THE COMMAND BEFORE KHARTOUM.
IT would appear, in spite of all the inevitable denials, that the Government is going to Khartoum this year. It is still officially stated that all action to the south of Egypt must depend upon the position of the Turkish question, which is of course true, but we do not fancy that that question is expected at headquarters to prove a serious impediment. At all events Major Wingate, ablest of Intelligence officers, is collecting all necessary knowledge from Omdurman and Khartoum ; strong efforts are being made to increase the force of the river fleet, which, it is said, Lord Charles Beresford will command ; the War Office is deciding on the regiments which can be spared to strengthen the expedition ; and there is a question, a most important question, as to the supreme command of the land forces to be employed. Is it to be still intrusted to Sir H. Kitchener, or is he to be superseded by an officer of higher military rank, perhaps Sir Redvers Buller himself ? There are many arguments for and against either course, and we desire as mere onlookers to state one or two of them, for in a country so often at war in remote regions they involve important principles.
It must be conceded at once that routine is in favour of Sir Redvers Buller, or some officer of his rank. The rule is that a force of a certain size should be commanded by an officer of a certain grade, and to leave such an appointment to a junior officer is regarded either as a sign of favouritism, unjustifiable in military opinion, unless the favourite is Royal, or as proof that the Generals with a claim are for one reason or another distrusted. at headquarters. They feel, in fact, super- seded, and deprived of opportunities of active service and distinction, the hopes of which enable soldiers to do their duty energetically during the long monotonies of peace. That is a very serious argument, seeing that every army is dependent on the zeal and ability of the higher officers, to whose grades, be it remembered, every officer, from the last-joined. Lieutenant upwards, is looking as his reward ; and there is another, seldom quoted, but perhaps more serious still. We do not want to increase the tendency of the British Army to split into separate corps according to its geographical distribution. That produces very dangerous rivalries, a separation of traditions, and sometimes acute differences among the officers ultimately responsible. One " India " is quite enough for one Army to bear without adding a dozen little Indies, each with a method of thought, and some- times a difference of discipline, of its own. It is essential, inJ view of ultimate foreign dangers, that the British Army should remain one machine, controlled in the last resort by a single Commander-in-Chief, who, to be efficient, must train up his own Staff, and therefore must be left to a great extent unfettered in his choice of officers for all supervisory work, and especially for all active com- mands. Lord. Wolseley must be responsible for the whole Army, and therefore the officer whom he selects for the expedition to Khartoum ought to be the officer appointed, more especially since, if the officer selected is Sir Redvers Buller, no one in the Army or outside it will venture to declare that the choice is an unwise one. Sir Redvers Buller has the requisite experience, he knows the enemy to be defeated, and he will be served with heart as well as loyalty by every officer under his command, Sir H. Kitchener included.
On the other hand, there are at least three grave arguments for giving Sir Herbert Kitchener a high local grade, and intrusting him with the command of the entire expedition. The power to do this is not questionable, for it was exercised both in the case of Sir Henry Lawrence— though we believe his commission was a contingent one and was never published—and openly in that of General Nicholson, who while before Delhi was still, we think, regimentally only a Captain. In the first place, Sir H. Kitchener had earned. the distinction, great and exceptional as it may be admitted to be. He has actually commanded an army in a very serious though " local " campaign, has defeated this very enemy, and must in the new expedition command, with exceptional authority as " Sirdar," the greater portion of the forces engaged, and nearly the whole of the Departments upon which the Army must rely for its efficiency. Though not of great rank in the British Army, his position in Egypt is so high and exceptional that to supersede him is a very serious matter. It is by no means certain that much of the change in the Egyptian Army is not due to his personal ascendency, or that the Egyptians, especially the fellaheen regiments, will fight as well under any one but the hard and stern but successful organiser whose order they have learned to regard as the decree of fate. In the second place, it is for political reasons not inexpedient that this expedition should be, in theory at least, an Egyptian expedition, that the British Government should only control it indirectly, and that the territories which may be acquired should remain until the general settlement Egyptian in form and under " Egyptian " ad- ministration. That end will be secured if the Egyptian "Birder" remains in undisputed command, and will be set aside if he is superseded by any officer sent out from the Horse Guards. The difference may seem immaterial, but we suspect that European diplomacy will see a great deal in it, and take considerable advantage of any change. And, in the third place, is it not advisable when we can without injustice open up a path to the young of the Army, to take the fullest advantage of it ; to let it be seen that service in the British Army, for all its deadly monotony, offers every now and then the chance of a career such as Napoleon opened to his officers,—the chance, that is, of rising to the very top, and of becoming a separate figure in the eyes of soldiers of all countries before the success- ful man is fifty ? It is too true (is it not ?) that a man of military genius has little chance in the British Army unless he is Royal or a great aristocrat, and that experience, valuable as it is, is allowed to count as if it were the only valuable quality, as if indeed none of the great conquerors of the world had been young men. Whether Sir Herbert Kitchener belongs to the class for whom rules ought to be broken it is of course for his superiors to decide ; but it is certain that the country thinks so, and that it is willing to run a risk which we cheerfully concede beforehand must always be a great one. It is contended, we know, that Sir H. Kitchener has a fault, that he expects rather too much of his men • but is not that the fault of most successful soldiers, and specially of those who are bound, as all British officers are bound, by the conditions of the task before them to succeed with very inadequate means ? It cannot, at least, be alleged of Sir Herbert Kitchener that he has been unlucky in the field, and we at least are superstitious enough to believe that the something we call "luck "—which is probably a certain balance of the faculties necessary to success—enters heavily into the list of qualities essential to a General in active command.
The balance of argument inclines, we think, to Sir II. Kitchener's side, but of course the question must be decided in the last resort by the great experts to whom all professional power is necessarily intrusted. There is no folly equal to that of governing an Army by news- paper vote, or the vote of that public which newspapers are supposed to represent. The instinct of a people will sometimes fix rightly on a, supreme chief—it did on Nelson—but it can seldom be trusted. as to the choice of the officers required as hit subordinates. The "public voice" may decide accurately as to the statesman who will make the strongest Premier ; but Parliament itself would blunder if it had to select the permanent heads of the Departments. The question must be left to the Minister of War, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Premier; but it is well they should know that as far as public confidence is concerned they may step out of routine and be held blameless.
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