MR. BACONS Six YEARS IN BISCAY.
ALTHOUGH not the most amusing, this volume is by far the most comprehensive and informing work upon the Spanish Civil War, that we have met with. The writer has not indeed re- sided for six or seven years in Si ate, taking his chalice of the fortune of war, and exposed to occasional annot mice from the Cellist authorities, without acquiring some of the feelings of a partisan of the Queen ; nor is his mind, though shrewd and in- vestigating, of a philosophical order. for he does not always per- ceivo the toilettes. of his facts. But besides a narrative of the leading circumstances of the war, and a general view of the phy- sical, social, and political features of' the Basque provinces, Mr. BACON S volume furnishes the only iuteliigible solution we have yet seen, of the causes of the astounding failures of the Liberals and of the fruitless successes of the Carhsts ; whilst it gives us some data from which we may conjecture the probable result of the present contest.
According to Mr. BACON, the insurrection in the Basque pro- vinces was not in any way connected with the suspension of the Fueros : indeed the revolt cotninenced in Bilbao en the 3d of Octo- ber, and nil the 4th CARLOI was proclaimed in form ; whilst it was not till the 30th November that a proclamation was issued by CASTANoN suspending the Fueros, "in consequence of the pro- vinces being declared under martial law." The Apostolicals bad been organizing a party in these regions ever since the last French invasion to restore FERDINAND; and instead of the pro- vincial liberties being a tnatter really at issue, the Absolute faction were at all times willing to waive them, so for as they dared, in order to consolidate their own power by assistance from the Minis- try at Madrid. As the Basques are governed by their own paro- chial or municipal authorities, elected by a widely-diffused suffrage, it was not difficult for the Absolutes to get the local government into their hands, backed as they were by an influen- tial priesthood operating on the superstition and local prejudices of an ignorant and sturdy peasantry, and aided by the persecutions of the General Goverinneat, which imprisoned, banished, or ter- rified into silence all persons of opposite opinions. In the mean time, they were nut idle at Madrid. All official situ- ations were filled by the Absolutes, and the army wiz* thoroughly reyfleered to suit their views, every one having to prove his devo- tion to the right cause before his commission was cenfirmed ; and one purgation not being deemed sufficient, a second took place. The result of this was to weed the army of almost all honour- able and high-spirited Liberals ; whose places were at first supplied by thoroughgoing Absolutes—mere blind instruments of the priesthood and the faction. The Ministry, however, soon found out that this was sacrificing the efficiency of the army too much; and latterly more experienced officers were appointed. Shortly before FERDINAND'S death, when the Queen began to exercise an in- fluence, the si stem of Liberal appointments was still further acted upon, and weeding* oft their side doubtless took place on the accession of the infant Queen. But still, when the insurrec- tion broke out, and for a long time after, Mr. BACON holds that the Royalist army, though formidable enough in paper musters, was inefficient from bad organization, and want of experience or knowledge in the bulk of the officers, most of whom were ill-disposed to the cause they marched to fight for,* and many of them positive traitors acting as Carlist spies, and giving informa- tion of every plan. The object proposed by the Absolutes, during the principal part of FERDINAND'S reign, seems to have been to get the rule of the Basque provinces into their bands, in order to crush their oppo- nents on the accession of C.sithos. The abrogation of the Salle law changed their purposes, but did not much alter their conduct, further than to stimulate their exertions. In what way they suc- ceeded in organizing an irregular militia, Mr. BACON informs us.
" The niatary organization of the provinces, between 1S23-1S33, was carried. into eomplete titeet -by the Carlist dlindlcione4 in Biscay and Alava. In the adjoining province of Ouipuscoa, the pre=ence of the Captain-Cli:neral, with the garrison of San Sebastian, served as a slight check, and still mote the pre- sence of Mallen/US landed ploprieturs, who, being attached to the Queer's cause, discouraged the arming of the peasantry by all the means in their power. in Navarre, the Royalist volunteers were very numerous, although they were but iuditlerently equipped. The supetior resources of Biscay, and their un- controlled possession of the country, enabled the diputaciun to perfect their arrangements. Numbers of cannon, which had long been abandoned as un- serviceable, were repaired and fitted for set vice; large quantities of gunpowder imported ; and arms of all descriptions carefully warehoused. All this was not so secretly dune but that the Madrid Government knew of their proceed- ings; of which, however, they took no notice. A short time after the out- break in 1833, I was informed at the diputacion, that the number of Royalists • is it Lot so at tin, present time, to a considerable extern? though, doubtless, deaths and desertions have operated. 1. The Provincial Assembly, or rather a council, which seems to unite in itself and its members both legislative and executive power, on the muster-rolls in Biscay w AS 14.276,-1m immense number in proportion to the population, being nearly one-half of those able to hear arms. As will be shown hereafter, when active service began, much inconvenience was expe- rienced from the withdraw'mg such a large proportion of the population from their homes, since fully one...third were married. In Guipuscoa the inlistment was not so heavy, the number being between 8,000 and 9,000. In Alava, Verastegui had enrolled a large force, probably nothing short of 6,000. The Royalists in Navarre, with the Rioja, did not fall short of 30,000. Thus, the Carlist party in the Basque provinces, when they rose iu favour of Charles, had an organized militia of near 57,000 men, with a further stock of about 80,000 men able to bear arms, on which to fall back as a reserve."
To encounter a force of this kind, which waged a desultory and national warfare in almost inaccessible mountain ranges, and upon :whom defeat and disaster had none of the moral effects which they produce in a regular army, the Queen opposed a body such as we have described; sometimes headed by stolid bunglers, never by a man of sufficient energy and capacity to form a consistent and intelligible plan of a campaign, much less to invent a mode of tactics to subdue their opponents. But other obstacles were at work. The Liberal party, or to speak more truly, the Queen's party, at Madrid, were divided amongst them- selves. Some of them consisted of Moderates, or aristocrats, who if not half Carlists in their hearts, would rather be defeated by the Carlists than owe success to more popular and energetic measures, which their prejudices of caste and education do not permit them to approve of. As a body, the Liberals themselves seem men of words rather than of action ; many of the more furi- ous exaltados became tame as doves as soon as they got within the precincts of the court and the prospects of place, and threw their principles behind them on a chance of office ; whilst, beside all this, the national corruption in pecuniary matters was at work, turning all public business into sordid individual jobs. These things not only operated injuriously upon the army, but diverted the minds of the generals from military affairs to political in- trigues. On the other hand, the Carlists displayed both energy and unity, sacrificing personal objects and individual will to the success of the cause. Still, with all their advantages, they are in- debted for their successes to Royalist imbecility, rather than to their own strength. When Mr. IIENNINGsEN, more than two years ago, published his Campaign with Zumulacurregui, we
intimidated our doubts as to whether the Carlists would ever be able to encounter a regular army upon equal terms, or to sup- port a campaign ; and the results have justified our prediction. Invincible in their fastnesses, or when well sheltered, they are powerless elsewhere, unless they take their adversary by surprise. The Carlist excursions into the more level provinces are forays, not campaigns : nor was there ever a greater proof of the ad- vantage of discipline than the effective resistance offered by a
Spanish army, such as we have described, after years of blunders
and defects, any one of which would have enabled a German, French, or English force to march at once upon the capital.
The same mismanagement attended the physical departments of the Queen's army ; and were one grand cause of the losses of the British Legion, though not perhaps of its discreditable failure. On the other side, there was vigour, unity, and forethought : yet we think that the eventful failure of the Carlist cause will be owing to the unsparing, though necessary exercise of these qua- lities. Mr. BACON thus describes the organization of the Com- missariat; and clothing and arms were furnished in a somewhat analogous manner, except when they were imported.
"It is time to say something respecting that system which has enabled a small province to maintain 30,000 soldiers for four years, to resist successfully the attacks of five armies; and even now, October 1837, although oue•third of their territory and all their chief cities are still in the hands of their foes, their troops overrun the Castiles and Aragon, where, if not always successful, they hold up an even fight. " The first consideration with the Carlist leaders was, that their troops should never lack food. This object being constantly in view, the whole province was divided into districts, and a commissary appointed for each. Every town and vil- lage, nay, even the smallest /uteri°, or hamlet of half-a-dozen houses, was assessed at so many rations per diem ; the total number for the entire province of Biscay being 10,290 rations of meat and bread daily, and 29,600 rations of wine tree*. As the meat ration was one pound, that of bread one pound and a half, and that of wine one pint, it follows that the weekly contributions, in provisions alone, amounted to 72,030 pounds of meat, equal to about 180 oxen, 108,045 pounds of bread, and 3,700 gallons of wine. Thrice a week the rations were collected in some convenient place of each anteiglesia, when the Alealde, agreeably to the orders he received from the Commissary, despatched them to head-quarters. Those districts wherein the troops were quartered had, of course, to find for the immediate wants a quantity of rations far beyond their quota; for which the Commissary gave them credit, so that they ceased supply ing rations until their advance was made up. It is of course understood that salt, oil, fuel, and lodging, had to be found for the soldiery in addition. In Navarre, the Car- lists had to adopt rather a different system. There they compelled the farmers, after getting in their crops, to send heavy contributions of corn to certain places which were appointed. The corn so gathered was placed in positjs—the same as the silos of Northern Africa, and issued to the Commissary, to he gtound and distributed as was required."
The province, taxed to this extent, in addition to the ravages of war and the inevitable loss of labour consequent upon so many men in the prime of life, being engaged with the army, only contains some 140,000 inhabitants. 'We naturally, therefore, wondered how it could bear such a drain without exhaustion, and expected some resolution of the mystery. The investigation of this point, however, never seems to have occurred to Mr. BACON; but in the last page of his work he says, "The feeling in favour of the Pretender, formerly so rife in Biscay, has greatly declined; and many of the inhabitants, despairing of success, have emigrated to America, and more have deserted to the Christinos : in fact, the foraging expeditions of the Carlists, which overrun the provinces to sweep off thousands of recruits, to be trained, fed, and equipped at the cost of Biscay and
Guipuscoa, have greatly dissatisfied the inhabitants." If it be net presumptuous to question the conclusions and even the state. merits of an observer, we should deem the recruits (even if so many as our author states) as a very secondary consideration with the Carlists; and that their desultory racing, and in a military sense objectless excursions, are really forced upon them by the exhaustion of their own districts, and the necessity of keeping their men fed and in motion. If this be so, the war, we conies. ture, is drawing to a close, and must terminate as soon as the or country accessible to the Carlists is swept of its resources. If the Queen can only contrive by some small pay and many promises to keep her forces together till that time, her nominal power will be secure. Whether the Liberals will possess the means or the ability to put down the banditti which will be formed from the Wbris of the Carlists, as well as to expel the Pretender, and to establish their own authority, is very questionable. The death of Csesos,whose health is said to be giving way, might stop the war, but we diubt whether even that would giving peace. The Basque peasantry, we imagine, will now continue Highland freebooters, opposed to government, and a nuisance to their neighbours, until Spain rise to the rank of a nation, and the Spanish character lose the list. lessness, corruption, and inconsiderate sloth by which it is now (listing cloned.
In this notice of Mr. BACON'S volume, we have confined our- selves to one point, and that briefly. Those who wish for the particulars on which we rest our views, must have recourse to the book; where they will also find a very good estimate of the dif- ferent classes of society in Spain ; a specific account of the Basques, and a narrative of the war and its episodes—as the de- ceptive or treacherous ELIOT Convention, somewhat too detailed for history, and scarcely animated enough for personal adventure, but connected, readable, and imposing. They will also find a pro. position for Englund to guarantee a Spanish loan of live millions, as the easiest way of ending the war: from which we must stre- nuously dissent. To guarantee the money, would be to give it, for the corrupt and incapable factions at Madrid to scramble for and squander. Even if it could effect its purpose, charity begins at home; and, with an increasing expenditure and a revenue al. ready deficient by more than half a million, we should be toad to waste our money in Spanish subsidies.
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