THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. T HE American nation has a dual personality.
Americans are at once the most idealistic and the most practical people in the world. They vibrate between Emerson and Edison. That this should be so is neither strange nor unreasonable. It is, indeed, exactly what would be expected by anyone who has realized that supreme truth which made Wordsworth say that
Passion Is highest reason in a soul sublime."
The yearning for—even the dreaming of—ideals is no bar, but rather a stimulant, to action.
This duality in the American nature was well illustrated by the opening of the Washington Conference. President Harding, in wise, serene.and moving words, worthy of his great predecessors in office, and worthy also of the tre- mendous occasion on which he spoke, moved wholly in the idealistic sphere and spoke of a war-wearied world, hungry and thirsty for better relations, craving for the assurance of lasting peace. Here are some of his actual 'words :- "All of us demand liberty and justice. There cannot be one without the other, and they must be held the unquestioned po8session of all peoples. Inherent rights are of Godand the tragedies of the world originate in their attempted denial. The world to-day is infringing their enjoyment by arming to defend or deny them, when simple sanity calls for their recog- nition through common understanding. Out of the cataclysm of the world war came new fellowships, new convictions, new aspirations. It is ours to make the most of them."
Equally lofty was his welcome to the members of the Conference :- " Gentlemen of the Conference, the United States welcomes You with unselfish hands. We harbour no fears ; wo have no sordid ends to serve ; we suspect no enemy ; wo contemplate or apprehend no conquest. Content with what we have we Eeek nothing which is another's. We only wish to do with you that finer and nobler thing which no nation can do alone, we irish to sit with you at the table of international understanding and good will. In good conscience we are eager to meet you frankly, and we invite and offer co-operation." President Harding maintained this lofty note to the end :- " Wholly free from guile, sure in our minds that we harbour no unworthy designs, we accredit the world with the same good intent. So I welcome you, not alone in good will and high purpose, but with high faith. Wo are met for the service of mankind. In all simplicity, in all honesty, and in all honour, there may be written hero the avowals of a world-conscience refined by the consuming fires of war and made more sensitivo by the anxious aftermath. I hope for that understanding
which will emphasize the guarantees of peace, and for commit- ments to less burden and a better order which will tranquillize the world. In such an accomplishment there will be added glory to your flags and ours, and the rejoicing of mankind will make transcending music for all succeeding time."
With the words that we have just quoted still ringing in their ears, the delegates turned to listen to Mr. Hughes, President of the Conference and the American Secretary of State—the High Minister in whose hands is the American department of foreign relations. Mr. Hughes instantly turned his face to the imperative need of the hour—to the practical question of reducing naval expendi- ture. A man less eager in the cause of humanity, a man more timid or more conventional, might have thought it right or appropriate either to adjourn or else to have a Committee appointed to make specific proposals for Disarmament. Happily Mr. Hughes, fully supported, we may be sure, by President Harding and his Cabinet and the delegates from the Senate and from both Parties of the State, showed no such hesitancy, finesse, or mock humility. The Government of the United States recog- nized, and rightly recognized, the greatness of the position occupied by America, partly through the fact that she is the strongest, the richest, and the least exhausted of all the Powers of the World, and partly because of the geographical position which she holds midway between East and West, between Asia and Europe, between the Atlantic and the Pacific. That gives her in a special degree the right of audience to the whole world. Mr. Hughes went straight to the point of naval dis- armament, or rather to the limitation of naval armament, leaving the politics of the Pacific for the moment in abeyance. After a short reminder that the policy of America had always been a policy of common disarmament, and after pointing out the significance of the fact that the Imperial German Government in 1907 expressed itself as absolutely opposed to the question of disarmament, and that the German Emperor " threatened to decline to send delegates if the subject of disarmament was discussed," Mr. Hughes went on to say that the present Conference had been called, not for general resolutions for mutual advice, but for action." At once he came to his concrete proposal. The essential of that proposal is a ten years' holiday from naval construction by the United States, Great Britain and Japan. But America proposes to go beyond the naval holiday. She desires, as it were, to antedate that holiday. The United States is now completing the programme of 1916—a programme which included the construction of ten new battleships and six battle-cruisers. Of these one battleship has been com- pleted and the others are in various stages of construction. In some cases from 60 per cent. to 80 per cent. of the construction has been completed. In order, however, to bring about the immediate limitation of disarmament, the United States proposes, if her plan is adopted, " to scrap all the capital ships now under construction." This means scrapping six battle-cruisers and seven battleships on the ways and in the course of construction, and two battleships that have already been launched. That is, the United States proposes to scrap fifteen new capital ships with a tonnage, when completed, of 618,000 tons. Next, she proposes to scrap all the older battleships up to . but not including the ' Delaware' and the ' North Dakota.' That would mean the scrapping of fifteen ships, with a total tonnage of 227,740 tons. Thus the United States proposes to scrap thirty ships, with an aggregate tonnage, actual and potential, of 845,740 tons. If Great Britain is to follow this lead in the spirit and the letter, she will stop the further construction of four Hoods, new capital ships which are not laid down but upon which money has been spent. These four ships, when completed, would have a tonnage displacement of 172,000 tons. Next, she would, in addition, scrap her pre- Dreadnoughts, second-line battleships and first-line battle- ships up to but not including the ' King George V.' class. This, together with the pre-Dreadnoughts which have already been scrapped, would amount to nine- teen battleships with a tonnage reduction of 411,373 tons. In all, therefore, Great Britain would scrap an actual or potential tonnage of 583,375 tons. Japan, to come into line, would abandon her programme of ships laid down, which includes eight battleships and four battle- cruisers. This does not involve the stopping of construc- tion, as the construction of none of these ships has yet been begun. Next, she would have to scrap three capital ships in course of construction, four battleships in course of construction, and two battleships not yet laid down, but for which material has been assembled.
The total number of new capital ships which Japan would scrap under this part of the scheme would be seven, and the total tonnage of these new capital ships, when completed, would be 289,100 tons. Thirdly, she would scrap all pre-Dreadnoughts and battleships of the second line. This would mean the scrapping of all ships up to but not including the Sottsu,' i.e., the scrapping of ten ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons. The total reduction of tonnage, actual and potential, would then be 448,928 tons.
It will be seen that under Mr. Hughes' plan there would be an immediate destruction in the three Navies of 66 capital ships, built and building, and a total tonnage of 1,878,013 tons. The proposals, if carried out, would leave America with eighteen capital ships, Great Britain with twenty-two, and Japan with ten. The United States would have 500,650 tons, Great Britain 601,450 tons, and Japan would have 299,700 tons. Finally, there comes the proposal as to replacement. For ten years there will be no replacement ; but after that, and when replacement begins, that replacement shall be limited by the agreed maximinn of ship tonnage—i.e., the United States 500,000 tons, Great Britain 500,000 tons, and Japan 300,000 tons.
Subject to the ten year limitation and this maximum standard, capital ships might be replaced when they are twenty years old by new capital ship construction. There is, however, to be an absolute maximum tonnage for any ship, and that maximum is to be 35,000 tons. As for smaller ships and auxiliary craft, they are to be limited in strict proportion to the capital ships. These last are the unit of limitation.
Mr. Hughes, wisely reticent, contented himself with four sentences of comment on his tremendous proposals :— " With the acceptance of this plan, the burden of meeting the demands of competition in naval armaments will be lifted. Enormous sums will be released to aid the progress of civili- zation. At the same time, the proper demands of national defence will adequately bo met and the nations will have ample opportunity during the naval holiday of ten years to consider their future course. Preparation for offensive naval war will atop now."
We are delighted to see the statement that our delegates, naval and diplomatic, have greeted these wise proposals of the United States with the utmost satisfaction. They certainly are in essence fair and just, though it is of course possible that when they are discussed in detail some weak points may be discovered and put right. In any case, no one can say that an attempt has been made by the United States. to propose a scheme which, though it looks on, paper fair to all the Powers concerned, in reality would give an advantage to herself. The scheme may very likely turn out to be improvable, but we are convinced that the proposal was made not only without guile or cynical selfishness, but with a noble sincerity of purpose.
The Japanese, not unnaturally, in what we may without offence call an English-speaking Conference, were more guarded in their approval. There seems, however, to be hope that they will not merely come into line, but will be glad to do so—glad, that is, to lift the great burden of armament from off their shoulders. But here, no doubt, will come the crux of the Conference. If Japan agrees to a naval holiday, which, we must admit, will maintain her relative naval inferiority to Great Britain and America, she is certain to ask to be compensated for giving up what she believes to be a good chance of securing the com- mand of the sea. she is frank she will say that her Navy was not built for self-defence, but in order to secure to her those rights in the Far East and on the Asiatic mainland which she considers as hers in virtue of her military and naval prowess, her enterprise, and above all her necessity—owing to her growing population and expanding trade. She went into the Naval Auction in _ardor. to ..make the rest of the world accept her at her own valuation, which is naturally very high. We cannot wonder if she insists that before she gives up her great imperial design, and• so weakens herself in that settlement of the Asiatic problem which is bound to come sooner or later, she must know where her sphere of expansion is to be. In other words, there is no small probability of her saying that, though we Anglo-Saxons talk a great deal about the open door, our talk generally seems to end in every available door being tightly closed to Japan.
That there is a real desire in America, quite as much as in Britain, to do the fair thing by Japan is certain, so long as it can be done without robbing China or rousing China, not as we want her to be roused, to trade enterprise and good government, but to a sense of injury, so deep that it may at last provoke her millions to that uprising which the Western World has dreaded ever since its first acquaintance with the Middle.. Kingdom. We must try to give Japan reasonable satisfaction, but we must also make it clear to her that what. we want to bring to the world is peace and not a new type of sword. If her demands should unhappily include anything which would make for future unsettlement rather than for true peace in China and the Far East generally, they cannot be granted. Though we are full of hope that the Conference may achieve the desires of its conveners, are more than satisfied with the spirit in which America is acting, and accept her concrete proposals, what really matter: is something bigger than even the problem of Disarmament. Immense as is, we admit, the practical value of Disarmament, and immense as will be the relief to the British taxpayer if it can be carried out, as we believe it can, that is not the supreme issue. What really matters at the Conference, not merely to us, but to the world at large, is the cementing of the blood brotherhood between the two halves of the English-speaking race, the " hand-fastening " of Britain and America. If that can be accomplished—fully, fairly, justly and permanently—the world has stopped reeling. She moves once more steady in her course. While we and America stand united the world cannot fall into ruin. The burden might be heavy, but we can and would together act as the pillars of Hercules. United we stand ; disunited use fall and the world falls with us. Quis separabit ? Who will dare to separate those whose union can accomplish as much for mankind /
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