CORRESPONDENCE.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY. IV.—ADMIRALTY COMMITTEES. To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR.']
Sin,—In my last letter reference was made to numerous Com- mittees appointed by the Admiralty during the last two years; it is now proposed to look a little more closely into their con- stitution and work. The declared intention in appointing these Committees was to give assistance to the Board of Admiralty in remedying faults of naval administration, and framing measures of reform. Consequently it was of the highest importance to ensure that the Committees should be properly constituted, impartial, independent, and capable of dealing with difficult and complex subjects. Great issues were involved ; the procedure, therefore, should have been deliberate and exhaustive. Before recommendations were made all authoritative views ought to have been considered, and alternatives ought to have been weighed. Let us see how far these essential conditions have been fulfilled.
The Committees have been "Departmental," and mainly composed of naval officers or civilians employed at the Admiralty. Very few gentlemen have been appointed from outside the Naval Service. Speaking broadly, most of the members in the course of their ordinary official duties would have been concerned with the subjects referred for con- sideration ; their opinions could have been ascertained equally well without the formal appointment of Committees, but the public would not have been equally impressed. As an example, take the Committee on Designs. There were fifteen members and two secretaries ; all but five were, or had recently been, Admiralty officials. One Rear-Admiral from the Fleet was appointed, and four civilians from outside the Naval Service. One of these, Lord Kelvin, was unfortunately incapacitated by illness from giving active assistance. In the case of the Committee on Dockyard Reorganisation there were seven members ; only one from outside, although this was pre-eminently a case where valuable assistance might Lava been given by gentlemen experienced in the management of great private establishments for shipbuilding and marine engineering. Two of the six other members were simply clerical officials at the Admiralty having no technical know. ledge. The contrast between the Committee on Designs of 1904-5 and that appointed in 1871 to deal with similar subjects is so great that further comment is needless. The Navy Estimates Committee, so called, has been credited with large economies in expenditure ; it was entirely composed of Admiralty officers, two of whom—the Financial Secretary and the Accountant-General—are officially responsible for naval finance. With them were associated the First Sea Lord and the Permanent Secretary; hardly an ideal Committee for such a gigantic task ; besides which all the members were occupied with routine duties. The Douglas Committee on Naval Training included Admiral Douglas, the Director of Naval Education, the Chaplain of the Fleet, three Captains R.N., and an Admiralty clerk. It has already been said that this Committee neither in constitution nor in procedure was such as should have been appointed to deal with the important subjects entrusted to it. This brief summary can' be verified by reference to many documents; there was throughout a marked indisposition to give information even as to the membership of the Committees when they were appointed. One can understand the desire for secrecy now that the facts aKe public property. It is not possible to claim that these Committees were of a character corresponding to the magnitude and importance of the tasks nominally assigned to them.
A notable feature of recent Committees has been the presidency of the First Sea Lord. One would have thought that Sir John Fisher would have been so fully occupied with his important official duties that he could not have undertakeu
this additional work. As a matter of principle also the First Sea Lord should have permitted independent and capable Committees to conduct these investigations, and should have been content to consider judicially their Reports and recommendations. In a moment of frankness Mr. Pretyman gave to the House of Commons an explanation of this universal presidency. The passage in which this occurs runs as follows :—
"In a very large proportion of the matters which come up for decision, the issue which is constantly arising is—Is this par- ticular thing necessary for war ? There is Only one person who can give an answer to that question, and that is the First Sea Lord: this is his particular function. He is the adviser of the First Lord on all questions of policy and preparation for war. I only mention this to show how enormously important it is, and how much time is saved by the fact that, in a very largo number of cases, the First Sea Lord is a member of these Committees. That ' short-circuits ' business [the italics are mine] and enables a decision to be given on the spot as to many points which involve reference and discussion."
There is here much food for thought. It is asserted that the First Sea Lord is "the adviser" on policy and preparation for war : according to precedent and experience, he is the principal adviser, not the sole adviser; his naval colleagues are not "negligible quantities." It is passing strange to 'find a Parliamentary representative of the Admiralty taking for granted that, on subjects of primary importance to naval 'efficiency, it is desirable to obtain "a decision on the spot." The collection, collation, and analysis of evidence in regard to these important subjects must precede any decision worth having. Haste in such matters is to be deprecated; mature consideration is essential. If Mr. Pretyman had been better informed on electrical subjects, lie would have avoided the analogy of "abort-circuiting." When a short-circuit occurs there is usually conflagration, and often serious damage or destruction. Many authorities on naval matters are convinced that the presidency of the First Sea Lord over so many Committees, and the heavy pressure of his personal opinions, have involved hasty decisions not based on thorough investigation ; and that the future results of this haste will be akin to those which occur when short-circuiting happens in . an electrical installation. They urge the necessity, while there is time and opportunity, for thorough examination of the Admiralty machinery by impartial authorities familiar with naval requirements and administration, in order that recent installations, hastily erected and set to work, may be subjected, if necessary, to amendments or adjustments that will secure safety and good working in future. It will never do simply to "watch and wait,"—as Lord Tweedmouth has declared his intention to do in regard to some important matters. Risks that may now be avoided, and mistakes that can now be remedied, may bring irreparable disaster upon the Navy if they are simply watched and permitted to develop. Every one agrees that the Navy should not be made the sport of party politics. It is equally true that naval efficiency should never be allowed to depend upon the judgment and discretion of any one man, however able and experienced be may be. The ancient system of government by a Board of Admiralty represents the latter principle. There is reason to fear that the principle has been ignored or obscured of late. It must be recognised afresh, and frankly applied to naval administration.
The charge of hasty decision is demonstrable from official Papers. One or two instances must suffice. The Douglas Committee (as was stated in the first letter) in eight weeks disposed of very many subjects of primary importance to the efficient training and specialisation of naval officers, and the performance of engine-room duties. The Committee on Designs was announced by Lord Se'borne in December, 1904; it probably did not meet until the New Year. In a Parliamentary Paper (issued in July last) it is stated that the Committee in the course of its work "carefully examined
and discussed six alternative designs" for battle- ships, and an equal number for cruisers. As a result, they "unanimously decided to recommend" the designs adopted for the 'Dreadnought' and for three ships of the ' Invincible ' class. These decisions are said to have been further dis- cussed with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Channel and Atlantic Fleets in January, 1905, and to have been "concurred in by them." The designs were "ultimately adopted" by the Board; the exact date of the decision is not given; in the case of the 'Dreadnought' it must have followed speedily upon the action above described, otherwise it would not have been possible to have made the progress in construction that was made on and for that ship during 1905-6. Although the keel was not laid until October 2nd, 1905, the work had been in band many months before, and the Navy Estimates for 1906-7 show this conclusively. Before March 31st, 1906, £86,000 had been spent on dockyard labour alone,—representing the con- tinuous employment of eleven to twelve hundred men for a year. Over 2400,000 had been spent on armour and other materials in the same period, nearly 2170,000 on machinery, and over £90,000 on gun-mountings. The total expenditure in 1905-6 was £835,000. These figures show that the design must have been settled in all its main features early in 1905, and make it probable that the work of the Committee on Designs in regard to the 'Dreadnought' was practically com- pleted—as the official Papers seem to indicate—in January, 1905. 1f so, the Committee must have made a " record " for rapidity in examination and discussion of six alternative designs for battleships, not to mention six other designs for armoured cruisers, which seem to have been dealt with in equally summary fashion. The issues involved were great : the four ships laid down in 1905 represent a total expenditure of eight millions sterling when com- plete for sea. There was no need for urgency, but if it had been a case of "life and death" more could not have been done to hasten the decision and to press on the work on the 'Dreadnought.' Overtime was employed extravagantly, other work was delayed, and the actual sum spent in the financial year 1905-6 was nearly double that intended to be spent when the Navy Estimates for that year were issued. Surely this baste requires explanation ; the dangers involved are obvious; what plea of justification can be produced ? A new departure of this nature should have been deliberately decided, not "rushed." Long before the 'Dreadnought' was finished or tried Mr. Robertson informed the House of Commons that the three new battleships to be laid down this year would be made six hundred and fifty tons larger—and of course proportionately more costly—than the Dreadnought,' presumably for the purpose of effecting improvements in them. This fact alone indicates that the preparation of the original design must have been hurried unduly; for the changes made can only be changes of opinion, IDA the result of experience. One asks in vain for an official explanation or justification of the manner in which this most important matter has been dealt with ; first by the late Board in regard to the 'Dreadnought,' and now by Lord Tweed- mouth and his colleagues. The complete technical responsi- bility, of course, rests upon the Naval Members of the Board, who were left undisturbed when the change of Government took place. The piece justificative prefixed to the Admiralty Memorandum on New Construction presented last July is not worthy of the occasion, or likely to be accepted as sufficient. As regards the three ships of the 'Invincible' class it gives no information respecting armament, armour, or speed, although each of them will involve a total cost of two millions sterling, and the work on them is well advanced. For further information one has to turn to inspired articles in the Press, giving details on some points and making assertions as to others,—another illustration of recent Admiralty methods described in the preceding letter. One cannot but conclude that if the Report of the Committee on Designs were published, it would probably become evident that its work was no more satisfactory than that of the Douglas Committee. Why should doubts of this nature be allowed to continue ? In the public interest they should be resolved without further delay —I am, Sir, &c.,
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