COUNT VON WALDERSEE'S APPOINTMENT.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR:] Snr,—Count von Waldersee's appointment to the supreme command in China, practically after the relief of the Pekin Legations, must, of course, have been with a view to further military and political action. England ought to have fore- seen that such further action must be futile. But, though it may be humiliating to have it stopped by Russia, England ought to welcome the opportunity of Russia's proposal in order to get out of an unnatural partnership with Germany in an impracticable adventure for the problematical benefit of Germany only. What more can be done after the relief of the Legations except retire ? We cannot punish the Chinese Government, because it is beyond our reach, and we cannot pursue it all over China. We cannot make it punish the worst offender,—itself. We cannot conquer China, and we cannot partition her ! The German Emperor calls for revenge, but on whom ? It can only be on ignorant people too poor to run away, whose offence is that they have been too easily misled by their rulers ! Extension of world-power may also be Germany's object, but England has no interest in that. The retirement of the forces of the Powers from Pekin may facilitate Russia's settlement of Man- churia, but that is practically accomplished already, and we cannot prevent its fulfilment. It is said that now that we are in Pekin we have a great opportunity, but nobody can tell us what to do with it. It is acknowledged that territory is use- less to us. On the other band, we cannot welcome Russia's proposal to treat with the Empress's Government. We have done all we can to make the iniquitous Chinese Government "lose face." It ought now to be discredited and humiliated in the eyes of its own people, and it seems that defeat and weakness do become known even in China, for the result of the Japanese War is said to have been one of the causes of the present upheaval. Nothing should be done to support the Empress's Government ; its guarantees, promises, and terri- tory are all equally valueless. Its Customs duties are said to be fully mortgaged, and its other revenues cannot be inter- cepted by us. The present Chinese Government may be the best for Russia's and Germany's purposes, but it is never likely to encourage trade and progress. England's policy is, in concert with Japan and America, to await patiently for the development of China by the Chinese. It will be said that we may have to wait for ever for that ! But why should that be true ? The Japanese, who were quite as conservative as the Chinese, have developed rapidly, and experience in our own Colonies and elsewhere proves that the Chinese are honest, busi- nesslike, quick to appreciate and recognise good government, and willing enough to trade and work with the rest of the world. We should avoid anything which may rivet the fetters of the worst Government in the world on such a people. If, and when, the Chinese evolve a really national Government, it will certainly be imbued with the national spirit, which is pre-eminently commercial and industrial. If the Customs duties cannot recoup us the expenses of the rescue from Pekin and a moderate indemnity to the sufferers, we must bear the loss, not increase it by further military adventure. Our interests at the ports should be maintained until the time when China, like Japan, has developed into a civilised Power. Missionaries in China would have to rely wholly on spiritual power, not on our military and diplomatic force. The ports and French, Russian, and English colonies of Chinese population should sufficiently employ their energies without risking themselves
in China proper.—I am, Sir, &c., L. C. J.
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