TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE EMPERORS AND THE SOCIALISTS.
THE Three Emperors at Berlin and the forty odd Socialists at the Hague appear to have certain common objects in view. Both at least have given out with a good deal of ostentation that the object of their meeting is to secure peace. Bo the Czar frankly told the Cossacks of the Don not many days ago. So the Report of the General Council of the International de- clares to the meeting at the Hague, "we assemble with the object of rendering war impossible by the emancipation of labour,"— in the meantime, however, sending "greetings" to the victims of the Commune, who also thought to render war impossible by the emancipation of labour, but who found that, as a celebrated orator of the International said at Geneva some years ago, a preliminary war was necessary to establish the impossibility of future wars. But not only is the general object of both these congresses,—the congress of Emperors and the congress of labour-regenerators,--the same, but the special subject of their discussions, so far as it is known, is not dissimilar. The International has been discussing the great subject of federa- tion or centralisation, shall the General Council be dissolved, and the Association in each country stand on its own legs and act on its own responsibility, or shall the General Council be rendered still more absolute, and have the powers of all the individual societies placed at its disposal ? ' And the conference of the Emperors is thought to be on a subject not very dissimilar,—namely, shall the three great Emperors of the East of Europe act as one or as three? shall they be so united in counsel as practically to wield their enormous con- joint strength for a single purpose, or shall they each go their own way without any common understanding at all ? If English counsel were likely either to be asked, or when given to be acceptable, probably the same would be given in both cases, and that would be in favour of having both bundles of sticks untied. Very little peace comes of these artificial attempts to gain peace by combining, under a single plan of operations, wholly diverse interests. The chances are that such alliances and mutual understandings will lead not to peace, but to war. As the Convention of Gastein led almost immediately to the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria, so now artificial agreements and arrangements on points on which the different Powers cannot really be united, are pretty sure to make the dis- appointments and heartburnings of the future still more bitter. And even as regards the International Congress, little as we hold its European influence to be, and wholly contemptible as that influence in this country (where it probably does not num- ber as many as five hundred intelligent and earnest adherents) certainly is, any mischief it may do is more likely to be done if the various branches of the Society believe that they can look for external support in resources outside their own, than if they are compelled to rely on themselves and themselves alone. Conferences to secure the peace of the world are pretty sure to endanger it ; and Conferences that aid in a distinct concentration of national powers and an organisation of national purposes, are much more likely to endanger it than Conferences which conclude by dissolving "General Councils," and leaving each constituent to take its own way. As far as we can see, the best thing that could happen as the result of the meeting of the Emperors is that it should have no result ; and as the result of the meeting of the International at the Hague, that the General Council should be dissolved, and the various sections of the International left to gain wisdom separately in their various distinct States. And not improbably this may actually be the issue in both instances ; though with the genius of Prince Bismarck at work at Berlin, there is more reason to dread that some combination for which 'at present at least he wishes, may be brought about. We say more reason to dread,' because we do not in the least believe that any of his better aims is in danger,—that the unity of Germany, for instance, has anything serious to fear from the particularists of Bavaria, or from that disaffection of the Roman Church of which Prince Bismarck himself has been so active a cause. It may be well for King Louis to understand that the Emperor of Austria no more dreams of encouraging the dis- affection of the South-German Particudarists than he does of breaking up again the kingdom of Italy ; but we cannot easily believe that, however freely King Louis may avail him- self of his undoubted right to abandon himself to gloom under the sense of his diminished importance, he can mis- understand the hearty loyalty to the German Empire which seems to have pervaded almost the whole people of Bavaria on the occasion of the recent military visit of the Crown Prince. Prince Bismarck's true object in. getting the Emperor's two Imperial neighbours to' meet him at Berlin, must have reference to much more. ambitious dangers and more alarming eventualities than. that. He has Italy with him, even if the Pope is against him, and the Pope has little power to endanger the discipline. of the German Army, even though it be largely composed or Roman Catholic soldiers. Doubtless his real object is to obtain some kind of influence over both the Czar an& Francis Joseph which will enable him to guard against either of them pursuing schemes in Eastern Europe which might endanger the new German Empire. Now, to our minds, the- most improbable as well as the most undesirable event would be the demolition of that great Empire (excluding, of course, the newly annexed Alsace and Lorraine) almost as soon as it- is created, but it is by no means improbable that the more- pressure Germany applies to make Austria and Russia under- stand that their interest and duty is to come to some agree- ment as to the Lower Danube and the fate of the Turkish. Empire, the more painfully she will make it evident to both, that their wishes and hopes are utterly dissimilar, and that. anycompact into which they may enter must be a burdensome: and irritating one to both. Great things are to be hoped. from the natural caution and fear of monarchs, warned as they have recently been by a mod fearful dramatic catastrophe to one of the most powerful (as it seemed) of their num- ber. But history does not seem to show that this con- servative spirit is at all likely to be fostered by lead- ing them into engagements or understandings which are certain to fret them as soon as they are made. It may be doubted whether the pressure applied to the French Emperor to make him agree to the neutralization of Luxemburg was, not one great goad to war. The one thing that the most sagacious statesmen,—statesmen who have conceived and won the most tremendous political games wherein there was much uphill work to effect,—too often fail in, is in letting well alone, even though all they want is to enjoy what they have gained. Prince Bismarck no doubt thinks it desirable to- take guarantees for the equilibrium in Europe which he hopes. that he has established, but is he not aware that these guarantees are far oftener than not the provocations to new war ? Even. France, though she will certainly brood long over her injuries, and in all probability in time make some great effort to re- deem her losses, is more likely to be stimulated to such new exertions by the appearance of a combination against her,, than to be overawed into passiveness. We suspect that Prince Bismarck, as a statesman, is a trifle too creative and ener- getic ;—that having won, he wants to fortify his position, and that in fortifying his position he will only weaken it. France will hesitate and calculate long before she makes her next spring ; and the only thing which could hasten it would be. resentment against the sort of precautions which PrinceBismarck appears to be taking. However, there would not be much in this, if the precautions themselves seemed likely to be of any value ; but this is precisely what we doubt. There is no. denying or weakening the fact that Austria and Russia have strongly opposing interests in the East of Europe, and that even a formal agreement to delay all action in these matters, wilL be much more likely to introduce new grievances between- them than to avert fresh causes of dispute. As a rule, where interests are inevitably antagonistic, by far the most pacific. course is to avoid as much as possible all distinct discussion of them,—to keep them in the background. Then the caution- of both parties, the statesman's instinct to delay dangerous steps, may really operate to avert quarrels. But the more antago- nists try to agree on a neutral policy, the more certain is either one or both of them to declare that the compact has not been_ fairly kept. If the Berlin meeting has the political signifi- cance which Europe seems agreed to assign to it, we greatly doubt whether Prince Bismarck will not make a false step. Any quarrel between Russia and Austria would be dangerous to- his master, but we cannot believe that such a quarrel likely to be postponed by conference, or the k"-Id of argument to which conference is pretty sure to lead. " It is far more difficult to keep special compromises fairly, and to satisfy your opponent that you do keep them fairly, than it is to restrain, in the interests of peace, a general feeling of political griev- ance and dread. The best that we can hope for from either of the great parleys of this week is that no result may come of them, or if any result, a candid conviction that the less said, the sooner it will be mended.
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