THE KAISER AT THE WIRE. T HE Kaiser's smiles are sometimes
more embarrassing than his frowns. A better instance of this can hardly be desired than his recent telegram to Count Goluchowski. The feeling expressed in it, indeed, is natural enough. In the Algeciras Conference the Austro-Hungarian delegate did undoubtedly render Germany a conspicuous service. It was more conspicuous, perhaps, than real, because when on March 8th Count Welsersheimb laid the Casablanca project before the Conference the terms had doubtless been settled in consultation with M. de Radowitz. Still, when chestnuts have to be taken from the fire, it is convenient to have some one to pull them out, and to accept a suggestion of compromise put forward by another Power was probably pleasanter to the German Government than to have to come forward with one of its own. The Casablanca proposal was not, it is true, accepted by France, but it prepared the way for the plan which was eventually agreed on, and Germany for the first time in the proceedings it exhibited in the character' of a peacemaker. Matters were coming to a point at which there seemed nothing left for the delegates to do save to return to their several homes. Inconvenient as this conclusion would have been for Europe, it would have been most so for Germany. By preventing this catastrophe Count Goluchowski has earned the gratitude of other Powers besides Germany ; but the German Emperor loves to express his emotions in open telegrams. Hence the message, which may have been meant to rejoice Count Goluchowski, but must at the same time have necessitated a large amount of explanation to the various European Chancelleries.
For, however it be looked at, it does involve a consider- able departure from the form which such messages commonly wear. When the European Powers meet in Conference to settle a difference which has arisen between two of their number, they are not supposed to take sides with either of the parties. They are there to mediate, to smooth away difficulties, to suggest compromises, and generally to prevent the dispute from finding its issue in war. The assumption of any other attitude than this would tend to divide Europe into two camps, and so defeat the object for which the Conference has been called together. A Power which avowedly went into conference with its mind made up on the merits of the matter to be arranged might almost as well have declined to be repre- sented at it by a delegate of its own. If Austria-Hungary had no part to play at Algeciras but that of a backer of Germany, Count Welsersheimb might have remained at Vienna, and the support which the Kaiser wanted have been administered by despatches to the various Powers who might from time to time need. to be reminded that to quarrel with William IL meant to quarrel with Francis • Joseph. ];t follows from tkis that the closer this descrip- tion comes to the actual policy of Austria-Hungary, the more anxious Count Goluchowski would be to keep the fact concealed. In an assembl3' such as the Algeciras Conference a single representative may exercise unexpected influence if at a critical, moment he shows a way out• of a difficulty which had threatened to wreck the work of the deggates and send them home empty-banded. But the value of the suggestion will depend•upon the sincerity with which it is offered. It will be worthless if it is known to have its origin in the desire of the Power which offers it, not to make the Conference a success, but to serve the interests of its own friend. When Count Welsersheimb laid his Memorandum before the delegates, and " hoped that the conciliatory spirit in which it had been prepared would commend it to the favourable consideration of his colleagues," the immediate effect might have been quite different if for " conciliatory spirit " he had substituted "consistent determination to play the game of Germany." ' Tjie influence of Austria-Hungary would have been wasted, and the help she might otherwise have given her ally would have been sacrificed to a barren assertion of her goodwill. Tactics of this order would have been as injurious to German success as to Austro-Hungarian credit. They would only have demonstrated Count Welsersheimb's ignorance of the rudiments of diplomacy.
The real strangeness of such a message as the Kaiser's lies in this, that he must be at least as well aware as every one else of the imprudence of sending it. Let us assume that the relations between Austria-Hungary and Germany were precisely what they have been from time to time described in the German official Press, that the Austro- Hungarian delegate was instructed simply to take his cue from M. de Radoivitz, and that in order to leave no 'room for mistake he had been furnished with a Memorandum from the Kaiser himself,—what would have been the substance of this document ? Can we doubt that from one end of it to the other it would have breathed nothing but warnings not to let the agreement between the two Powers become public. Never forget,' the Kaiser would have written, ' that the value of the aid you are directed to render me depends wholly on its being supposed, at all events outside the Conference, to be rendered to the cause which has the right on its side.
You are sent to Algeciras to discover whose that cause is, and it is only because the evidence leaves you in no doubt upon this point that you will finally declare yourself of my opinion.' We cannot doubt that this is the Kaiser's theory on the subject, when he stops long enough to have a theory. His practice as embodied in the undated telegram to Count Goluchowski is curiously unlike his theory. "Yon have proved yourself a brilliant second on the duelling-ground" may be a very pretty compliment, but it is hardly one that a Minister for Foreign Affairs expects or desires to receive from a foreign Sovereign in return for services rendered at a European Conference. One obstacle which stands in the way of our complete appreciation of William IL's singu- larly interesting personality is that we have ceased to measure him by any received standard of human action. We think it strange, no doubt, that he should address Count Goluchowski in this fashion, but we do not realise how strange it is until we imagine, say, the French President sending a similar message to Sir Edward Grey. It is fortunate, perhaps, for the German Emperor that he has made good his claim to be as indiscreet as he pleases, and that only the minimum of mischief follows upon his words. There is, indeed, another conceivable explanation of the message. What if the Kaiser were not quite as satisfied as he proclaims himself with the action of Austria- Hungary at the Congress ? What if the support he expected from her was given less unreservedly than he wished ? Then it would be quite in keeping with his character that he should try to secure the credit of an alliance in which he had ceased to have much faith. did not get much out of Goluchowski'—so he might have said to himself—' but if I thank him with sufficient heartiness all the world outside the Confer- ence Chamber will believe that I got it. That is a fair second-best in the way of successes, and with that I must for the time be content.' Even a German Emperor may feel that in the actual condition of Europe complete isola- tion is a dangerous luxury, and that the goodwill of Austria-Hungary is pretty well thg last of his international assets. The want of judgment s'hown by this telegram is pretty much the same whether we take it as expressing the Kaiser's real feeling towards Austria-Hungary, or only the feeling which he wishes the world to attribute to him. In the one case, he deprives Austro-Hungarian support of any European importance it might otherwise have had. In the other, he makes it the wise course for Count Goluchowski to convince Europe at the earliest oppor- tunity that the praise bestowed on him is unmerited.
Whichever of these interpretations we put upon the tele- gram, the moral it suggests is pretty well the same. There is enough of uncertainty about Austro-Hungarian prospects to give her statesmen genuine uneasiness about the future. The conjunction of an ally such as Germany on one side of the frontier with a strong Pan-German party on the other side is not without ominous meaning. But Austria- Hungary will not, it may be hoped, be left to regard the Kaiser as her only friend, or an alliance with Germany on German terms as her only policy. Europe as a whole is intimately concerned. in the dominions of Francis Joseph descending to a single heir, and not contributing to the further disturbance of the existing equilibrium by the transfer of any part of them to another Power. When, therefore, the Kaiser bids Count Goluchowski reckon on similar service from him, the promise may possibly be prompted by his fear of some rearrangement of European alliances which would make Austria-Hungary independent of any such dangerous support. International relations are seldom governed by purely disinterested con- siderations, and wherever Austria-Hungary might find allies, it would be for other reasons .than her own indi- vidual advantage. But there are degrees of self-interest, and an alliance which has for its object the maintenance of peace, and as a means to this end the discouragement of territorial change, is at all events more serviceable** Europe than one which is directed to the aggrandisement of a particular Power. Nations have not always the opportunity of choosing between the two, and when this opportunity is wanting they must do the best they can for themselves. But it would be a misfortune for the world if Austria-Hungary should find herself in this solitary position, and there are encouraging signs that the European barometer does•not point in that direction.
Previous page
