LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM.
1.10 THE EDITOR OP THY " SPEOTAT0141
Sra—The Times, the other day, called those who opposed the late vote for the physiological laboratory at Oxford, "well- meaning, but irrational opponents of scientific freedom." The phrase is well put, and the cry of " scientific freedom " is a taking one. It may be worth while to examine whether it is not really more taking than rational.
The cry of " scientific freedom " comes, I presume, from those who ask for unfettered freedom of action for " science," as science, as distinguished from those who defend experiments on animals as having a practical object for the benefit of mankind. They would, I imagine, justify animal suffering when inflicted simply for the advance of physiological knowledge, otherwise there seems no meaning in the words "scientific freedom." The other class, I imagine, would justify such experiments only when they are really likely to lessen human suffering. I am not at present concerned with this last argument, to which, in itself, I have never objected. The question as to the other position really comes to this. Is it lawful to seek for knowledge by means which would be confessedly blameworthy, if they were used for some other object P Now, assuming that " science " simply means" " knowledge," and that one branch of knowledge has as much right to the name of " science " as another, let us put three kinds of know- ledge side by side, and see how they stand.
First, there is the knowledge of political facts and of all that directly or indirectly illustrates political facts. This form of science we call history. Some of us venture to hope that this branch of science is now and then of practical advantage for practical politics. But whether this be so or not, some of us follow this branch of science for its own sake, believing that knowledge of this kind is a worthy object of man's pursuit. If their studies lead to any practical result, so much the better ; if they do not, they have at least improved their own minds, and they have done no harm to man or beast.
Secondly, there is the knowledge of the earth and of every- thing to do with it, its present condition, and the changes which it has gone through. This form of science we call geology. That this branch of science is often of very great practical value, nobody doubts. But I conceive that a genuine geologist will study Ids subject just as zealously, whether it leads to any practical -results or not. If it does, so much the better; if not, he, too, has improved his own mind, and has done no harm to man or beast.
Thirdly, there is the new science of "physiology," i.e., the narrow sense which that name has somehow got. It is distin- guished from the elder science of natural history, which was satisfied to know the outsides of animals, and their insides as studied by dissection after death. Physiology seems to mean knowing the insides of living animals, knowing how those in- sides will be affected by all kinds of processes, whet will happen to this or that part, if you do this or that to it. We are told that this kind of knowledge, like the other two, has its practical use, in the improvement of the art of medicine. But it is as certain as in the other two cases that the votaries of this branch of knowledge follow it for its own sake, whether it leads to such practical results or not. They say, like the historians and the geologists, that their study is good in itself, and improves their own minds.
Hence comes the difference between this branch of science and the other two. The physiologist cannot say, as the historian and the geologist can say, that the means by which he gains his knowledge hurts neither man nor beast. Not a few beasts have been put to great pain—and there was a time when some men were also—for the sake of the advancement of knowledge of this kind. The means or study of the historian and the geologist are not open to any shadow of doubt on any moral ground. The means of study of the physiologist are open to at least a doubt. That is the point to be discussed. No one wishes to meddle with " scientific freedom " on this subject, any more than on the other two, so far as its means of research are as harmless as those of the other two. But some of us, of whom I am one, have a doubt, and more than a doubt, as to the morality of seeking for knowledge by means which we should all con- demn, if the acquisition of knowledge were not the object.
The distinction seems to be well marked by the fact that physiology is the only branch of science which it has been found necessary to bring under the restraint of the law. There is no need to pass laws to fetter the " scientific freedom " of the philologer or the astronomer ; the " scientific freedom " of the physiologist has to be fettered by Act of Parliament. That is to say, in the pursuit of the other studies, there is no inherent danger of moral evil; in the pursuit of physiology, there is.— [We should deny altogether the right to put animals to torture, even in the confident hope of lessening human suffering.
Would any humane man torture a man to obtain a remedy for the toothache P And if not a man, why a dog or a cat ? Their lives are not nearly so valuable, but their sufferings are just as severe, and count for an even larger proportion of their whole experience.—En. Spectator.]
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