A House of Communities
Wilfrid Sendall
The Tory proposals for the House of Lords are not proposals for reform but rather for the abolition of the House of Lords and its replacement with a new second chamber founded on entirely different principles. It would be best to recognise this, and therefore not to play about with schemes for Preserving continuity. If a new institution is to be created, it would clarify thinking to start from the ground. Historical experience indicates that Institutions live or die according to the effectiveness with which they discharge the functions for which they were originally designed. But once launched, they acquire a character and force of their own. They affect the attitudes and behaviour both of their members and of the society which has created them, frequently undertaking functions very different from those for which they were designed. Parliament itself was established as an instrument by which mediaeval kings obtained consent for taxation. But membership of Parliament, particularly of the House of Commons, had a dramatic effect on the behaviour of its members, leading them to acquire functions far beyond those originally intended.
A new second chamber should not exist simply to revise legislation and to hold debates on large public issues. The present House does that very well. In any case, as the single-chamber men in the Labour Party are eager to point out, these functions could be satisfactorily discharged, after some simple procedural changes, by the House of Commons itself. What the Tories want, and what the abolitionists in the Labour Party fear they might get, is a second chamber with sufficient autkiority to stop the House of Commons carrying through a revolution, even abolishing itself, by simple majority vote.
Note the word 'authority'. It is not enough simply to award powers to the new second chamber if it lacks the authority to use those powers. The present House of Lords dare not use the powers it already has because it lacks authority. Authority can only be bestowed by an expression of the corporate will of the community, or of a substantial majority of it. If the community really willed a revolution, nothing could stop it. But the assumption is that a Commons majority could be obtained by exploiting some transient issue, and the revolution then accomplished contrary to the people's will.
It follows that the second chamber must be representative of the people, but chosen by some method differing from that used to elect the Commons. Otherwise it might be just a reflection of the Commons, which would defeat the object. If there are to be government-nominated members, there must be a strict limit on the number. At present there would be nothing to stop a government ennobling enough members of the Transport and General Workers' Union to swamp even the built-in Tory majority of hereditary peers.
The suggestion of Lord Home's committee, that the majority of second chamber members should be elected by proportional representation from the constituencies designed for the European Parliament, would be reasonable if it were intended to adopt the same numerical basis for representation as that used for the House of Commons. But is that what is wanted? If we are to embark on the experiment of creating a new institution of representative government, why not experiment boldly?
One of the merits claimed for the House of Lords is that it draws into debate specialised professional knowledge and experience from important sections of the community not usually politically vocal. To enlist this useful element in the new chamber Lord Home's committee favours a substantial nominated membership. But it is worth examining this notion of drawing on extra-political expertise alongside another proposition, namely that a plural political society provides the most — perhaps the only — effective barrier to totalitarianism. Sir Ian Gilmour has made the point in his book, The Body Politic:
'Twentieth-century experience has amply confirmed Acton's doctrine that liberty is possible only in societies where there are organisations in existence other than political. Only totalitarians want to sweep away countervailing centres of power, and the continued existence of such centres is the best defence against totalitarianism.'
• Should we not therefore seek a second chamber which is representative of such countervailing centres of power as still exist and which it is desirable to maintain? The idea has a respectable Tory ancestry. It is the ideal conception of the House of Lords as defended by the young Disraeli in 1835 in his 'Vindication of the English Constitution'. And the doctrine of pluralism as a defence against over-centralisation was shared with Tory Radicals such as Richard Oastler. The countervailing centres in Disraeli's argument were the Church, the Law, and the landed interest. in contemporary society the trade unions are the most obvious example: clearly they should have appropriate representation in the new second chamber, as should the Church and the Law. The landed interest is not what it was in 1835, but there are many other communities which should qualify — various categories of industry, the City as representing commerce and finance, medicine, the universities, and other religious and racial communities.
It should not be difficult to devise means whereby these could each choose representatives, either by election or nomination, but no exact arithmetical relationship between the number of potential electors and the number of representatives should be sought. This is an opportunity to repudiate slavish obedience to the principle of 'one man, one vote' — and the false egalitarianism on which it is founded — that has created the very danger of an 'elective dictatorship' against which protection is sought.
If a directly elected element is wanted, it should be chosen on a community, not a numerical, basis. There should be members for, say, the South-west peninsula, Wessex, the Severn valley, the Midlands, Yorkshire, Northumbria, Lancashire and Cheshire, Cumbria, East Anglia, Kent and Sussex, North and South Wales, Highland and Lowland Scotland. Representation should be equal for each region, not in proportion to population. The areas mentioned have separate and broadly identifiable community interests. It is not suggested that the list given is necessarily exhaustive or even accurate in description. It is intended simply to convey the general idea. But at all costs let us confine 'one man, one vote' to the House of Commons.
An assembly thus composed would have the authority to make use of the powers it was given. A limited delaying power on general legislation is all that should be required, but on legislation and any other matter affecting the constitution and liberty of the subject, the second chamber should have an absolute veto. The area over which the veto would extend is a matter requiring the most precise drafting. It should be embodied in a statute separate from that establishing the second chamber as, once enacted, it will in effect be a written constitution or Bill of Rights. It will confer on the second chamber the character of the United States Supreme Court, and should effectively dispose of the danger of an elective dictatorship.
The aim should be to encourage the new chamber to develop and exercise a faculty of corporate, collective judgment, such as the House of Commons once possessed but is in danger of losing. It is a matter of conjecture whether we shall get a more sensible second chamber before we have achieved a more sensible House of Commons.
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