SECOND ACT
DEBATE there was bound to be, as soon as the Govern- ment announced its decision to accept Nasser's terms. Not primarily on the decision itself, which has for so long been known to be inevitable that opposition to it seems rather contrived—a genuflection to the events and emotions of last November with very little relevance to the facts of today. But because the announcement provides a suitable occasion for considering the whole Suez affair. The real sur- prise is how little effect Suez and its repercussions have had on the British political scene. In its big climb-down the Government has shed some of its supporters on the Right, but for the most part they were people who had become dis- gruntled long before Suez. Quite apart too from their own capabilities they cannot have great influence; because they are even more determined than the rest of the Conservative Party to keep the Socialists out, they would not vote with the Labour Party. And they can rebel with impunity because their constituency associations are behind them. (The Conservative Left, on the other han4, could exert influence, both because it might in the last resort be prepared to bring down the Government and because its views and ideas are rather more practical; but its members know that if they rebel they will not be readopted next time. Rebellion from the Right there- fore is possible but ineffective; rebellion from the Left would be effective but is impossible.) True, all this means little enough. Lord Salisbury's talk of capitulation, and the Suez Groupers' references to appeasement, are both absurdly wide of the mark : all that the Government has done is accept the inevitable. Still, acceptance of the inevitable can be humiliat- ing, if for months past your policy has been based on refusal to accept it; and there could have been no great cause for surprise if the Government were now held in general con- tempt. Yet it is not. Its standing is perhaps even rather higher in the country than it was a couple of months ago.
Partly, of course, this is due to the weakness of the Opposi- tion. The Labour Party has had innumerable opportunities, and it has munificently muffed them. But the real reason lies in the essential political stability of the country whenever it is not disrupted by external emotional issues. Suez was one such; but from the moment that British troops were with- drawn—when British interest in the Middle East collapsed— the reaction was not to overthrow the Government for its incompetence, but to regard Suez as irrelevant—to go back to the political situation as it stood before last November. The inability of the Government to avoid accepting the in- evitable has not been taken as a sign of weakness; it has been taken as read.
How little party politics now matter can be judged in any suburban pub on any Sunday morning, when a visitor from another country, unused to native ways, might be pardoned for gaining the impression that Aneurin Bevan is the leader of the Tory Party. Mr. Macmillan's reputation at Westminster now stands high; but he has not yet established himself as a commanding national figure.
In the circumstances, the resignations of the Suez rump were illogical. The game, after all, Was played—or at least started—according to their rules. The Government acted in November as the Suez Groupers had always urged it to act. When the coup failed they had the choice then of resigning, or shrugging their shoulders, acting the good loser, and telling each other, 'Better luck next time.' To wait until now to resign is absurd : a gesture of political frustration. Even so, it may be taken as an honourable, if misguided, gesture; at least the resigners come out of the affair better than some of their colleagues, who have let their loud mouths be silenced with the Government gob-stoppers of promise or preferment.
So ends Act One. But Act Two may well turn out to be even more difficult. The essential problem remains : the rela- tions between Israel and the Arab States. At the moment the Israelis are making up their minds when to send a ship through the Canal. Not 'whether' : when. The American argu- ment will almost certainly be what the British argument used to be : not just yet! Wait—the Israelis will be told—until tempers have cooled : until Nasser sees that he can no longer rely on the support of the other Arab States on the question of the freedom of passage, or until economic pressure brings him to his knees.
It is unlikely that the Israelis will be prepared to accept this argument._ They have heard it too often. Nor is it likely that they will be prepared to wait for the judgement of The Hague Court, or of whatever other international body may be chosen to arbitrate. The Israelis can hardly be blamed if they come to the conclusion that the issue will have to be freed, sooner or later, and that it might as well be sooner. If so, the refusal by the Egyptians to let an Israeli ship through the Canal would be a declaration of war.
Naturally this is a dangerous situation; but it will not be made less dangerous simply by telling the Israelis to be patient and all will be well. They have no cause to take our word for it. There is .consequently no point in the Govern- ment using what little influence it has left to deter Israel from action. What further climbing-down has to be done will have to be done by Nasser. We have put ourselves in a position where we have few sanctions in our grasp; but what we have can at least be used to secure this one benefit—the only bene- fit, it may turn out to be, from the whole Suez affair—that the shipping of all nations can once again go through the Canal without fear or favour.
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