MIDDLE EAST MYTHOLOGY

SIR,—Further to Ian Gilmour's recent article on the Middle East, may I ask you to examine the two following propositions?

Proposition A Nasser = Suez Fiasco; Suez Fiasco = Someone Betrayed Us; Someone Betrayed Us = Rotters in Positions of Power; Ratters in Positions of Power= Empah in Danger.

QED Nasser = Empah in Danger.

but Proposition B

Nasser = Crime of Suez; Crime of Suez = Wicked British Government; Wicked British Government = The Establishment; The Establishment = Social Injustice; Social Injustice = Angry Young And All They Stand For,

QED Nasser = Angry Young Men A ATSF.

Of course, the terms of reference chosen for these two propositions may be false; it may be that Colonel Nasser, like most politicians, is a compound of good and bad moral qualities, instead of being either one or the other. Let us try.

GOOD

(a) Has restored the self-respect of the world's Most abject nation.

(b) Really intends to raise their standard of living.

(c) Seems to be able to run Egypt without corrup- tion for the first time since before the Pharaohs.

(d) Thinks that all Arabs should run their OWI3 affairs.

(e) Has generally hastened a process that was in- evitable anyway. BAD (a) Is a military dictator with a kind of Fascist State.

(b) Refuses to face some important facts. (Israel is a fact.) (c) Uses disquieting terms such as 'extermination' and makes reference to 'short and bestial' wars in connection with Israel.

(d) Interferes in the affairs of other Arab States.

(e) Leaves electrifying fiction matter such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion hanging around his office. (For a Prime Minister, this is worse than a crime; it is a blunder.)

Perhaps it is absurd to try to impose an arithmetical shape on the character and career of Colonel Nasser. However, the attempt was made in good faith. The idea is to try to avoid choking with emotion, either pro or anti, every time his name is mentioned. In this way, some reasonable quality of judgment might be brought to bear on Middle East matters, from which all sorts of interesting results might come.

For instance, we might stop looking under the bed every night for Colonel Nasser. Equally, with a detachment born of steady nerves, we might speculate whether his latest announcement of wicked Com- munist plots in Iraq is not connected, in some way, with Brigadier Kassim's refusal to follow the path of General Neguib (whatever became of him, anyway?). Apart from this, we might start to see the facts of life as they really are and shape a Middle East policy accordingly.

Bushey Heath, Hens