Guaranteeing Czechoslovakia Fine phrases have been coined about the projected
guarantee of the frontiers of the new Czechoslovakia, but the arguments against the participation of this country in any such arrange- ment are conclusive. If there were a prospect that it could be of the, small st benefit to Czechoslovakia, the case might be different. But it could be of none. The guarantee would presumably be joint, not several, which means that the default of one guarantor would release the rest—and among the rest are Germany and Italy. In the second place it would be virtually impossible to implement effectively a guarantee of the frontiers of a small State in Central Europe. In the third the new technique of guarantees, by which their operation is obviated through pressure brought on the guaran- teed to accede to a third party's demands rather than resist them, brings the whole principle into disrepute. Fourthly, the Munich decisions and their consequences are an imperious warning to Great Britain to clear herself of all commitments in Europe east of the Rhine until the day comes, if it ever does, when after full deliberation general or specific obligations are undertaken by the members of a reconstructed League of Nations. Fifthly, such a guarantee would necessitate the expansion of the British Army to a Continental scale, a develop- ment to be justified on no other grounds, and to be deprecated on many. * * * *
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