SECRET ITALIAN POLITICS.* SOME suspicion naturally attaches to publications which

purport to give revelations about the doings of clandestine agents—a suspicion further enhanced by the fact of such publication being anonymous. The narrative in the volume be- fore us is, however, not apocryphal, and the documents in it are quite authentic. Nor is there any mystery as to who was the chief agent in the transactions recounted, and the virtual author of the book. He was a certain Diamilla Muller, by calling an engineer, who had a wide acquaintance amongst the active ultra-revolutionary politicians of Italy, and who got to be enrolled amongst the emissaries whom it was the constant weakness of Victor Emmanuel to be employing, on errands of espial and secret negotiation, in every conceivable quarter. These clandestine agents of the King's were numerous, and their character was often strange, not a few nor the least active being women. They would be despatched to Vienna, to Paris, to Rome, to Mazzini, to Garibaldi, and to the various political emigrations, and in nine cases out of ten this happened without being known to the Ministers, though the object which the King

• Politica hiegreta Italiana, 1863-1870. Torino : Roux o Focal°. 1880,

was striving to promote in these covert operations was not in itself incompatible with the national policy. Victor Emmanuel's nature was curiously composite,—strong, and yet with marked weaknesses ; full of manliness, and yet liable ta fits of indecision; straightforward in capital matters, yet not indisposed in minor points to have recourse to veiled processes ; a Prince who, in critical moments, evinced a true sense of his duties as a constitutional sovereign, and nevertherless, on other occasions, was restlessly ambitious of being more than a. King Log,—of having the same chief hand by stratagems of his own invention in making the fortunes of Italy, that his fore- fathers had in converting the countyship of Savoy into the kingdom of Piedmont. Much of this last feeling in Victor Emmanuel was doubtless due to the strong craving of an essen- tially soldier's temperament for the excitement of action, but also there was in him an inheritance of the astute fibre which eminently distinguished so many of his .race. He felt an in- ward impulse towards the exercise of kingcraft, which he would try to indulge by secret practices carried on through eccentric channels, and often in the strangest directions. Thus we find the representative of Italian monarchy at one period holding parley with the inveterate high-priest of Italian re- publicanism, with the view of concerted action for effecting the complete liberation of Italy from foreign domination. Tim story of this whimsical attempt at the coalition of incompatible forces is told in this volume, and constitutes its most interesting portion.

In the spring of 1863, Mazzini, then in London, was actively engaged in preparing a movement for the liberation of Venetia. It was the period just after Aspromonte, and a good deal of agitation prevailed in Italy. Muller happened to be in England, charged by the Italian Government with the purchase of muskets for the National Guard, and through him arms were secretly despatched into Switzerland for Ma.zzini's use. The latter took up his residence at Lugano, for the purpose of directing his contemplated insurrection, but soon was driven to recognise the impossibility of realising the hopes he had entertained. At this conjuncture communications with the King were opened. A letter was written by Muller, at Mazzini's suggestion and initiative, to a Turinese lawyer, Pas- tore,who was confidentially employed by the King, asking him to

ascertain of the latter whether there was any foundation for It reported engagement to give military assistance to Louis Napoleon, in certain contingencies that might arise out of the

movement in Poland. The reply was emphatically in tho nega, tive. So far Mazzini had not been expressly mentioned, but bet had been plainly indicated in Muller's' letter as the inquiring party. Five months later, in November, Mazzini addressed two letters to Muller, one for his private instruction, the other containing a programme to be submitted to the King, and. the basis on which Mazzini proffered co-operation towards the liberation of Venetia. The emphatic tone in which.

Mazzini lays down his terms is characteristic of all his commu- nications. He speaks throughout like a potentate, conscious of great power, and dictating his conditions :—

" More than a year ago, I publicly declared that I would resume. entire independence, and be bound only by the inspiration of my

conscience and by circumstances Even if I were willing to surrender my independence, the party would not do so Reserving, therefore, my freedom of action, I um desirous of not weakening in the least the union of forces for the Venetian undertaking If he who contemplates war with Austria has faith in my honour, which I never have betrayed, I declare that I believe no final victory possible without the regular army, and the intervention of Government On this head the King has, therefore, nothing to fear. I am a Republican. Possibly, I am persuaded that the poli- tical question must be mooted by me, before I die. But to raise it in, presence of Austria in this Venetian qnestion, would seem to me a crime The natural mode of operations, as indicated by circumstances, is the following :—Insurrectional initiative by the Vene- tians ; response from some bodies of Volunteers, or popular manifes- tations; intervention by tho Government The plan being, approved, the line of action is clear. A word addressed to Venetia rein- forcing that from me. Slackened action from the Executive against

us; no repressive cordons or sequestrations of ems Secret instigations to Servia, Hungary, and the Poles for simultaneous move- ments immediately after our beginning I have omitted to speak of two essential matters, as whoever has any knowledge of us must necessarily tako them for granted ; firstly, the frank declara- tion of absolute opposition to all French intervention in our war, as well as to all Italian on the Rhine ; secondly, the action of Garibaldi, who is the soul of every volunteer movement I need not add, that with this present Ministry (Minghetti's) there can be no pos- sibility of our confidence or of that of the country, which is essential for success. This letter you may communicate to the King."

In the private instructions occur these sentences

"I cannot tie myself by engagements, I can co-operate in action.

The future must be free for me Steer by these directions,

and do not overstep thorn If you make the King read my letter, watch the impression produced, specially as regards French intervention and Italian on the Rhine. Should my views be favour- ably entertained, then we will talk about fixing a date. At present it would be.premature."

The document, we are told, was transmitted, through the medium of Count Savoiroux, one of his aides-de-camp, to the King, on whom it is said to have produced a great impression. The line of action proposed coincided with his own impulses largely. Scruples of conscience came into play in respect of Rome. But to take in hand the Venetian question was to fight Austria, which Victor Emmanuel was always keen to do ; as he likewise was .constantly prone to abet national move- ments, principally represented by Hungarian and Polish • Generals, in which he saw forces naturally in alliance with those of Italy. The state of relations with Prance, however, made the King reserved about responding, though be allowed

further communications from Mazzini, in which a decision was pressed for in energetic language. In one letter, Mazzini indignantly complained of a statement that in Naples he had made pledges which had been broken by him. On March 1st, 1864, Muller was suddenly taken to the King by Count Savoiroux, and received "a note in the King's writing, which he was authorised. to transmit to Mazzini ;" it is given in full, and is signed with the King's initials. The following are the most important passages in this document :—

"I never said that I had spoken or made engagement with that individual, nor that he had made such with me. I only said that I had been indulgent to him on occasions he himself is, perhaps, not aware of I said that I could not admit of his party taking the initiative in the events which are to happen I say now, that this being admitted in principle, I am disposed to concert as is proposed, but assuming myself and my government, as soon as there is a shadow of a chance, with all the strength of the nation, the glorious mission of our country's final labour."

And the King added these earnest words at the close :—

'Let the individual bear in mind that the moment is grave, that it must be weighed with a calm brain and a warm heart ; that I and we all era wishful and bound to fulfil the great work in the shortest possible time ; but woo to us all, if we know not how to do it well, or if by engaging in rash and untimely follies, we were to come to disasters that would plunge our country back again into its old mis- fortunes."

The exhortation made no impression. Mazzini insisted on immediate action, as being rendered expedient by the Dauo- German embroilment and the fermentation in Poland. In a memorandum, dated March 19th, and given to the King, Mazzini made an urgent demand for arms, to be handed to an agent he would indicate. To this the following answer was

written :—" Turin, April 5th.—As soon as the Archduke Maximilian has left Trieste, as soon as ever the character of

the Conference of the 12th inst. [the London Conferences on the Danish Question were then sitting] is known, the individual

may send the person he wishes to take over what he requires. —V. E." This is a most remarkable paper to have come from the King's hand. The great war did not break out in the north which Mazzini predicted, with the confidence so characteristic of him ; and the Polish movement did not take the course he reckoned upon, with equal self-assurance. At this moment also occurred Garibaldi's journey to England, and it reached

the King that Mazzini was strenuously exerting his newer- ful influence on the excitable hero to kindle a perilon con-

flagration, by putting himself at the head of a rash and rildly adventurous expedition. Milller was then again dispatched in April to London by the King to restrain Mazzini, and a highly curious correspondence, to be found in this volume,

ensued, which was transmitted, partly in cipher, through the Italian Legation. It is evident that there never was a possibility of inducing Mazzini to abate any of his extreme propositions. Still, the strange negotiation was continued for several weeks, aud the King actually admitted Muller to his presence, to ex- plain the terms on which Mazzini insisted. The latter, in addition, appointed a second agent to represent him. This

agent, by name Antonio Most°, bad a long and confidential interview on May 17th with Count Castiglione, who acted.

as the King's intermediary, and an audience, to which both agents were to be admitted, was fixed for the following day. On Corning to the palace, they were, however, told by Count Cas- tiglione that, on reflection, the King had deemed it better not

-to receive them, but to put his views down on a paper, which Count Castiglione read to them, without, however, giving them

a copy. The substance of the document was in the closing sen- tence,—" That if the party was bent on attempting a movement, in spite of the emphatic opinion given that favourable time must be waited for, when he would be ready to stake throne and life, then he was determined to do his duty, to save the nation from misfortunes, and the consequences must fall on those who were the provoking agents."

This was an ultimatum which involved rupture. Mazzini addressed, indeed, in conclusion to his representative a letter meant for the King, and which was transmitted to him. Like all his letters, it is couched in a tone of haughty independence and. of proud defiance. He wrote in the style of one who dis- posed of incalculable forces, and, treated on a footing of perfect equality :—

" I regret that my envoy was not received. I find it singular to make reference to what happened in the past concerning others. I answer only for my own self. If confidence is placed in me, one must come to an understanding direct with me ; if there is no con- fidence, then all intercourse is useless and unintelligible. Leaving aside now these particulars, and taking into consideration the letters of March 9th and the contents of that of the 17th, it is clear we cannot understand each other I recognise that 1 have been under a delusion, and I renounce continuation of a useless intercourse. Lot each follow out, as best he can, what is inspired by

love of' country and national honour • I therefore retire, and retain my liberty, free from every tie except that of my own conscience,—a domain wherein kings and citizens are equal.

I hold war with Austria to be urgent and reason- able ; I hold it should be commenced in Venetia, and followed up by Volunteers and by the Monarchy. I hold it to be a grave fault to let the moment slip. Therefore I exert myself, and I shall continue to exert myself, for its promotion. Should the Government interpose obstacles there will clearly remain to me, for attainment of any scope—national unity— only to attempt a radical change in the order of things that stand in the way I request you to make known there any final de- termination. I shall not again write on the subject. In conclusion, am glad to tell you that on this occasion you have acted faithfully and in a manner to merit my esteem."

It will be difficult to match such a document addressed to a King by a refugee conspirator. From Mazzini, there was,how- ever, nothing singular in the tone. This was by no means the

only covert correspondence with which Miiller was concerned, and it must be admitted that through all Mazzini's letters there runs the same spirit of inflexible and dictatorial self- assurance. The various episodes related in this volume have each their interest; they illustrate the great difficulties, but in- adequately appreciated at the time by the public, which had to be encountered by responsible politicians in charge of the great work of national reconstruction, left incomplete by Cavour. The undeniable authenticity of the documents given make this volume of value to whosoever may care for the history of these eventful years, thought none of the chapters, in our opinion, contains matter of a more suggestive nature than that which narrates the anomalous negotiation we have selected as a speci- men of its contents.