TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS.
THE Russian Government has placed all the Powers, and especially this country, in a position of grave embarrasstnent. She has announced in an unusually formal way, threugh a circular addressed to all the Powers interested, that the Legations being rescued, and there being no immediate opportunity of aiding the Chinese Government against its "rebels," she proposes to retire from Pekin, and whenever a regular Chinese Government appears, to recommence negotiations with it from Tientsin. She recommends all the Powers to follow her example, and in proof that she is in earnest she directs her Minister, M. de Giers, to retire at once with all Russian subjects and soldiers, and promises, whenever her railway is secure, to retire even from Manchuria. As she cannot, without exposing her subjects to massacre, keep the latter promise, we need not discuss it just now, except to blame once more the readiness of the Asiatic Depart- m en t of the Russian Foreign Office to give impossible pledges which seem convenient ; but the first decision will perplex Lord Salisbury more than any event of recent years. His first wish, we do not doubt, will be to accept and endorse it. This outbreak of anti-European feeling in China must be to him, to speak frankly, an unmitigated nuisance. It could not have occurred at a more unfortunate moment. Great Britain has a serious war still upon her hands, serious because it keeps the bulk of her Army abroad, she wishes greatly to revise and improve her military system, and she cannot call suddenly on India for unlimited military aid. She perceives clearly that with the transfer of the capital the difficulty of coercing China is indefinitely in- creased, and she recognises, or at least her statesmen recognise, that any territory acquired in that Empire would diminish, instead of increasing, her resources. A retreat would, therefore, be to her a relief, and to Lord Salisbury a mode of escape from a position in which he must feel like a soldier ordered to march through a forest where every tree may conceal a foe. It is no affront to Lord Salisbury's bright intelligence to suppose that he is perplexed, like every other statesman out of Russia, by a situation for which there are no precedents and no guiding rules. One half of Asia has risen upon its European guests and tried to slaughter them out. There are no means of conquering that half even if there were the inclination, and yet to leave them unconquered may well seem to be a grave dereliction of historic duty. Under such circumstances the temptation to do nothing—which is substantially the Russian counsel —but wait events, and .see if some reasonable government will not arise in China, must be almost irresistible. It will be all the stronger because, though our people are suspicions of what may happen after withdrawal, Lord Salisbury is absolutely sincere when he says that he wants nothing in China but trade, and especially wants no increase of dominion. Nobody can touch the Yangtse Valley without our consent, for that would take ships, and we can destroy ships; and that being so, whether Russia conquers Manchuria—which we cannot prevent—or Germany demands Shantung—which j we have no interest in preventing—must seem to a Foreign ' Secretary matter of comparatively trifling moment. All prima-faeie arguments are therefore in favour of the Russian proposal.
But then there are reasons, weighty reasons, on the other side. In the first place, to retire from Pekin with nothing settled, with no punishment inflicted for the past wrong, and no security obtained against its repetition, is, to give up the claim to justice in China, and in truth, I though the words are misused till they seem vague, to , abandon the cause of civilisation. Residents in China, bewildered by the vastness of the interests at stake, are always liable to exaggerate, but there can be little doubt of their exact-accuracy when they say that if China . this time remains unpunished, the Chinese will consider i themselves victorious, and no white man in the Empire, whether preacher, or trader, or diplomatist, will hence- ' forth be safe. 'Nothing will happen,' the Mandarins will say, 'if we kill foreigners ;' and whenever they are enraged, which happens- more frequently- than their faces show, they will avail themselves of their impunity. Europe, so far from controlling or even advising China, will dwell in China on sufferance as -an unhonoured and unwelcome guest. It is possible that the development of trade will be arrested, probable that the construction of railways will be prevented, certain that Christianity will be no longer discussed or propagated except by those who can endure to see all their converts martyrs. It is something more than hard to ask a British Foreign Minister to con- sent to a result which every elector in his country will consider shameful, or, at all events, one demanding most convincing explanations. Moreover, there is a second obstacle more strictly diplomatic. It is certain that the German Emperor will consider himself jockeyed by a general retreat from Pekin. He has a special ground of quarrel with China, he has thrown himself into it with his accustomed energy, and he has by appointing Field-Marshal von Waldersee to the command of his forces proclaimed urbi et orbi that he means to do something great. If he accepts the Russian proposal he will look almost ridiculous, his armaments being needless, while if he is compelled to go on alone he will consider himself betrayed, not only by Russia, but by all the Powers. His bitterness will certainly not be diminished by a reflection that he has recently tried hard to deserve British benevolence, or by the suspicion that to isolate him is the very object of the Russian proposal. Russia, we may be sure, does not want the German Army on the coast of the Gulf of Pechili as well as on her European border.
In circumstanets so complex almost any course is open to serious objection ; but the easiest would, we think, be to point out to the Russian statesmen the dangers their polity entails, and to announee to them the pulley we sug- gested last week,—i.e., the policy of retiring immediately after retribution, and on our part without any territorial acquisition. We would then ask their aid in pressing on China an agreement which shall secure at least some of the conditions of future security—for example, leave to fortify and garrison the Legations—and meanwhile to retain Pt-kin as "a material guarantee" that the claim of Europe to justice shall not be disregarded. The city is not a perfect guarantee, because the Chinese with Sega.n for a capital can afford to disregard "a remote Northern city," but still it is better than none. The Mauchu Princes are little accustomed to life anywhere else, they will thirst to regain their palaces, and they may in the end, rather than finally abandon Pekin, submit to execute the most guilty of their own number. It will be tedious work to convince the Court that it cannot usefully resist, but still it may be done, and once done, there will be great un- willingness to rick a repetition of the outrage. That is not a promising prospect, but at least it is better than any which would be visible if the unpunished Empress and her unpunished Court were permitted to regain Pekin under a thin pretext of conducting negotiations.
Li Hung Chang loves negotiating, and it should not be forgotten that it is he who said : "China cannot cede territory, for opinion will not allow it, and cannot pay an indemnity, for she has no money, but she can and will give written promises that affairs shall be better managed in future" ! We may have to accept even that assurance, as the best we can get, transparent as the fraud would be, but we certainly shall have to accept it if we restore the Empress to her capital without conditions made. Naturally she will say : Europe could not do without m3 in Pt-kin; what. have I to fear ?'
But though we regret that Russia should have made her proposals for leaving Pekin without the essential condition that a vigorous attempt should be made at punishment, we adhere, in any case, to what we said last week as to our true policy in China. As soon as we have exacted reparation from China of a kind that will check outrages in the future, we have every reason for adopting Russia's policy of withdrawal. R-paration accomplished, our true policy becomes identical with that proposed from St. Petersburg. As it is, Russia has impaired a sound policy by not insisting that it shall be preceded by reparation. Possibly, as we have suggested above, Russia may be induced to reconsider her scheme. If so, no harm has been done. If not, the essential thing is to consider what Great Britain should do next- Our own answer is clear ; it would be : Announce that we shall join with any other Powers willing to co-operate in exacting punishment from China, but that after punishment had been exacted we should follow the example of Russia and withdraw from further action. We need not miss a wise policy because Russia insists on adopting a portion of it in an unworkable shape.
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