TOPICS OF THE DAY.
• AMERICA AND BRITAIN: OFFICIAL DISCONTENTS.
ATE dealt last week with the Mrs. Gummidges on both sides of the Atlantic—the people who cannot be happy without the chewing-gum of melancholy and without deploring the unfortunate, though ineradicable, animosity between the two halves of the English-speaking race. We deal to-day with what appears to be a more serious matter but is in truth quite as impalpable if not quite so ridiculous—the alleged governmental friction in regard to world policy between this country and the United States. Here the problems at issue are not matters of temperament. They are official rather than popular discontents. The first and most important of these is the problem of Japan. This " Bogy ' rests upon the view that our defensive alliance with Japan was intended, or at any rate could be used, and therefore, of course, in the eyes of the Alarmists is sure to be used " sooner or later ' in a manner highly detrimental to America. America, BO goes the legend, is bound " sooner or later " to come into conflict with Japan. Japan wants, and intends to have, something, or rather several things, which the Americans don't mean her to have. Japan wants her citizens to have as clear a right to come to and live in California and the other Pacific States as the nationals of European countries have. Further, she wants to force the people of the Pacific Coast to treat her emigrants and the children of her emigrants in the matter of education and social rights exactly, say, as they treat Italians or Slays and their children.
This claim is resented, first, on the ground of colour, and, next, as an interference with the constitution of the United States which gives to the individual States of the Union the right to make such laws as are the chief grounds of the Japanese complaint, i.e., local legislative Acts which in practice override treaty engagements. In addition, the Americans believe that Japan wants to take from them the Philippines and the Sandwich Islands and generally to command the Pacific Ocean. " This state of things," say the Americans of anti-Japanese views, " must ultimately end in hostilities between America and Japan. Their policies are irreconcilable and neither will give way to the other."
The next step is to point out that since Britain is an ally of Japan, Britain is " clearly bound to come to the assist- ance of her ally." Therefore, while the Alliance lasts, war with Japan means for America war with Britain. This is a pretty bad piece of syllogistic reasoning, but even if it were logic-proof we should not be greatly per- turbed. As Sir Thomas Browne said long ago, nations are not governed by " Ergotisms."
Needless to say, so crude, nay so ridiculous, a view of the situation is not held in the State Department or by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. People whose business it is not merely to talk about treaties but also to read them know perfectly well that our Alliance with Japan cannot possibly be interpreted by any sane man in the way we have just described. Five minutes spent over the Treaty will show not only that it does not verbally bear that interpretation, but that it has signs all over it of a deliberate intention to prevent such an interpretation. To begin with, the Treaty is strictly localized to Japan and the waters round Japan and China. Therefore no casus foederis—i.e., cause of war contemplated by the Treaty— can arise except within this limited area. Next, it is a defensive Treaty only. Therefore the ally could not be involved in war if Japan were the aggressor—that is, if Japan attacked America.
But this is not all. When we last renewed our Treaty of Alliance with Japan, our statesmen in the House of Commons and in official documents were most careful to explain the localized nature of the Treaty. They made it absolutely clear that the Treaty was never meant to be used, and never could be used, against America. Finally, and to prevent any misunderstanding, we took the almost unprecedented course of getting the Japanese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister (we forget for the moment which) to annex to the Treaty a formal note in which the Japanese Government in • the fullest and frankest way stated that they realized the very special relations which existed between the two halves of the English-speaking race, and respected our determination to do nothing which could seem hostile to America. In fact, the Japanese said as plainly as words could say that they knew they could never expect help from England should they un- fortunately engage in war with America. Finally, as Lord Northcliffe pointed out in his recent speech, when we signed the Peace Commission Treaty at Washington in 1914 we announced to Japan that the Treaty would be construed as limiting the scope of the British and Japanese Alliance.
One might have imagined that this would have been enough to give a quietus to the anti-American Alliance legend. Unfortunately, however, when people grow sus- picious in the matter of foreign affairs, they are apt to become sense-proof. There have actually been mischief- makers and muddle-heads in America who, confronted with the documents we have just described, have developed out of their own inner consciousnesses a wonderful secret Treaty with Japan, or at any rate secret clauses in the renewed Treaty. These diplomatic documents, though never divulged (this view must surely have an Hibernian origin), " are well known to contain provision for a joint attack upon the United States," or at any rate " for British action intended to prevent the United States defending herself against her dangerous and treacherous enemy," &c., &c. We are sure that the American readers of the Spectator will not expect us to deal very seriously with this triumph of secret diplomacy. Indeed, we should not be surprised if most of them would entirely release us from the duty of tracing it to its scource or discovering its origin. The investigation, they would see, would be too much like that contemplated in the well-known definition of metaphysics—" looking in a totally dark room for a black cat which isn't there." Even if some Sinn Fein or German enthusiast were to show us the particular cupboard at the British Foreign Office, guarded by mounted Black-and-Tans and surrounded by electrically-charged barbed wire entanglements, in which the secret Treaty was placed, we should be prepared to take oath and say that, like Mme. Humbert's safe, it would be found to contain nothing more compromising than chocolates and cakes for the lady shorthand-typists. Our Treaty of Alliance with Japan was in truth most carefully worded so that it could never under any possibility involve us in war with America. It was intended, as its history shows, to prevent the destruction of Japan by means of a coalition headed by her powerful neighbour Russia, and for no other purpose.
We think we have said enough to annihilate the allega- tions that Japan and Britain will some day be arrayed against the " Daughter Republic of the West." Yet we have till now left the most important argument on our side unstated. Even the most wildly imperialistic and most aggressive of Britons do not contemplate with pleasure blowing the British Empire into smithereens in a single instant. We all know perfectly well that this would be the result if we went to war with America not to support some rights of our own, but in order to help the Japanese to fight America. The moment such a war was declared, the bonds that unite us with the Dominions would be severed. If the people of Australia and New Zealand were asked which side they were going to be on in a war between the men of the white race and the men of the yellow race, they would not hesitate for a second. They would not waste time reading diplomatic papers, or considering legal points, or thumbing the clauses of the Treaty. They would say : " We are with our own flesh and blood If the poor old mother country has gone mad, we cannot help it. We are deeply sorry , but if things have come to this pass, we must reluctantly take the leadership of her elder daughter rather than of herself. Help yellow men to take San Francisco by assault ! Good heavens, what are you talking about ! " The same dreadful message of disintegration would run from end to end of Canada with a similar vehemence. There could only be one place for Canada in a fight to a finish between Japan and America—by the side of America. White South Africa would give the same answer. Nor would that be all. The moment they realized what had happened, ninety-nine per cent. of the population here would be stoning their own Government for its criminal lunacy in backing Japan against our own flesh and blood. We are quite as sure here as they are in the Dominions as to which is our proper side if it comes to war between Japan and America.
Surely thoughtful Americans must see this as well as we do. They must know that war on the side of Japan against America would be for us the impossible, the uncreating word—the word that would let down universal darkness upon us and our Empire. Surely they know that we are not mad, not bent upon national suicide. Therefore, how can they believe the abject nonsense talked about the Japanese Alliance and what it means for America ? Even the emissaries of the Sinn Fein Irish and the Germans must know they are talking moonshine when they shout " Beware ! " into the ears of the inhabitants of the Pacific Slope.
" But," it will be said, perhaps, " all this sounds very well, and as you put it is convincing enough. But if you are right, how comes it that you have not long ago denounced the Alliance with Japan, or rather, for the job is easier than that, refused to renew it ? An oppor- tunity is just coming for refusal to renew. Yet we do not hear that any such action is contemplated." The easiest answer for the Spectator to make to such criticism would of course be to point out that we always opposed the Japanese Alliance, as our readers know, not merely on the ground that the Russian danger was very much exag- gerated, but still more because the Alliance with Japan, how- ever good in intention, might be misunderstood in America. Instead of risking such misunderstanding, we always desired to make it quite clear to the people of America that we sympathized with them as with our Australian fellow-citizens in their determination to remain unmixed white communities. We fully realize, however, that this is by no means a sufficient answer to the question we have suggested. The national answer is, fortunately, quite as satisfactory, though not quite so short as our own. Strange as it may seem to certain members of the American Senate, we continued the Alliance with Japan after the menace from Russia disappeared because we considered that to be the most friendly course to take as regards America. Our Foreign Office knows that the State Depart- ment does not want to get into a quarrel with Japan over some dispute in which, very possibly, the legislature of California or some other Western State has, whatever its intentions, managed to put itself juridically and diplomatic- ally in the wrong. With a people entertaining so high a sense of national honour as the Japanese, a dispute over the treatment of their emigrants might very possibly bring on a war which neither Government desired, when in fact the dispute could easily be made the subject of compromise. In such a case it might be very convenient for the Ameri- can Government to be able to say to the British Government : " Do make your Japanese Allies realize what they are doing. Point out how impossible it will be for us to yield if they put their demands in the way they are now putting them, and how certain it is that if they force matters you will have to withdraw from the Alliance." In a word, one of our reasons for continuing the Alliance has been the keeping of the peace. To be quite plain, we have felt that as long as we are in alliance with Japan we may be able to help to calm down her population should they become excited on a " Pundon,or."
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