"MATERIALISM, AND ITS LESSONS."
UNDER this title, Dr. Mandsley dilates, in the August U number of the Fortnightly Review, on the lessons to be learned fromMaterialism, and on the injustice of the reproaches so often directed against it. His paper, however, will hardly strike readers accustomed to diacmis the questions on which it turns, as a very strong one. In the first place, Dr. Maudsloy avails himself of the fact that a few great believers in the orthodox theology have, like Milton, and, at one time, Robert Hall, been materialists, to plead that Materialism is not inconsistent with orthodox theology ; while the whole implicit tenor of his paper, and the explicit tenor of its conclusion, is to depreciate prayer, and even" penitence," indeed all the religious exercises on which theology of any school whatever would insist, in favonr of a strict conformity to the laws Of social "evolution," whatever they may be, as the only upward path for man. His earlier plea, then, that a man may be a materialist and yet retain a tolerably orthodox creed, is a plea which weakens the effect of the rest of the paper, and gives an impression that Dr. Maudeley is anxious to find a mode of escape from the conclusions which, to him at least, seem the right and logical consequences of Materialism, for such of his readers as may shrink from holding those logical consequences as he holds them. And it always puts a writer in a false position, that he should go painfully out of his way to show weaker brethren how they may, if they please, adopt his premises, without being absolutely compelled to come to his conclusions, though it is plain enough that he thinks the latter the only proper inferences deducible from the former. This is time first note of weakness in the paper. The second is more serious,—namely, that while Dr. IVIaudsley is very strong on "the lessons of Material- ism," so far as they appear to sustain the accepted morality of the day, ho does not seem to have the courage to note the lessons which are of an opposite tendency, though they appear to follow as clearly from his materialistic principles as the others. Thus, ho says, " When we look sincerely at the facts, we cannot help perceiving that it [moral feeling] is just as closely dependent upon organisation as the meanest function of mind ; that there is not an argument to prove the so-called Materialism of one part of mind, which does not apply with equal force to the whole mind ;" and he argues therefrom that all the highest phenomena of conscience and will are jut as much functions of the physical organi8ation, as the suspen- sion of conscious life is the result of a pressure of a piece of bone upon the brain. That, we understand ; and we under- stand also the satisfaction with which Dr. Mandsley notes the interchangeability of mental disease and moral degeneracy, the emphasis with which he insists that moral degeneracy is often the first sign of a coining mental alienation ; and again, that mental deficiency in the parent will come out sometimes in descendants, in the form of a deficiency of moral sense. All this is evidently part and parcel of Dr. Maudsley's case. But then, what can be clearer than that it is also part and parcel of the same case to maintain that in no intelligible sense of the term is any man more " responsible " for anything he is, does, or suffers, than is the victim of a fracture of the brain for the suspension of consciousness which that fracture of the brain causes. Dr. Maudsley is never weary of insisting that all the phenomena of mind, great and small, are just as much functions of the material organisation, as are the phenomena of brain- disease in a man whose brain has been staved in by the kick of a horse; or whose blood has been drugged with opium. Well, if that be true, he is, of course, quite right in saying," Whether this man goes upwards or downwards, undergoes develop- ment or degeneration, we have equally to do with matters
of stern law." But what can he mean by his very next sentence ?—" Provision has been made for both ways ; it has been left to him to find out and determine which way he shall take." Why, if Dr. Maudsley's philosophy has any truth in it at all, this is precisely what is not "left to him." It may, indeed, be given to men of acuteness, if they be adequately endowed, to find out which way they are to take, but as for de- termination,—that is, as Dr. Maudsley himself insists, accord- ing to his belief, a "matter of stern law." It has been deter- mined for them by the .long and iron chain of natural law, or else his doctrine is vicious from beginning to end. If it be, in any conceivable souse of the word, more " left " to man whether he shell take the upward path of development or the downward path of degeneration, than it is " left " to the particle of dust whether it shall be blown this way or that way by the wind, the whole meaning of Dr. Maudsley's essay vanishes. What would he have said, if any one had told him that it was " left " to the lad whose brain was exposed, and on the exposed part of whose brain the doctor was sometimes pressing, and sometimes ceasing to press, whether he would answer the question put to him or not. He would have laughed at the unscientific statement, and ridiculed it as pure ignorance. Yet he has himself maintained that this case is a typical case, illustrating, so far as dependence on the physical organisation is concerned, all man's reasonable and moral life. If there is any reason at all in Dr. Maudsley's as- sort ion that " wheu we look sincerely at the facts, we cannot help perceiving that it [moral feeling] is just as closely dependent upon organisation as is the meanest function of mind ; that there is not an argument to prove the so-called Materialism of one part of mind, which does not apply with equal force to the whole mind," what he means is this,—that the physician who experi- mented on the lad's exposed brain, by asking him a question, and then pressing on it, so producing complete unconsciousness, and then,again; discontinuing the pressure, when the lad answered the question just as if it had only been that instant asked, was just as much, and just as little, able to determine for himself whether he would or would not press on that exposed brain, or to act otherwise than he did act, his own physical organisation and hi 8 own antecedents being what they were, as the boy under his finger was to determine whether lie would or would not answer the question put to him, without reference to the continuance or discontinuance of the pressure. At least if this be not Dr. Maudsley's doctrine, the whole paper seems to us simply without meaning. Once admit that man, at any moment in his existence, has a real power of choosing in which of two alternative ways he will go,--the upward path of develop- ment, or the downward path of degeneration,—and Dr. Mauds- ley's doctrine that "there is not an argument to prove the w- eaned materialism of one part of mind which does not apply with equal force to the whole mind," is false. For unquestion- ably he believes that the lad with an exposed brain of whom he speaks had no choice whether he would answer or no, so long as the physician was pressing on that exposed part of his brain; and, unless therefore, there is precisely as absolute a dependence between the determination which any man takes, at every epoch in his life, whether he will choose the upward path of development or the nward path of degeneration, and the organisation which induces him to take that determination, the general eoctiiue announced by Dr. Memdalcy cannot be sustained. Yet the whole essay assumes its truth, and so far as we can grasp its meaning, has no point, unless its truth be assumed. The whole attack upon the doctrine of sudden solutions of continuity, the whole "lesson" derived from the gra al enlargement, by minute but constant causes, of the brLin of the E avage into the brain of modern civilisation, appears to go for no- thing, if it he admitted that any man can so far eman- cipate himself from the influence of his own organisation as to change its line of development, counteract the resultant of its existing forces, and shift it from the downward to the up- ward path of evolution, or vice vend. And yet, despite this apparent confidence of Dr; Mandsley'a in the iron logic of his position, ho puzzles us by continually insisting on what he calls the" stern feeling of responsibility" which his principles enforce, and repeating that it is left to man "to determine which way he shall take." All we can say is that if it is so left to man, in any case whatever, to determine which way he shall take, there is no real analogy between the case of the patient with the exposed brain, who had no power at all to determine whether he would answer the question put to him or not, so long as the physician's finger pressed on his brain, and ordinary human
beings in the act of determining on their course ; whereas, if there be no such analogy, the-large materialistic generalisation of Dr. Maucleley's essay is a false generalisation, and the moral significance of his elaborate introduction is utterly un- intelligible. As it BOOMS to us, Dr. Maudsley uses the mate- rialistic hypothesis so long as he. likes it, and dispenses with it just when it suits him to dispense with it, though, of c,ourse, he is not conscious of his own inconsistency. While he wants to
enforce the absolute dependence of the mind on the body for the purpose of ridiculing the hypothesis of a separate spirit, he keeps our attention constantly fixed on those phenomena which are typical of this dependence,—on the injured brain, the mental phenomena in connection with which you can produce at will by physical means as you play on a piano with your fingers,—on the moral effect of drugs which in some directions is equally sure,—on the connection finally between physical and mental disease. But the moment he wishes to expound the high " morality " of materialism, he changes his policy ; he then be- gins to talk quite freely of oue power of determining whether we will strike into the upward or downward track ; of our stern responsibility for our choice ; and BO forth. While he is in this vein, we hear nothing of our moral actions being as much func- tions of .our physical organisation, as insane illusion is a function of physical disease. We are, on the contrary, represented as having real alternatives before us, and as if no tyrannical physical organisation were dictating to us what we should be. The analogy of the trephined patient is here utterly forgotten. The higher moral feelings are appealed to as if they were the feelings of a totally different being from him who is thus made to re- spond to the proper stimulus, just as a nerve responds to an i electric excitement,—and the great law of Dr. Maudsley'e essay s forgotten. Now, we submit that this is not philosophy. Let Dr. Maudsley choose which he will have Is the patient on
whose brain you can play as certainly as on a piano, the type of all moral agents in all moral actions, or not? If he is, let us hear nothing of the high morality which gives us a choice between the upward and downward path. If he is not, let us hear nothing of the great generalisation which proves that "there is not an argument to prove the so-called materialism of one part of mind, which does not apply with equal force to the whole, mind:"
For our own parts, we have no hesitation in saying that Dr. Maudsley is quite right when he recognises that there are acts as to which we have an absolute choice, and quite wrong when he tries to make the wholly involuntary response of the mind to a yhysic,a1 stimulus, the type of all our mental actions. The structure of our language, the laws of our country, the assump- tions of common-sense in every minute of our lives, all affirm this ; and yet all affirm that there are also mental functions which follow as inevitably from the application of a physical stimulus, as the striking of a clock follows the descent of the striking-weight. But then, if there be two quite different types of the workings of our mental life,—the optional and the in. voluntary,--the free cause and the bound effect,—the philosophy of Dr. Maudsley falls to pieces. Not only is his rationale of the mind incomplete, and incomplete at the most important point, but his rationale of the universe fails with his rationale of the mind. If the miud is not a mere function of a naate&A or- ganisation, the whole of his dogmatic denial that there is any room for the spiritual interaction of a divine mind with the human, collapses at once, and indeed, the thesis of his paper becomes false. Of course, Dr. Maudsley will not admit this. He will zealously maintain that what he calls the responsible act of man in choosing between " development " and "degeneration," is quite. as much an effect of material organisation as any other. And of course,, he has a perfect plasophic right to maintain this,. only we think he should explain clearly, that what he means when he speaks of the momentous responsibility of choice, is no- thing at all,.--nothiug, at least, more than what Calvinism means when it talks of the same thing. He should confess frankly that it is a mere illusion, not a reality, that he refers to,—that the question between development and degeneration is determined for everybody for all time, as surely as it WU determined for all time whether the seed which existed before animal life had over appeared on the earth, should develop into the flower, or should rot into the elements from which it sprang. Again, if this be, as we suppose, Dr. Maudsley's solution of the question, why, instead of assuming that the phenomenon of a spontaneous response to physical stimulus is the type of all mental action, did he not endeavour very carefully to prove
this, and to bridge over the immense chasm between such cases as that of the lad whose mind- was prevented from acting by pressure on the brain, and that of the man who stands at the meeting of the two ways between " development " and "de- generation," and. to whom he himself ascribes the stern respon- sibility of choosing between the two P In shirking this de- monstration, Dr. Maudsley shirks the very kernel of the question he was discussing.
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