The value of Mr Shultz
Christopher Hitchens
rr he 'peace mission' undertaken by Secretary of State George Shultz would not be necessary if American policy in the Near East showed any sign of coherence or offered any chance of success. The mere fact of his presence — touring here the rub- ble of the American embassy in Beirut and there the wreckage of American strategy in Jordan and the West Bank — is an admis- sion of failure. If any small 'breakthrough' lies anywhere ahead, it will be the outcome of rather baser considerations than any be- ing trumpeted at the moment.
First, though, a few necessary preliminaries about Shultz himself. He received rather a warm reception on his ac- cession to the post, principally because he was not General Alexander Haig, whose mercurial and devious style had become a serious worry to the White House and a constant standby for the press. Shultz was forgiven his chronically unimpressive per- formance at his confirmation hearings, and it was agreed to overlook the fact that, like so many members of Ronald Reagan's cabinet, he is interested in the Middle East only to the extent of a large financial stake in the behemoth Bechtel Corporation. Ever since taking office, he has cultivated what we journalists call a low profile'. In fact, he has been almost undetectable. Policy on Central America is run by a small clique in the White House. Policy on Western and Eastern Europe seems to have become a province of the Defence Department. In the Middle East, the President himself saw a chance for glory, so the bulbous Secretary was relegated once again. By his inertia and diffidence, Shultz has avoided condemna- tion or criticism. He hopes (not without justification) that the mainstream press will take his modesty for the model of quiet, statesmanlike, pipe-sucking behaviour. In fact, he reminds one of nothing so much as the British backbench nonentity or nincom- poop, whose defenders, bereft of any real ammunition, will say stoutly that 'after all, he's a jolly good constituency man'.
What is the Shultz constituency? He is know to favour the unbreakable alliance with Israel, which on a military level is now America's toughest and most reliable ally in the region, as well as the strongest power in itself. But he worries that a promiscuous pro-Israeli posture may lose America its friends in the conservative Gulf states. He tempers this worry with the reflection that the Arabs, outgunned and out-generalled as they are, have no alternative to the United States as a source of pressure on Israel. This hope, endlessly and inevitably disap- pointed, is durable nonetheless; perhaps partly because it is an illusion. The third in- gredient in Mr Shultz's makeup is a loyalty to his President. And his President needs, very much, to be able to enter an election campaign with a foreign policy success. An announcement of a 'disengagement' by Israel from Lebanon would come under that heading.
What would the Israelis want in return? Assuming that they see the point of re- electing Ronald Reagan (which there is every reason to believe that they do) and assuming that they know how much the events of last summer lowered their stan- ding with public opinion (ditto), and assuming that they understand the impor- tance of not terminally irritating their chief patron and arms supplier (ditto), they could well envisage trading a big concession in Lebanon for continued possession of the West Bank and Gaza. But that would mean abandoning any hope of a deal on good terms with King Hussein of Jordan. Yet, since Reagan's ineptitude has closed that door in any case — he seems never to have
believed that the King was serious about a halt to Israeli settlement and colonisation — what can be lost that has not been thrown away already?
Such are the elevating thoughts and choices competing for priority in the mind of Mr Shultz. He may well be suffering from the common delusion that there is plenty of time, and that a final or con- clusive agreement can once again wait until the next round of wheeler-dealing has been finished. After all, the Soviet Union has been (for now) rolled almost out of Middle Eastern politics. The PLO has been beaten and scattered. Post-Sadat Egypt looks reasonably tame. The days of the OPEC cartel seem, in memory, to belong to anti- quity. Should a businessman turned politi- cian not be able to make everybody see sense?
Well, no. The Russians are famed for pa- tience among other things, and there are developments in Iran and Syria which they watch with interest. The whole credibility of Arab leadership, from Baghdad to Riyadh, was compromised by the humilia- tion of Lebanon, and there must be young officers whose names we do not yet know but may shortly have to learn by heart. Some of them may well be in the Egyptian armed forces. Meanwhile there is no sign of any collapse of nationalist allegiance among the Palestinian Arabs. So that Israel, which is clearly and candidly bent on the annexa- tion of the West Bank, will have to do one of two things with the majority of its in- habitants. It can either make them all Israeli citizens, which seems on the face of it im- probable. Or it can invite them to move elsewhere — perhaps even with compensa- tion this time. A durable coexistence is the only alternative; it is the option which makes the mind boggle even more than do the first two.
Any of the above developments could wipe the smirk off Shultz's face in an after- noon. Certainly, the great nightmare of the State Department Arabists is that, as in the past, an Israeli military victory will be suc- ceeded by a Western political defeat. That happened after 1948, when a surge of na- tionalism' and revanchism passed through the Arab world. It happened after 1956, and it happened after 1967. For a time, this worked in the interest of the United States because it could plausibly pretend to be a friend of the Arabs and a foe of the old European empires. This is not the case in a period when America stands unchallenged as the broker and armourer of the region, as well as the closest ally of Mr Begin.
It is highly unlikely that Israel will li- quidate the whole investment it has made in building up the strength of the Lebanese Phalange, the militia of ex-Major Haddad and other local beauties. But it is not unrealistic to imagine a bargain which restores at least some Lebanese sovereignty and which can be claimed both as a victory for Arab pressure and American diplomacy. If and when this happens, one should bear in mind that it means continu- ing the Palestinian agony for at least one more generation. This may or may not seem too high a price to pay for Reagan's second term.
A few weeks ago, George Shultz made a speech in which he totted up the cost of American policy in typically profit-and-loss style. The average citizen, he said, was tax- ed only 17 dollars a year for 'building peace in the Middle East', and could contrast this with the cost of haircuts and potted plants in the same period. In point of fact, Mr Shultz got his figures wrong by leaving out several rather costly military loan program- mes. For these discrepancies he was duly roasted by the respectable papers. But thought it was a bad argument even if it ad- ded up. As he trudges round with his cor- porate and cost-effective plan for the Mid- dle East, with an arms sale here and a con- cession there, the Secretary looks more than ever as if he knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.
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