Solving Argentina's problem

Raymond Carr

Buenos Aires Let there be no mistake about it. Argentina, for those left inside it, is a much more Comfortable place to live in than it was in the last days of Isabel Peron's presidency. Then I felt as if I was witnessing the dissolution of a great nation: a society without political direction, its cohesion eroded by terrorism and a galloping inflation that turned Argentinians into a race of short-term speculators. You may not like military governments but the Junta, composed of chiefs of the three armed services, which took over two years ago, has now at least restored something resembling normal conditions of life.

The key to understanding present day Argentina is the traumatic experience of terrorist guerrilla warfare. That war is not, and never was, the simple war between high-minded goodies and brutal fascist militarists presented to us recently by BBC television. Rooted in personal and political frustrations, it was a complex, byzantine affair: right-wing nationalists using the language of Maoism in a section of the Peronist montoneros; the Trotskyists of the ERP; strange combinations of Freud and Marx; idealism degenerating into a mafia; rightwing terrorist gangs enjoying the protection of sections of the army and police.

Even Gino Germani, an Italian antifascist, has recently deplored the direct and indirect support given to political violence in Argentina by parties and intellectuals. Now fellow-travellers of terrorism are in exile or • Prison. The government dismisses the 'human rights' campaigners abroad as hypocrites with double standards. When CorPoral Arroyo, father of six, was killed in a shoot-up with 'subversives' the official communiqué concluded: 'Nobody will plead for Corporal Arroyo's human rights'.

But the continued detention of newspaper editor Jacobo Timmerman, and many other less well known persons who have spoken out against, blatant illegalities, distresses even Argentina's friends.

But despite all of this, it is still hard to realise the sheer size of the guerrilla threat.

It could stage full-scale military operations against barracks, occupy parts of the pro vince of Tucuman. In 1973 the guerrillas could well believe that they were within sight of taking over Argentina. But now the army, for the time being at least, seems to have beaten the guerrillas. Once numbered in their thousands, they are now .a morally discredited rump of a few hundred. In the war the police and army have used brutal methods: people have simply disappeared.

Killings on both sides have started a blood feud and to restore the rule of law will be a very difficult task. The victory over ter rorism, however, does give the Junta a form of legitimacy, at least for the middle class, enjoyed by few previous military gov ernments. The question now is: what will it do with the fruits of victory? How will it set about the creation of the 'strong democracy' which President Videla declares as his aim?

The Junta's plans for the economic future, the work of a civilian minister Dr Martinez de Hoz, are, in the Argentinian context, bold enough to justify talk of a 'national revolution'. If the tactical short-term aim is to cure inflation, the strategic aim is to cut away the fat from a highly protected, uncompetitive economy where manufacturers pitched prices high and expected the government to pump enough purchasing power into the economy to buy their goods— a sure' recipe for inflation.

The tactical aim of reducing inflation has been in part realised; though if Argentinian inflation at 100 per cent is better than the 400 per cent of 1974 it is still fearsome. The strategic aim of 'revolutionising' the economy on strict capitalist-market lines must be a long and painful process, and the Junta will aim to stay in power until the fruits of fiscal heroism show up. Meantime austerity and high living costs are unpopular with everyone — the Treasury Secretary has dared to criticise the inflationary consequences of hosting the World Cup, and that in a football-mad nation. This unpopularity is one reason why the Junta cannot risk an election for some time.

If the ultimate shape of the Argentine economy is unclear its political future is even more in doubt. What will be the 'political project' which the armed forces will presumably put into operation when the present Junta retires in October and General Videla takes over as President? It is clear, at least, what the armed forces will not tolerate: a return to the wilder forms of Peroniit populism and a party regime that will take its revenge on the military. Presumably it hopes Peronism will die a natural death and some less hegemonic and exclusive labour movement will emerge in a country where the trade unions are the strongest civilian organisation.

It is not that the armed forces are inT sensitive to labour demands. They have 'intervened' (i.e. put an officer in charge) in the unions and if the military interveners began by thinking their job was to hold down wages they now, like any other trade union boss, are aware of the pressures for higher wages and tussle with other military men in charge of state enterprises. They know that austerity can never be allowed to bring mass unemployment and this determination to keep unemployment at its present low level — 2.6 per cent — is in

contradiction to Martinez de Hoz's belief in the curative effects of the market. The workers are discontented enough with the decline in their real wages; they certainly will not tolerate massive dismissals.

There can be no quick advance towards full democracy; that would be a disaster for

democracy. There may be military pol iticians who are prepared for a moderate 'opening', even to toy with the idea of capturing some of the remnants of moderate Peronism. There are other military rightwing groups ready to plant bombs to keep President Videla from any over-indulgence in liberalism. It is the job of working out the stages by which democracy will be rein stalled that must give the officers engaged in thinking up the 'political project' their headaches. Any government that 'freezes'

party life pays a heavy penalty in poor information — only the squeals of the injured amongst the more powerful pressure groups get through. The Junta will

obviously take on more civilian ballast and invent a party that will operate in what the Spaniards call 'democracy with adjectives'. From there to 'democracy without adjectives' is a difficult road and the victory over the guerrillas is only a first step. Peronism has either to wither away or to be integratedinto the political system. The military, at some stage, must withdraw into an uncharacteristic political neutrality and, as a first step, show respect for the rule of law. And all this is dependent on avoiding the pitfalls of expansion, with hyperinflation followed by recession with inflation.

It is a tragedy that a nation, so modern in its social structure with its large middle class — hence the appalling weekend traffic jams — has lurched from political crisis to political crisis. Except in the worst periods of the terrorist war and under the more barbaric manifestations of Peronism, Argentina has remained an open, tolerant society run' by exclusivist, intolerant parties and politicians.

And in spite of the appalling pavements, always in some mysterious and never-ending process of being dug up, in spite of the thoughtless destruction of some fine late-nineteenth-century architecture, in spite of its disastrous airport, Buenos Aires is one of the great civilised cities of the Western World.