A CHIEF OF CHIEFS
AST Tuesday's debate in the House of Lords brought out very clearly the weak point in the machinery for planning war. It was indicated in one lucid sentence in a not altogether d speech by the Lord Chancellor, who said that it all boiled wn to the question "whether there should be someone who uld take the part of chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee." t is indeed the point. It was handled delicately by all the ers—and indeed by the writers who have been taking part the vigorous correspondence recently published in The Times cause the present chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee none other than the Prime Minister himself. And because that so, and because there is an overwhelming weight of informed nion in favour of a change, it should be made clear at the set that there is no question of any attack on the Prime sister,' and not the least desire to deprive him or the War hinet of the final authority in the conduct of the war. On the ntrary, changes are urged precisely because it is desired to engthen his hands in dealing with his multifarious duties by viding him with the best possible organisation for using the owledge of his experts and producing a unified plan of strategy all fields of war.
The recently published White Paper on the "Organisation for int Planning" served to show how much has been done in ringing together representatives of all the Services for joint tanning and joint intelligence. At the top, subject only to the ar Cabinet, is the Chiefs of Staff Committee, consisting of the 'efs of Staff of the three Services, and presided over by the rime Minister when he is able to be present. Beneath this is Vice-Chiefs of Staff Committee, similarly representative of the ree Services, performing duties delegated to it by the Chiefs Staff Committee. Under these come a Joint Planning Staff, and ctions for Strategical Planning, Executive Planning, and Future perational Planning, and a joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ith a number of specialised Sections below it. Broadly speaking is agreed that the organisation below the Chiefs of Staff Cornttee is on sound lines, though requiring expansion in some rections, and it is testified that there is much good team-work d readiness to co-operate. The criticism has been directed not gainst the details, but the organisation at the top. Lord Chatfield minded the House of Lords on Tuesday that three months o he had suggested that it was a mistake for the Prime Minister mself to be chairman of the Chiefs of Staff C.9namittee. Since en Sir Edward Grigg has given prominence to the question y initiating a discussion in The Times, urging that for the unified Planning of the war a committee in which the Chiefs of Staff sit ogether is not enough, and that a non-Ministerial Chief ought SO preside over the joint General Staff, giving the whole of his time and attention to considering the fullest use of the three Services and the equipment that can be produced, and the pre paration of plans for submission to the War Cabinet.
The composition of the unified planning authority—that is to say, the Chiefs of Staff Committee—is the key to the whole situation in the planning of the conduct of a war which stretches Over the whole world. It is right that it should include the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services, as it does, but each of these is deeply involved in the control of his own department, and has hmited time for surveying all fields of operations. Moreover, from the nature PI his duties it is natural that each should look at the problem Primarily from the point of view of his own Service. Mr. Churchill has unique qualifications which would make him an inspiring chairman of such a body, if he had no other duties and Were able to attend all the meetings of the Committee. But, of course, he has innumerable indispensable duties as Prime Minister, and in practice he can only rarely attend the meetings, and it may even happen that as Prime Minister he has too much authority in directing the technical discussions where the view of every Service Chief should be given all the weight to which it is entitled. How, in his absence, can firm decisions be arrived at? And, when he is present, how avoid going over again the ground that has been traversed in his absence? The joint planning committee should be a mainly professional body presided over by a non-ministerial Chief to work out and prepare strategic plans on land, sea and air in all fields of war, capable of presenting its plans for the consideration of the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet, with whom under all circumstances the last word will rest. There is in this suggestion no derogation from the authority of the Prime Minister. Policy, and of course war policy, must remain under his supreme direction. But he must be provided with a strategic thinking department, giving its undivided attention to the technical problems of war planning, and preparing schemes for the fighting Services by which the policy of the Government can be carried out with energy and efficiency.
The unanimity with which this change is urged by those whose opinion carries the greatest weight can scarcely fail to impress Mr. Churchill. Lord Hankey is in favour of it. Lord Trenchard joined Lord Denman and Viscount Swinton in urging the appointment of a permanent head of the Chiefs of Staff organisation. Lord Milne, a former chief of the Imperial General Staff, thought that it was "the lack of one staff drawn from the three Services linked together with only one head that had led to many of the events of the last two years." It is not so much further additions to existing machinery that are wanted (though the technical and research staff should be strengthened), but, as Professor A. V. Hill has pointed out, "an integrated war staff, a high command, designed for the purpose of planning the war as a whole." And there is one other opinion, of the greatest possible weight, quoted by Lord Treachard —that of Mr. Churchill himself, speaking in i919.
The initiative in Service matters must in the main come, and as a general rule comes, from the professional head. He plans, he outlines, he proposes.
The initiative which Mr. Churchill recognised in 1919 should come from the Service chief, must, on the same principle, in these days of combined operations, come from someone who can speak for the three Services together.
Lord Simon did not omit to point out that when things are going wrong it is natural to put the blame on the organisation. But if things persistently go wrong, and there are repetitions of the same mistakes, it is not only natural but necessary to question the efficacy of the organisation. The failure to provide adequate air support in one critical operation after another is evidence of the fact that planning has been unsound.' Crete is an old story, but how was it that two great ships were sent to the Far East without aircraft support, and that big reinforcements were landed in Singapore after it was recognised the position was untenable? No need to multiply instances, but the fact has been palpable both to professional men and to the general public that since 1940 mistake after mistake has been made which would not have occurred if the central planning authority for the war had taken into account all the circumstances and adopted a strategy to fit them. Sir Edward Grigg is justified in asking us not to refrain from learning from the enemy. Germany no doubt 'has made many mistakes in her conduct of the war, but she has achieved most of her successes by the perfect integration of her land and air forces. It is relevant to point out that Hitler does not rely, for advice on the three separate chiefs of staff, but on the OberKommando of the Wehrmacht, Field-Marshal Keitel, with a war staff representing all three Services. Sir Edward even suggests that Mr. Churchill has assumed more burdens than Hitler, since he carries the responsibility of Ober-Kommando as well as that of the head of the Government.
In this high sphere there must be some delegation Mr. Churchill must be persuaded that it is not within the strength of one man to carry all the burdens. We need him in the sphere of supreme direction, and under him a body, directed by one full-time man, capable of advising him on war strategy and with authority to explore every situation. Should a Service bepreferred—not that such a choice is essential—the name General Wavell instantly suggests itself. The time will come when this country in conjunction with its Allies must ass the initiative and compel the enemy to conform to our strat We cannot afford to approach that great moment with inadequate thinking department and defective combined pl Mr. Churchill must be induced to take the one step a will enable all arms to serve together with complete confidence their movements are really "according to plan" and under seeing direction.
Previous page
