By Confusion Stand By ANTHONY HARTLEY DOLMCAL commentary on the
Congo from 1- the latitude of London is largely crystal- gazing. As presented in the daily press the pic- ture is not unlike that of Milton's chaos: . . . where eldest Night
And Chaos, Ancestors of Nature, hold Eternal Anarchy, amidst the noise Of endless wars, and by confusion stand.
For hot, cold, moist, and dry, four Champions fierce Strive here for Mastery, and to Battle bring Their embryon Atoms . . .
N‘Ith Mr. Hammarskjold filling the thankless role of the 'mach old' who presides over all. The criticism which is often brought against the UN and its Secretary-General is that, so far from acting in the Congo as the force of law and order, they have actually made matters worse by refusing to exercise even the small authority that a minute military force can hope to exert in a very large country. And, if this criticism were justified, it would be a very serious matter, since, as Walter Lippmann wrote during the summer, 'the UN enterprise is the most advanced and the most sophisticated experiment in inter- national co-operation ever attempted.'
Last July, when UN forces were sent to the Congo, they went to restore order at the request of the Congolese Government headed by Mr. Lumumba, and the motion in the Security Coun- cil which authorised their employment was accompanied by a request to Belgium to with- draw its troops who, after the mutiny of the Force Publique, had been employed in protecting Belgian nationals (but who had also carried out reprisals against the Congolese). Since then things have become more complicated. At present at least three different sets of forces are using the Congo as a diplomatic (and sometimes as a mili- tary) battleground.
First, there are the Congolese themselves. The struggle between Mr. Lumumba and his enemies seems to have been largely motivated by the dislike of the Congolese tribes for any govern- ment dominated by hereditary rivals—a dislike which hardened into a coalition against Mr. Lumumba's attempt to impose a central auth- ority of a rather dictatorial kind. In fact, if this attempt failed, it was probably because President Kasavubu had his own Bakongo supporters around Leopoldville, while Mr. Lumumba's source of strength was far away in Stanleyville.
Secondly, there is the game of power politics now beginning to be played with some enthu- siasm among the African States. Thus President Nkrumah's policy in the Congo seems to have been dictated to some extent by his wish to keep the leadership of African nationalism, to which the physical size of Ghana would hardly entitle him. It is nonsense to talk of him leaning towards Communism, as Mr. Herter has done, but he is certainly not influenced solely by a disinterested desire ta see order reigning at Leopoldville. Similarly, the Abbd Youlou, the Prime Minister of the ex-French Congo Republic, who has figured prominently among opponents of Mr. Lumumba, no doubt has in view the possibility of future influence on the other side of the River Congo. It is hard not to agree with the Soviet diplomat who is reported to have said that every African State with a Congolese policy was in- triguing for its own advantage.
Thirdly (and more crucially), there is outside intervention from the Great Powers. Leaving aside Belgian attempts to keep some control over the minerals of Katanga, both Russia and America have been deeply involved. The Ameri- cans, it should be noted, only acted when an influx of Soviet technicians in support of Mr. Lumumba appeared well under way. Then they subsidised Colonel Mobutu and his coup d'etut. Whether they were wise to do so is another ques- tion; by their support in the UN for Mr. Kasavubu they have turned the uncommitted Powers against them. America now is in some- thing of the same position that Britain once occu- pied in the Middle East, when it supported the Hashemites against President Nasser's Egypt. With this difference: that America is a far stronger Power than Britain.
Here any attempt at analysis breaks down. It is quite impossible to foresee the result of this complicated play of forces except to say that, on the face of it, things look badly for the future of UN action. Mr. Hammarskjold might yet succeed in imposing some settlement on the Congolese, but it is hard to see how he can possibly restrain the African rivalries which have been unleashed, still less force the US and Russia to cease their intervention. And, though I would not wish to see this point overemphasised, he will not be helped in his task by the lack of political efficiency so far displayed by the UN command.
To put it brutally, no settlement is likely, even on the purely Congolese level, unless someone is willing to knock the rival factions' heads to- gether. That someone can only be the UN, but at the moment its local commanders do not even seem to use their troops to supPress obvious atrocities, such as the reprisals carried out by Colonel Mobutu's gendarmes at Kikwit, and many of them are obviously more concerned with the policies of their home governments than with that of the UN. And this is very damaging: an ineffectual intervention is worse than none at all, since its brings international action itself into discredit.
But it would be a mistake to conclude with Mr. Khrushchev, Colonel Mobutu and the Beaverbrook press that the UN had better pack its bag and fade away. What is taking place in Africa now is a very dangerous type of Balkanisation which is slowly being polarised by the Great Powers. Unless something is done about it, events will move towards an inter- national clash which will be exceptionally liable to get out of hand, since the main antagonists will have responsibility for their African allies. but no control over them. Something must be done to put a stop to this process, and the UN is the only existing body which can take the initiative. Probably the best way of doing this would be for Mr. Hammarskjold to encourage direct negotiations between the new American administration and the Russians, but in the meantime UN forces had better stay where they are—indeed their presence appears to be the only alternative to complete disorder and the starvation of the civil population. But they must be commanded resolutely, and their political leadership must do everything it can to get some sort of agreement between the different Congo' lese factions. The round-table conference which is just opening in Brazzaville provides an oppor- tunity to produce a more viable government over the river.
As to the long-term outlook, it should be recognised that events in Africa are more likely to conform to a Balkan or South American pattern than to any other. That is, for a long time to come there will be local rivalries between local leaders, sometimes producing small out' breaks of war and always creating tension. If these clashes are exploited on every occasion by outside Powers, as they have been in the Congo, the situation will be intolerable and the danger to world peace constant. The UN is obviously suited to help quench such outbreaks, but its efficacy will depend on good will which may not be forthcoming. A more effective way of neutralising Africa might be for the African States themselves to form a regional organisa- tion to deal with disputes between members. Dr• Nkrumah's suggestion of an African high cony nand is sensible, but only if it were not made the instrument of one country's (or one grouP of countries') ambitions.
Any political commentator writing on the Congo today should not close his article with' out emphasising the potentially serious nature of the crisis. If there is a Congolese civil war. with support coming to Stanleyville from the USSR and to Leopoldville from the US, it will be Korea all over again—with far more dis' astrous implications, since it will not merely be a question of the Communists versus the rest. but the Afro-Asian bloc will be split right doNN0 the middle. For the West, participation in such a struggle would mean the elimination of the uncommitted countries and the destruction of any possible form of international arbitration.
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