In defence of Concorde

TECHNOLOGY ANGUS MAUDE, MP

Last week Concorde at last made its maiden flight, but the argument over whether or not the whole project should be cancelled con- tinues. Some months ago, in an article entitled 'A Case of Human Sacrifice; our science correspondent, Dr Peter J. Smith, put the case against supersonic airliners of all kinds. This week Angus Maude, a former Con- servative aviation spokesman, argues that it is too soon to pronounce sentence of death.

A little over a year late, the first Concorde prototype has flown, inaugurating a flight test programme in which up to seven aircraft are scheduled to undertake more than 4,300 flying hours of tests over the next four years.

Three weeks before the first test flight took place, a full-page advertisement was placed in the Guardian by the 'Anti-Concorde Project,' a campaign undertaken by a committee under the 'patronage' of those two formidable Amazons the Baronesses Stocks and Wootton of Abinger. The purpose of the campaign is quite straight- forward—to get the Concorde project can- celled by the British and French governments. The committee's initial propaganda adduces a variety of reasons for this, but two are clearly dominant: the Concorde is very expensive, and it is liable to make a great deal of noise. The question posed—and it is certainly reasonable— is simply whether it is worth while to spend so much money on annoying a great many people for the sake of the minority who will travel in Concorde aircraft if they are ultimately brought into airline service.

The question is not, of course, posed as clearly and logically as that. As with most propaganda campaigns, the authors are unwil- ling to leave out any syggestions that might prove damaging to the enemy. It is first sugges- ted that Concorde will be a flop anyway. Then, if it does manage to fly, it will never be able to fly economically in airline service because it will not be allowed to fly supersonically over

in- habited aims. Next, if it does manage to fly economically with a subsonic limitation over land, the sonic booms will be an intolerable im- position on people in ships. Finally, even if it turns out to he an economic proposition and manages to avoid the ships, the cost is bound to , escalate further and the taxpayer should not be called upon to bear the burden.

None of these objections can be dismissed as the ravings of reactionary cranks. And it should be said at once that we do not now know, and may not know with certainty for another year, whether some or all of them are valid. The one thing that is certain is that if the Concorde is cancelled now, without further tests, we shall never know.

• This is not, of course, a conclusive argument against cancellation. A time could come, before very long, when the balance of probability sug- gested that Concorde was unlikely to prove an economic proposition sufficiently viable to jus- tify heavy additional expenditure. The question is whether the balance has tilted that far at the present time, and it is not a question that can be answered with any certainty at all. The only people who can answer the essential technical questions at this moment on the basis of up-to- date knowledge and experience are those „who have a substantial interest in getting Concorde into service. All one can do is to try to assess the probable implications of such evidence as is available.

It is probably unfair to make gloomy prog- nostications on the basis of the past history of the project. The designers and constructors have run into many technical snags, and the tests will no doubt reveal more. So far, how- ever, they do not-appear to have been snore seri- ous or numerous than a normally pessimistic man would expect in a complex Pioneering pro- ject involving so many unknowns. Needless to say, a firm which is fighting for its life (as the British Aircraft Corporation, in common with -most of the British airclaft industry, was in the first years of Labour government), and minis- ters who have committed themselves to a pres- tige project, are not normally pessimistic. Al- though Mr Wedgwood Benn has wisely kept his options open, courageously refusing to be pres- sured into making irreversible commitments about line production, he has not been exactly knocking the project, any more than have the spokesmen of sac and Sod Aviation. There is always a temptation to estimate costs and time schedules on the low side. The longer you can keep Parliament and the Treasury- from losing patience altogether, the nearer you get to the point of no return when it would seem absurd to cancel.

The original target date for the first test flight was grossly over-optimistic. Mare systems modifications have had to be Made than were allowed for, and Concorde is not an easy air- craft to work in. But the pre-flight systems tests have 'been very thorough, and there is as yet no reason to suppose that future schedules will prove anything like as wrong as the first. Nor, one would hope, should there be any more major changes in customer requirements. Six- teen airlines have so far been responsible for a number of important modifications, including two 'stretches' involving changes in length, weight, speed and range.

All advanced aircraft development projects suffer from escalating costs, and the American SST (if it survives) will be no exception. Con- corde has suffered more than most, as a result of the minute insistence on a mathematically exact sharing of the work between Britain and France. Neither Britain nor France could have completed the Concorde project alone; but it is possible that the final cost will be anything up to 50 per cent higher than it would have been if all the work had been done in one country. Even so, the cost record of Concorde does not look too bad.

Original estimates, when the Anglo-French agreement was signed at the end of 1962, pro- vided for research and development costs of from £150 million to £170 million, to be shared equally between the two governments. By 1966 the estimate had risen to £500 million at 1966 prices. Total expenditure has now just passed the £300 million mark (at current prices). On 22 January, Mr Berm told the House of Commons that 'latest reports indicate that the estimate of development costs has risen substantially and, depending upon the experience of the flight trials, could rise further again.' He has so far been unwilling to quantify his statement, but he has continued to sound optimistic about Con- corde's commercial prospects. The cost escala- tion has been considerable, and could still be- come critical, it seems. But, by comparison with previous projects of comparable magnitude,and novelty, it does not yet appear staggering.

• The crucial question, still unanswered, is that of the aircraft's lift/ drag ratio. On this,- in the last resort, all Concorde's payload economics depend. The difficulties of getting it right with a fixed-wing aircraft which must fly at both sub- sonic and supersonic speeds are notorious, and it is admitted that recent calculations of drag have given some cause for alarm. Against this, it is a fact that in SAC'S previous supersonic air- craft the drag has proved to be below predic- tions. Only the flight tests will show what modi- fications are necessary and how damaging they are to the economics of payload and range.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that all goes'reasonably well, is it possible to make any predictions about the commercial future of Concorde? Again, it is not possible to pronounce on these with any confidence, although some general observations may be made. While recog- nising that the aircraft's economics could still fail to justify putting it into production, it is possible to make some estimates of what might happen if payload and range turn out to be satisfactory.

First, it is hard to feel much sympathy with those journals and writers who have consistently predicted that Concorde could never prove a commercially attractive aircraft even if the de- signers' calculations were right. In other words, these critics have, simply been saying that the makers are building the wrong aircraft. Some would have preferred a bigger and faster ssr, on the lines of the original American ideas, while others insist that the only worthwhile objective is to build very large subsonic jet air- liners with a view to reducing fares. It remains to be seen how the American project works out, but it is clearly not one that was open to British and French manufacturers. As to the second alternative, the objective may or may eot be sound (and there is room for genuine disagree- ment about this), but the alternatives are not mutually exclusive.

Above all, one must surely take some account of the reactions of major airlines. At present, sixteen airlines have options on seventy-four production aircraft. None of these operators will know whether they will want to place firm orders until, at some stage in the flight test pro- gramme, the makers are able to give reasonably hard performance guarantees. Nevertheless, the airlines are still acting as if they thought Con- corde might turn out to be a profitable invest- ment for them, and it is hard to see why they think this if the whole enterprise was miscon- ceived from the start. We may perhaps discount the noises made by BOAC and Air France, which are in the last resort government-controlled; but it is surely significant that Pan Am thought it worth while to take a full page of newspaper advertising, on the day after the first Concorde flew, to proclaim that 'before long eight sleek Pan Am Concordes will be_among the first to welcome you into the new age of flying.' How can anyone maintain, in the face of this, that Concorde cannot be a commercial proposition? Whether it will is, of course, a different question. BAC continue to maintain that there will be an assured initial market for up to 250 Con- cordes, and that there will continue to be a market for Concordes in one shape or another for at least another twenty years. In particular, they claim that the American SST, if it comes into service several years after Concorde, will complement the smaller aircraft rather than drive it from all airline routes. Neither of these assertions is indefensible, although the first is clearly optimistic.

On the general question of the aircraft's eco- nomics, SAC'S assumptions include a total and worldwide ban on supersonic flying over land, and a general airlines policy of fare surcharges on Concordes to safeguard the payloads of sub- sonic airliners still in service. As to whether the demand for supersonic passenger travel is there, it is perhaps more useful to try to predict on the basis of past experience than to accept un- questioningly the assurances of those who do not like the Concorde anyway. The fact is that increases in passenger aircraft speeds have al- ways in the past attracted more traffic—not only in- terms of transfer to the faster aircraft, but in the form of a total growth in traffic. There is no reason at all to suppose that this will not be true of Concorde, even with a fares surcharge, especially as it brings some intercontinental journeys down from more than twenty-four hours to little over twelve.

It is true that Concorde's payload—only about 7+ per cent of its gross take-off weight— is very small, and seat /mile costs are high. On the other hand, costs per aircraft/mile will be lower. The ssT will fly much farther in an hour than a subsonic jet, and will operate at higher route frequencies. In short, if performance matches predictions, the market should be there. - Much will, of course, depend on the attitude of the AMerican aviation authorities. It seems almost certain that they ssillban supersonic fly- ing over the us—at least until thereltan Ameri- can ssr in the market—and one would not put it past them to ban the Concorde from landing and take-off on the grounds of noise. There is little doubt that Concorde is noisier at the point of take-off than subsonic jets, particularly in re- spect of lateral noise; on the other hand, the duration of maximum noise is shorter. In any case, no one in his senses would advoca& that Concorde should get special treatment in respect of subsonic noise. It is up to the makers to pro- duce an aircraft which conforms to existing noise regulations, and they say they are doing this. It seems that the other anti-Concorde argu- ment, which is that it provides serious handling problems at airports, is mistaken. The British Airports Authority seems to have few worries about it.

The airport noise argument is not really .an argument against Concorde. There will be sub- sonic jets which will present exactly the Same problems. Theltlain fact is that major airports should not be. sited inland near large residential areas, and this question will ultimately have to be dealt with as a matter of principle.

The problem of sonic boom is, of course, something quite different, but it is essential to discuss it fairly—which many of Concorde's opponents do not. First, we do not really know what the Concorde boom will be like. Every supersonic aircraft produces its own 'overpres- sure' patterns of a distinctive kind, and no one can predict Concorde's with certainty. The pro- totypes will not fly transonically until probably the late summer of this year, and flying at the full speed of Mach 2 is still a year away. Testing at supersonic speeds will be done over open sea.

Meanwhile, the makers' estimates of Con- corde's range, route speeds and thus potential market have been firmly based on the prospect of a total overland ban on supersonic flight. It happens that the aircraft's range is not signifi- cantly reduced by subsonic flight. If its super- sonic 'pressure jumps' turn out to be so low as to be 'socially tolerable,' the increase in poten- tial market would be an uncovenanted bonus. This is unlikely, in my view, and I believe that most sensible people would oppose any attempt to stretch the limits of tolerance in Concorde's favour. The odds are that Concorde's supersonic flight will be (and ought to be) banned over inhabited land and main shipping routes. The point is, however, that this is not an argument for cancelling the project now, since Concorde could still prove a commercial proposition even with the ban.

There is little than can be said with confidence about the dangers of upper atmosphere pollu- tion, radiation, solar flares and the rest. Both the manufacturers and the airport authorities recognise the problems, and the flight tests will certainly have to provide convincing answers before certificates of airworthiness are granted. ln this field, again, there are unknowns which will remain unknown if the tests are cancelled.

We are left with the argument on grounds of general principle. There are many people who simply feel that Concorde is a dangerous tech- nological monster which should be banned on _principle. 1 confess that I am not entirely with- out sym-p5t.h.y for this point of view, but I be- lieve its assumptiloill to be a little too simple. It is not in principle unreasilnable„ for those who believe (as I do) that technology a'st..— ke strictly controlled in the social interests of human beings, to Maintain that supersonic pas- senger ffight represents a breakthrough into a new dimension, and that the line should be drawn firmly here and now. The question is whether it can be drawn, and whether the mon- ster can be told firmly and finally to go away- I do not believe it can. In the end, &six will

surely come, whether or not their advent in air- line flight is delayed until the 'state of the art' renders them less potentially objectionable. It should not be forgotten that the Russians have already flown one.

Above all, I am convinced that the optimistic conviction of the 'Anti-Concorde Project' that the Americans will not build ss-rs if the Con- corde is cancelled is impossibly naive. Whatever happens to the present American project, the search will not be abandoned. It is the American habit to put every obstacle in the way of their foreign competitors, including attempts to get their projts cancelled or their aircraft banned from us routes, and then to step in and scoop the pool. The Comet pioneered jet passenger flight, but the Boeing 707 captured the market. Americans worked hard to get the isa2 can- celled, in the interests of the F111, and it is not easy to believe that we are now better off for having cancelled it.

On balance, therefore, it seems to me—even taking into account the likely future costs—that the flight testing programme for Concorde ought to be allowed to go ahead. If, in a year or fifteen months, the makers assumptions are proved right and no serious snags have emerged, airlines will want to place firm orders. The de- cision, whether or not to authorise line produc- tion, can then be taken by the Government. It is possible that there is a real export bonanza in sight. On the other hand, it is possible that it will become clear inside a year that the econo- mics are all wrong. In that case the project should be cancelled.

I am not in favour of 'giving Concorde the benefit of the doubt' in any marginal situation, and I am rigidly opposed to stretching the limits of toleration for it in respect of sonic boom or airport noise. But it does seem to me that it would be wholly unreasonable, on economic • and technological grounds, to cancel the pro- ject without going much further with the flight testing programme that has now begun. Nor does the probable balance of social advantage yet seem to demand it.