the Russian army wero permitted to cross the Russian frontier in pursuit. It would have been only natural that Prussia should have resumed her former ter- ritory, of which she had been deprived at Tilsit in order to form the Duchy of Warsaw. When she, however, insinuated this demand, it was rejected by Russia ; who, with some difficulty, consented even to abandon to her the Grand Duchy of Posen. The generals and statesmen of Prus- sia were alarmed at the demands of Russia to push her frontiers beyond the Vistula, and even to the Wartha. General Knesebeck, one of the most distinguished members of the Prussian Cabinet, declared, in a me- moir that cannot be too often quoted in the present day, that in such an eventuality the independence of Prussia was at stake ; and that, in such a case, Prussia could only regain her position by a general European war for the balance of power, the object of which would be to throw back the Russian frontier and to diminish Russian influence. Hardenberg entertained the same opinions, and at first united with the representatives of England, Austria, and France, who struggled against the demands of Russia. But Alexander exerted his personal influence with his friend Frederick William III, who peremptorily ordered his Minister to attach himself to Russia. From that time the favourable dispositions of Lord Castlereagh towards Prussia ceased. Prussia was thenceforth regarded as the vassal of Russia, who only supported her lukewarmly; and the final result to Prussia was, the very prejudicial "delimitation" of which she still most bitterly complains.
The infatuation of Frederick William HI for Russia induced the Im- perial Cabinet to conceive the plan of gradually reducing Prussia to the position of a state dependent on Russia. Alexander's first step was to seek the hand of the eldest daughter of the King of Prussia for his brother Nicholas, who was not even then the direct heir to the throne. Frederick the Great had always repudiated the idea of "sacrificing a Princess of Prussia," (as he himself terms it in his Memoirs,) and had contented him- self with providing the hereditary Grand Dukes, afterwards the Emperors Peter and Paul, with daughters of his generals of the rank of princes. Frederick William III, however, was well pleased to grant the band of his daughter ; who accepted the honour at the price of changing her creed. It became the constant aim of Russia to win over the Prussian courtiers and influential members of the Prussian army by a deluge of Russian decorations and diamond snuffboxes,—the more so as the Prussian people manifested a constant repugnance to Russian sympathies. The Emperor Nicholas carried this principle to the greatest extent, in sedulously com- pensating Prussian employes for services rendered even to their own Sovereign, making himself appear to them in the light of a suzerain. Count Nesselrode, in a secret despatch addressed to the Grand Duke Con- stantine, and forwarded to Warsaw in 1830, emphatically termed these relations as " d'une intimite utile avec la Prusse." This tender friend- ship of the Czar for Prussia did not, however, extend itself to realities. At the separation of the Grand Duchy of Posen from the Kingdom of Poland, Alexander still managed to deprive Prussia of certain portions of territory allotted to her by treaty. Shortly after, Russia suddenly broke off a treaty of commerce into which she had entered with Prussia at the period of arranging the Polish question, merely because she found it to her own advantage to do so. Prussia submitted in silence. In 1830 the Polish Revolution broke out. Frederick the Great would probably have profited of this moment to drive back Russia across the Dwina and the Dnieper. Frederick William III most unwisely assisted the Emperor Ni- cholas in every way in his power to put down the Poles, and contributed largely to his successes. What advantage did Prussia obtain for such signal services to Russia ? Was it the restoration of the treaty of commerce ? No indeed ; it was the incorporation of Poland by Russia, (a stop as hurt- ful to the national as it was to the material interests of Prussia,) and the erection of a line of fortresses between the Vistula and the Bug, which form a vast military tote-de-pont, dangerous alike to the political in- terests and independence of Prussia. Not content with these important results, Russia has never ceased to cast a longing eye to the acquisition of the mouths of the Danube and of Dantsic, the loss of which to Prussia would have completely reduced her to the vassalage of Russia, and cost her her independence. All this, however, did not operate on the infatua- tion of Frederick William III for Russia. , It was a subject which called forth severe criticism from the Prince Royal, now Frederick Wil- liam IV. The latter knew well that the sympathies of the Prussian na- tion were not in favour of Russia ; and he was perfectly aware that any appearance of the vassalage of Prussia to Russia would create an insur- mountable barrier to the plans which Prussia might hereafter attempt to carry out in Germany through the instrumentality of the Protestant po- pulation. On succeeding to the throne, Frederick William IV sur- rounded himself with those who were known not to belong to the Rus- sian party. Almost his first decision was the fortification of Konigsberg and of Leetzen, both directed against Russia; the Polish nationality of the Grand Duchy of Posen was more protected than heretofore; a marked coldness sprang up between the brothers-in-law occupying the thrones of Prussia and Russia, which continued till 1848. At that time Russia was ably represented at the Prussian Court by Baron Meyendorff. He ingratiated himself into the Royal favour and confidence by his active efforts to put down anarchy and to restore the dignity and influence of the Sovereign : he profited of his position and the circumstances in which he was placed to organize at the Court, and round the Court, even to its most distant avenues, a compact Russian party, and won over the nobility and military to his cause by representing Russia as the only safe supporter and protector of the aristocracy. A great part of the Prussian nobility were caught by the bait. It was precisely by a similar manoeuvre that Russia had formerly captivated a portion of the Polish nobility, through whose instrumentality their country was eventually ruined. This Russian party has been since designated by the name of the "Kress Zeitung party." It comprises the whole entourage of the King. The Emperor Nicholas is far more the object of admiration and devotion of this party than his Prussian Majesty; who, however, is gracious enough not to take umbrage at this dereliction of allegiance.
A difficulty arose: the King was neither disposed to sacrifice his Ger- man aspirations nor his Minister M. de Radowitz to Russian dictation. The Czar persisted, nor did be refrain from applying openly the severest epithets towards his Royal brother-in-law. It is well known that Count Brandenburg died of a broken heart on his return from Warsaw, where he had received from the lips of the Emperor himself expressions which stung him to the quick when pleading before the Czar the cause of his country. The King, in tears, was compelled to dismiss, almost to banish for a time, his devoted friend and Minister. Then followed Olmiitz, where Prussia had to succumb to the dictation of the Czar. It is well known that the Emperor Nicholas in his confidential conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour, on referring to the European Powers and their influence on the future arrangements of the East, never once referred to Prussia ; completely placing her out of the list of the Great Powers, and treating her as if she was a tributary of his own empire.
From the foregoing remarks it may be asked, what advantage has Prussia ever derived from her alliance with Russia, who, since 1805, has almost uninterruptedly domineered over the Prussian policy ? We are unable to cite any single one; for the heroic efforts of the Prussian nation in 1813-1814 only served to place Prussia in a less advantageous position than she had occupied in 1800, more especially as concerned her military frontiers. On the contrary, the Prussian blood which was then shed only tended to give to Russia that commanding position in which she has weighed on Europe ever since that period.
Again, in the war of 1828 and 1829, which was concluded by the treaty of Adrianople, Prussia gratuitously aided in the elevation of Rus- sia. Every one conversant with history must acknowledge that the as- cending movement of Prussian power terminated in 1806—that is, with the establishment of the Russian alliance. The explanation is 'clear. Russia has constantly sought to make Prussia her satellite, and it has been, therefore, her interest to prevent Prussia from extending her in- fluence and increasing her strength. The undeviating and consistent policy of Russia has never lost sight of its aim in her relations with, Prussia, while Prussia has been constantly guided and governed in her relations with Russia by feelings of personality and sentiment.
It might, indeed, have been supposed that, when at length the great European struggle against Russia for the maintenance of the balance of power had arrived, Prussia would have gladly seized that opportunity to assert and establish her independence as a Great Power, so dangerously menaced by Russia ; and that she would have seized with avidity such a moment to safeguard her own people and the whole of Northern Ger- many, for ever, against the threatening invasion of the "barbarians," as Frederick the &mat habitually termed the Russians. If this be not so, if the Court of Prussia is completely embedded in Russian sympathies and blinded by Russian illusions, it can only be regretted that the policy of a state, that the aspirations of a free, liberal, and civilized nation, and that the great and vital interests of a whole country, should be sacrificed to the narrow-minded and selfish views of a small and fanatic party.
The King of Prussia, who is far more gifted than any of his entourage, has proved on more occasions than one that he is by no means a blind admirer of Russia, and that he is perfectly cognizant of the plans of his Imperial brother-in-law. Notwithstanding, however, he appears re- solved to abandon the cause of Germany and of civilization, in order to devote himself, like another Curtius, to the cause of the Orthodox Russian Church.
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