MODERN ARMS IN MOUNTAIN WARFARE.
THE reader of modern newspapers is a spectator who surveys the revolving kaleidoscope of the world; and latterly he has been entertained by a series of war- scenes. When this year began, he was following with keen interest the phases of a fierce contest between one of the strongest armies in Asia and a few thousand tribesmen, on the outer slopes of the Afghan highlands; the field of operations was narrow and obscure; the combatants were equal in nothing but courage; the odds were made even, for a time, by the difficulties of mountain warfare. To-day he looks on at the spectacle of two modern nations contending from dis- tant continents on the vast open battlefield of the ocean. He has just seen Anglo-Egyptian troops ascending the Nile, and driving the Dervishes out of their entrenchment by one resolute charge ; he is watching the ominous preparations of rival European States to break down the most ancient and populous Empire in the world; and he contrasts in amaze- ment the tame immobility of China with the wild energetic patriotism of the Afridie. Each of these scenes suggests curious questions as to the proportionate influence in warfare of the elements of race, national character, moral and material strength, superiority of armament, and physical environ- ment; for in these days of restless human activity, the destiny of a nation, as formerly of a man, depends more than ever upon its ready power of self-defence.
As between States, it seems clear that the loose, W- omanised rulerships of Asia are becoming more and more incapable of resisting the concentrated forces of highly civilised Governments. Except the Ottoman Empire, there is no Asiatic State which could defend itself against a European army; and that Empire is partly European, and owes its safety mainly to the mutual jealousy of its European neighbours. All other kingdoms of Asia are practically at the mercy of the Western Powers. As between races, the case stands differently ; for under certain conditions and circumstances the balance still seems to lie even between the trained and the untrained fighting man. All military history shows that where a naturally courageous race has the advantage of position, where the people fight entrenched behind the natural fortifications of a difficult country, they are formidable to regular troops. The Turks could never, in the course of centuries, reduce Montenegro; the Russians took thirty years to subdue the Caucasus ; it will have taken the English at least as long to pacify the Afghan mountaineers; while, on the other hand, undisciplined valour has almost always been useless against scientific warfare in the plains, as in India, Central Asia, and Upper Egypt. Even there the barbarian, who fights after his own fashion, as the Zulu did, may now and then score a victory, for the moment, against the regulars; but half-disciplined armies, who awkwardly imitate the tactics of their opponents, have no chance at all.
The warfare between the plains and the hills, between powerful conquering rulerahips who have swept level and rich countries with their armies, and hardy tribes who make their stand behind mountain fastnesses, has gone on from time immemorial. The English marched up easily from the Indian seaboard to the Indus ; but at the foot of the Afghan hills they came to a halt, and have since moved onward very slowly indeed. Where both sides use quick-loading, accurate firearms, it seems probable that the balance of the advantage is in favour of hillmen ; and the Afridis have got rifles which they know how to handle. In a country where tactical movements are not much hampered, where discipline steadies the fighting line, and troops can be concentrated or extended as need may be, equality of weapons does not save the barbarian, and the more you improve the mechanical armament the easier is the triumph of civilised force. It was with javelins and short swords that the Romans subdued the most warlike races of Europe,—Gauls, Germans, Iberians, and Britons; they won entirely by drill and generalship, by steadfast effort at close quarters, as when Omar writes of a sharp encounter that his soldiers settled the affair with their swords. The Macedonian soldiers could not have been much better armed than the Persian host; but Alexander led them without a check from the Hellespont to the Hyphasis; and probably he had no rougher adventures than among the hills where the English have just been fighting, in the Swat Valley and along the Cabul River. We may conclude, therefore, that as it was in the Roman days and has been in our own times, so it will be in future—the possession of improved war material will not help Asiatic kingdoms; and in battles on a large scale, with room fur manceavring, the trained military strength of Europe will continue to scatter Oriental armies. But among narrow passes and steep ridges the sharpshooter and skirmisher, the deadly marksman at long ranges, has evidently become much more formidable than heretofore ; he has been bred to this work from his youth up ; he repre- sents the flower of his people in vigour and energy ; he is contending as a volunteer against paid soldiery ; he has at last found a weapon exactly suited to the system of guerilla warfare; and in consequence our late at Frontier Campaign has been the most severe of all those on record since in 1849 we first drew our frontier along the skirts of the Afghans highlands.
In short, the Afghan problem has now become for file English in India more complicated than ever, because Eastern and Central Afghanistan is perhaps the most difficult high- land country in Asia, held by a warlike and fanatic people who are arming themselves to the teeth with excellent rifles. There is a great manufacturing arsenal at Cabal, and the impartial enterprise of European traders offers an unlimited supply at low prices. We cannot disarm or disable them without occupying the country, and while occupation even of the older hill ranges has already become a stiff job, the longer we postpone it the stronger will they be. For the last thirty years our declared policy has been to make Afghanistan strong and friendly. There can be no doubt as to her increase of strength, but in the matter of pro- moting friendliness our success is not not so plainly demonstrable ; remembering that, as Lord Roberts said long since, the more the Afghans see of us in their own country the leas they like us. The method of enlisting military races and tribes into our own Army has answered excellently in India for the last hundred years; but then we have usually begun by annexing their country, as in the case of the Sikhs. Where the clan remains independent, and the clansman en- lists, he goes back to his hills a trained rifleman, with a thorough insight into our tactics, and some knowledge of our weak points ; and this is the case with the Afridi.
The upshot seems to be that as between plain and moun- tain, between the attack and defence of natural fortifications, the improvement of long-range weapons favours the defence. But the curtain has now fallen upon the Frontier War; and the scene is now changing from the hills to the sea, where the physical surroundings, the waves, the wind, and the weather, are exactly even for both sides. In such conditions it is probable that the best mechanical armament and scientific superiority must tell speedily and decisively. The difference in the hearts of men tells too.
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