The freedom to die
Sir : John Rowan Wilson's statement (7 February) that 'our attitude to abortion and population control is becoming increasingly more rational' is truly astonishing. Contracep- tion and abortion are usually justified by appeals to 'social welfare,' public opinion,' 'progress' and similar concepts, none of -*filch is any less mythical or any more rational than old-fashioned ideas of 'Divine law.'
Dr Rowan Wilson also states that there is 'no justification for imposing religious vidtvs of morality on a community which has largely jp..,,,,4bandoned organised religion.' How does he justify the imposition of secular morality on those individuals who, if given the choice, would -
reject it? The abortion law compels people who disagree with abortion to pay for the National Health Service in whose hospitals abortions are carried out, doctors who disagree with abortion are penalised in favour of those who agree, and patients who require genuine medical treatment are penalised in favour of abortion cases who occupy an increasing num- ber of hospital beds. The chairman of the parliamentary Labour party recently stig- matised parents of large families as 'social delinquents,' so it seems only a matter of time before contraception becomes compulsory.
The experience of Nazi Germany shows that euthanasia can ultimately lead to mass- extermination of 'social undesirables,' and, to be honest, I cannot see any difference in prin- ciple between the killing of unborn babies in abortion clinics and the killing of Jews in gas- chambers. For some reason. Nazi-type propo- sals need only be called 'liberal' in order to achieve respectability. Of course, opponents of abortion and euthanasia are prejudiced, but so are the advocates of abortion and euthanasia. One prejudice may be more attractive than another, but the idea that sociologically-based prejudices are more 'rational' than theologi- cally-based prejudices is one of the greatest fallacies of our time.
Donald M. Bowers General Hospital, South Shields, Co Durham
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