THE BATTLE OF THE ODER
By STRATEGICUS IIHE question with which my last article ended remains without an answer ; but perhaps it is now possible to pose the question differently and suggest in consequence an answer of another sort altogether. From S.H.A.E.F. has come a survey of the Germans' Ardennes offensive and the rather sorry epilogue with which it ended. The suggestion conveyed seems a little complacent, but substantially it is justified. As far as one can see the hero is outside the spotlight ; but that is merely normal. The American soldier, the G.I., was, of course, the real agent of ttundstedt's destruction ; and even if this survey should appear to convey a little too much comfort it is well to have it issued at a moment when the Moscow Press is calling for the reopening of the " Second Front." The vast majority of the casualties inflicted on the German armies in the west occurred in battles fought when the eastern front was dormant. One can see that the dormancy waseffective. Nevertheless the German Army had not before suffered such a shattering blow ; and the Russians might have turned the debocle on one front into general defeat if they could have struck then.
General Eisenhower is very unlikely to miss any opportunity to profit by the common enemy's plight. Even if, as is now commonly stated, there is no liaison between him and the Russian Command, that would still be true. His own chances of distinction—to put it no higher—depend upon seizing the diversion of force from his own front to strike with all the strength he can mobilise. If another diversion had not taken place, to the Far East, we should probably not now be celebrating the fall of Manila, but the European war would be a thing of the past ; and it is strange to find American commentators bothering about the treads and guns of the latest German tanks when this much more serious factor is merely noted. Presumably the flow of replacements, reinforcements, guns and munitions has been strengthened to meet the present situation. The Americans can be trusted to react quickly ; and here time is once more the key-word.
Indeed, the First Army are forging ahead and they seem to have dug well into the Siegfried defences, if they have not yet completely penetrated them. Unless we are to ignore all the pointers that reach us from abroad the diversion of troops from the western front has been considerable. The battle which is now beginning to take shape in the east must be determined by the fullest support the Allies can give in the west ; and they have given some with a directness that could scarcely be imagined beforehand. The Strategical Air Force was diverted to Berlinlast Saturday and found itself carrying out what was, in effect, tactical air support ; and the various air forces have continued to assist in much the same way.
But this battle of Berlin has from the first been the centre of discussion. When Ley said that the Germans would fight beyond the city he was perhaps only parodying finer and more apposite words used by Mr. Churchill. But at least he raised the questions whether the enemy would give battle for Berlin and whether he would fight on to the south. As to the second question, it seems possible that a core of Nazi fanatics will refuse to lay down their arms unless one of the famous gangsters orders him to do so. In this case there is certainly some sound mountainous country in the south which would offer a suitable terrain for guerilla warfare. But I find it very difficult to believe that, if the Germans are beaten in a decisive battle, they will refuse to surrender. The picture of an organised resistance transferred to southern Germany is unconvincing.
It is the other question that provides the greater interest. The question whether Guderian can make a stand "somewhere" may he allowed to lapse. It is, however, a little difficult to understand why he has not struck at the Russian armies if he has the force ; but what is sufficient for making a stand on some appropriate line may well be far from enough for a counter-offensfire. The advance has certainly slowed down since I last wrote. The only distance from Berlin of which I could then be sure was eighty-five miles. It has shortened by fifty miles in a week, and this suggests that the rate of advance has been cut down by half. It would be easy and satisfying to infer that the slackening had come from the effects of the thaw. There is no doubt that the thaw has slowed down some of the more primitive transport ; but it may not have had the same effect on the tanks, and the infantry defy all weather conditions.
If it is not the thaw, it would be easy to attribute the retardation to the inevitable brake on supply and the friction of the offensive. Here, once again, it seems that we have not reached the heart of the matter. Admittedly the machine should have been slowed down before this. It is perhaps the most wonderful part of the offensive that it has been kept in motion. In earlier Russian offensives we have seen a somewhat similar indifference to the conditions which historically and, it would seem inevitably, bring armies to a halt. At times it has seemed that a fortnight was about the extent of the rope the Russian Command could count on. But this offensive has continued for nearly four weeks, and is still making, at the very least, local gains of importance.
What, then, can be the reason for the slowing down of the advance? As I pointed out in my last article, the resistance encountered is the least calculable, and may be the most intractable, of the conditions that govern the pace of an advance. But here it seemed clearly to invite a further spurt to enable the Russians to encounter the weak force which was. avoiding battle. The delay seems now to be explained by the news of Koniev's advance. An examination of the shape of the Russian position suggests a great salient which would leave Guderian free to strike back from the north at his own chosen moment. The one condition for success in such a plan was that the Upper Oder line should be held against the Russians. For some time little had been heard of Marshal Koniev from the Russian side, until on Tuesday night it was announced that the Upper Oder had been forced on a front of fifty miles. The Germans had been discussing this battle for about a week, and the complete break apparently occupied some four days. But, before that, the Russians had established small bridgeheads across the river at various points, as they have been accustomed to do, almost automatically, with each river-line they have reached.
It is the shape of the battle of Berlin which has slowed down the Russian advance. Zhukov now holds a position of some fifty miles along the Oder ; but, although his spearheads are flung out towards Stettin and Dantzig, he has in effect exaggerated the salient which the Russian armies occupy. He has been pinning down the bulk of the German forces, and thereby making Koniev's task as much lighter as possible. Now that this commander has so far extended his hold on the western bank of the Oder, the battle of Berlin has been given a new shape. Zhukov has no mind for a battle of Berlin to be followed by other battles through Germany. It is as little to his liking to face a guerilla campaign of any dimensions in the south. It is his design to make the battle of Berlin decisive beyond all question ; and although it is hard to imagine how the fall of Berlin, even after a siege, should fail to be decisive, one cannot be certain that a brutal and fanatical enemy would not continue organised resistance as long as he could compel dupes to take part in it. Koniev's role is to sweep into the area of the capital the German troops who man the Upper Oder and lie in the area of Dresden and Leipzig, the new capital. They dare not make common cause against him, because Zhukov's columns are ready to march upon Berlin at the smallest sign of weakening.
The German commentators have been suggesting that Breslau must be the objective of Koniev. For, from German admissions, it seems that Breslau is the main point that pins down the line of the Oder. When that falls, or is by-passed, the river-line will almost certainly be broken through as far as Furstenburg. The battle of Berlin will probably not develop befote the battle of the Oder is completed, and it will be no mere delaying action, bUt a terrific battle of decisive proportions. Zhukov is too skilful a commander to allow Koniev to venture too far beyond direct support, and we shall see the thrusts to the north gather strength as the Oder dam gives way. Indeed, this decisive battle of Germany may develop a little more slowly than has been expected. It has been the German desire that the crisis should be delayed ; but now it appears that this great clash may be the final clash through a synchronisation of the attacks on all the major fronts. The Germans are announcing a great offensive in Italy, and they are probably right in thinking that Alexander will not permit Kesselring to withdraw without paying for the privilege. As we have seen, the west is moving. There will be no withdrawing from Hungary without immediate retribution. One of the German newspapers was writing some ten days ago about the "final show-down." It may now be at hand ; and the signs suggest that it will be clear and overwhelming.
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