TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS.
TRE is at the present moment probably more prospect of an effective European intervention to secure a certain amount of autonomy for the Herzegovina and Bosnia than there has been since the beginning of the outbreak; and though the mutual jealousies of the Powers may once more destroy the hope, we believe now that England may, if she pleases, turn the scale in favour of such an intervention, and by that means restrain Servia and Montenegro effectually from the war policy into which they seem more and more likely to rush. That Russian influence is being exerted with energy to secure some substantial concession to the insurgent Slays there can be no doubt, and that this is regarded by too many English- men as a sufficient reason why England should thwart that policy, there can also be no doubt. For our own parts, we take a very different view. We believe that, looking at the matter even in the most selfish light, we should be increasing and not diminish- ing the power exerted by Russia in the South-East of Europe, if we again throw ourselves into the false position of a mere prop to Turkey, and ignore the wretchedness of the populations driven, generation after generation, into rebellion, rather than acquiesce in the oppression they suffer. It is futile to say, as so many do say, that the barbarous Mohammedan Govern- ment is no worse for the Christians than barbarous Christian Governments would be for Mohammedans. That may be quite true. But the alternative is not between a barbarous Mo- hammedan empire and a barbarous Christian empire, but be- tween a barbarous Mohammedan empire and a network of barbarous Christian States. Centralisation is a benefit only where the Central Power is really far superior in its traditions and civilisation to the provincial and local powers which would supersede it. Highly centralised powers wielded by any really barbarous Power,—even though it be not more barbarous than the local provinces it rules,—are a pure evil. Barbarous pro- vinces will rule themselves badly, but they will rule themselves much better than a barbarous tyrant will rule them. They will try to remove the evils the pangs of which they feel, but a barbarous tyranny will only try to remove the evils the pangs of which the tyrant feels. We do not in the least deny that the Christian Insurgents of Herzegovina and Bosnia are probably quite as cruel and vindictive as the Mohammedan caste which strives to keep them down. But not the less the breaking-up of the rude Turkish Empire into provincial com- partments with a real autonomy, must end in a great allevia- tion of the mischiefs complained of, and,—what is more to the purpose from the Turkish point of view,—a great diminu- tion of that vindictive feeling against the Porte which results from her local misrule. So long as Russia incessantly pleads for these autonomies, and the Powers which dread Russia only ignore the real gain they imply, Russian influence in the East of Europe will go on spreading, and go on eclipsing that of less sagacious States. If we oppose these autonomies, it will be said, and justly said, that England, from motives of a petty jealousy, is obstructing that natural and wholesome disintegration of the Turkish Empire which must precede any real advance of South- Eastern Europe in civilisation. It is our true policy to support the representations of Russia, while holding to our own view of the best mode of giving effect to them. No doubt Russia would prefer to see the creation of very large units of Slavic autonomy, whereas England would prefer to see very small units,—and as we hold, would have a perfectly sound disinterested, as well as a sound interested reason, for that preference. Of course Russia wants to stimulate the passion of Slavic nationality. That is not the English cue, and what is more, it is not for the interest of the Turkish provinces that they should be aggregated into large States. Small local govern- ments, externally dependent on Turkey, but not governed by Turkey, would offer infinitely more chance of a good local representation than large and ambitious Slavic States, always dabbling in a foreign policy of their own, and too large for anything like efficient institutions of popular representation. England would have the strongest ground, if, while going a mile with Russia, she refused, probably with the active con- currence a Austria and Germany, to travel with her the whole Russian league. But while we either resist an essential reform, or stand aside indifferently, saying that it is no business of ours to assist in breaking up Turkey, we put Russia in the right, and ourselves in the wrong.
Our hopes for something like an efficient intervention are not
founded solely on the attitude of Russia, and the difficulty of restraining Servia and Montenegro from going to war unless some satisfaction for the grievances of the Insurgents can be obtained. We feel a growing persuasion that Germany will use her great influence for the same end, though not per- haps in the form in which Russia would desire it. Almost every journalist in England knows the peculiar character of the Times' special letters from Berlin. Their news is often singularly incorrect, but it is always news which the German Foreign Office, for some reason or other, wishes to be believed ; and now for a long time these letters have taken a very remarkable line as to the Herzegovina insurrection. Day after day they have brought out in strong relief every element of news which seemed favourable to the insurgents, often grossly exaggerating the character of their suc- cesses, and keeping as much as possible out of sight the far more formidable successes of the Turkish troops. Day after day, they have insisted that the situation was growing more grave and more likely to demand intervention, when, as far as every other source of information went, the situation seemed to be grow- ing less grave for Turkey, and more like a complete sup- pression of the rebellion. This character of the limes' special news from Berlin,—which always represents, by no means, indeed, official belief, but at least an undercurrent of official suggestion and intention,—has grown more marked than ever during the last few days ; and coupling it with the great features of Prince Bismarck's policy for the South-East of Europe,—the policy which sent Prince Charles of Hohen- zollern to Roumania, and encouraged Austria to move her politi- cal centre of gravity nearer to Prague, while refusing to rob her of her civilising German elements of strength,—we cannot think we can be wrong in holding that Germany favours secretly, if not avowedly, the policy of intervention, and of putting an end to. the Turkish administration of the disaffected provinces,. though not, of course, as yet to the Turkish suzerainty over them. It is certain that Austria must favour the same policy, so long as no new impulse is given to Panslavism ; and if iii be so, the adhesion of England would certainly turn the balance, and secure such a joint Note to Turkey as it would be impossible for that weak and bank- rupt power to refuse to listen to. Such a represen- tation would powerfully reinforce the peace party in Servia, because it would meet all the legitimate expectations. of the reasonable members of the war party. So, and so only,. indeed, we suspect, can the Servian Parliarq,ent be restrained from openly declaring war on Turkey, and perhaps plunging all the dependencies of Turkey into a war of which no one could, with any approach to probability, forecast the result. Certainly, at the present moment, the political leash by which Servia, is held-in is being strained to the utmost. And there can be no relaxation of the strain, without a promise of obtaining, without war, some of the chief objects at which those who. are waging the war aim. Those objects have been put for- ward by the Insurgent leaders with singular moderation and sagacity. And unless England vies with Russia in attempting to secure some of them for the suffering pro- vinces, it seems very likely that, without benefiting Turkey at all, she will seriously injure herself. Indeed Constantinople will be rather safer, instead of less safe from the Russian grasp, if the Herzegovina and Bosnia can be secured against the miseries which vex them into periodic insurrection. And even if it were not so, no good will ever come of the cynical policy which ignores the wretchedness of multi- tudes, in order to maintain against Russia the dominion of the seas.
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