THE FOURTH SPRING
By STRATEGICUS
THE development of the Eighth Army's new attack, with its encouragingly auspicious opening, must exert an important intluence on the year's offensive against the Axis Powers. On both sides, indeed, plans have already been formed, and preparation is
steadily beingpressed forward for a campaign which must have a
more than usually decisive character. The general strategy of the Allies has been determined. This year is to see them exert .their
utmost strength against the European members of the Axis. Russia has
engaged the bulk of their power for two years, and the rest of the L.n.ted Nations are not yet in contact with more than a very limited proportion of their strength. This is, of course, only true of their ,ground forces. We are engaging their submarine fleet. If their surface ships do not challenge the Allies this is because the enemy ,ornmand does not see how it can safely do so and sees no objective ,ilnmensurate with -the obvious risk. But Doenitz will not rest content with a policy of -masterly inactivity,' Of that we may be sure, though probably the whole strength of the Axis navies will not be risked until the peril of invasion of the Continent is immediate. In the air the Allies are able to strike behind the battlements of fortress Europe." They are, moreover, either immobilising or engaging at least half of the Axis air-strength. It is known, for instance, that the Luftwaffe could concentrve sufficient numbers to bomb Britain heavily ; but, as with the surface ships of the enemy navies, these may not be committed to the risk of grave loss with an invasion looming ahead. Meanwhile the various Air Forces of the United Nations are invading Germany, Italy and enemy-occupied Europe with growing frequency and power ; and it is still not certain whether their contribution is to be vital or merely ancillary. That they are doing considerable damage to transport, communications and the industrial potential of the Axis Powers cannot be doubted. There is even a certain amount of evidence that the enemy morale is suffering attrition ; and if, as is established, it wore thin under the comparatively rudimentary attacks of the last war, it should be almost -threadbare under the colossal blows of this. Unfortunately air-power succeeds quite frequently when little is expected and fails when most reliance is placed on its success. Yet it is true that the full and unlimited air-attack is only now beginning to develop, and we can but hope that it may have the success the enthusiasts anticipate. Theoretically it should be able to create greater destruction than the heaviest and most accurate conceivable artillery bombardment. Let us hope that it does.
If it should, a great part of the Allied problem is already solved. It should wear down the enemy morale, block his communications and so isolate the battlefields the Allies intend to invade, cut down his supplies of weapons and the petrol that sets his armoured divisions and aeroplanes in mthion, and write an appendix to Douhet. Apart from the air arm, and the weapon of the blockade, there is as yet no means by which the Allies can attain contact with the bulk of the enemy ; and meanwhile they have somehow to evade the attrition of their shipping and the supplies it carries. It is not being over-sanguine to conclude that on balance they are doing more effective damage than they suffer. With the rapid growth in their air strength that rather tentative conclusion may take a firmer and fuller outline ; for Mr. Alexander is the authority regarding the aeroplane's striking contribution to the submarine problem and Sertorius, the German commentator, has confirmed the First Lord's point.
It is on the ground that the position appears least satisfactory. In Russia the Germans still seem to be able to concentrate a vast striking force ; and they will attack, as soon as the season has made up its mind, on the sector they have selected. Russia a(least is in no doubt aliout German intentions; and, in spite of her brilliant winter campaign, she is in a somewhat difficult position to meet an onslaught made under the spur of desperation. There can be little doubt that that is the true state of affairs. This is the fourth Spring of the war, and it finds Germany in a greater quandary than that hich faced Ludendorff at a similar stage of the last war. If Ludendorff felt impelled to stake the full power of his army on the chance of a decision, the German Command must today labour
under a similar but stronger compulsion. In the fourth Spring of the last war how near the enemy came to success is a matter of h:story. But today Germany must put Russia out of the war
or she is lost. The only alternative—the chance of tiring out the Allies—has disappeared. Hitler knows that though they have tasted little success, they have had sufficient to inflame their confidence, and in one sphere—the air—they are already supreme.
What, then, will Germany do? . After the first attempt to destroy the Russian armies outright proved to be impossible, she changed her strategy and directed her forces to the capture of the main base% communications and productive areas. She attempted to immobilise the Russian armies and reduce them to an impotence which would
make them an easier prey. But now she may revert to her original strategy, not because she thinks Russia so much the weaker, but because the time-factor makes a speedy decision imperative. She has certain advantages she did not possess before to offset to some extent her losses. These advantages are founded upon the very success of the Russian winter campaign. Over many miles of the front Russia has behind her the "scorched earth" of recent battlegrounds, with railways only just brought into working order again and witil no natural features to chock an onset and no time to create more than rudimentary artificial barriers. When Timoshenke took Elnya and Yartscvo, in 1941, Bock used the unorganised gains as the foundation for the encircling attacks that were the prelude to his advance upon Moscow. When the Summer offensive was launched last year, the prelude was three heavy attacks across the Donetz about Izium towards Kupyansk.
The Germans are once more attacking about Izium ; and it Is not impossible that an advance in this area might launch Hitler's final attempt to secure a decision in Russia. It might, once again, be the prelude to the main attack, delivered, possibly, each side of the Smolensk railway. The objective would be the encirclement and destruction of the armies which are at present holding thaw sectors ; and as the attack would be a counsel of desperation in any case, it would be carried out with all the 6:wee and fury Germany can command. The' very success of the air-offensive against Germany would add to the energy and resolution of the attack, since it would make the need of a rapid success the greater.
The Allies in the West are still far from making an effective contribution to the need of a diversion. In Tunisia the Eighth Army has driven the enemy from the Wadi Akarit position, but although he will certainly be pushed to the north, time presses. There are, of course, other weapons in the Allies' hands besides the Eighth Army. One of these is the American-French unit which threatens io move to the coast through Kairouan and cut the enemy force in two. In spite of the Eighth Army's successes, Rommel has so far always contrived to escape at the cost of some damage to his army. The prospect, therefore, that seems to face the Allies is a series of positional battles resulting in considerable casualties to the enemy, but doing him no vital damage. The result of that process would be the spinning out of valuable, and perhaps vital, time and, as a climax, the heaviest assault of all on the entrenched bridgehead about Bizerta. There must be other ways of destroying the enemy than that, and it is imperative we should develop them.
It is, of course, not at all inevitable that the Allies should be prevented striking in Europe by this prolonged rearguard action in Tunisia. Indeed, it might be much better if other attempteto invade the Continent were launched while Rommel is still selling time. All we can see at the moment is the gathering of the clouds in Russia. But it is absurd even to imagine that the Allies have not fully considered the opportunity which the launching of another offensive in Russia would offer, even if loyalty to a brave and brilliant Ally did not arise. There is, however, no space so tiresome as the interval between the acts ; and it would be more encouraging if the incidental music included a worthier selection frOm the " AngloSaxon " repertoire.
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