Nigeria's phoney talks

BIAFRA SIR LOUIS MBANEFO

Sir Louis Mbanefo was head of the Biafran delegation to the Kampala peace talks with Nigeria. From 1959 until Biafra declared itself independent last year he was Chief Justice of the Eastern Region of Nigeria.

The Biafra delegation went to the Kampala peace talks in the hope that the Nigerian government genuinely wanted a negotiated peace. Biafra has always believed that the war was unnecessary and senseless, and could not achieve a pacification of Biafra. It was unfor- tunate that Nigeria ever started the war against Biafra. The pogrom of 1966 in which more than 30,000 Biafrans were killed and over two mil- lion mutilated, maimed or rendered destitute, eleven months of war and . eight months of indiscriminate bombing of the civilian popula- tion, hospitals and schools have achieved only one thing, and that is to increase the bitterness the Biafrans feel towards Nigeria. We had hoped that the Nigerian.government, realising that the problem was basically human and in- capable of military solution, would see the need for stopping the bloody war that has caused so much loss of life and misery and agree to a cease-fire; but our hopes were quickly dashed to pieces at Kampala.

My instructions were to negotiate first a cessation of hostilities and then to reach agree- ment on how we and the Nigerians could live in peace. We feel that talks on the political issues could be meaningful only if fighting, shooting and blockade stopped. It soon became apparent, especially after the first rumour that Port Harcourt had fallen to the Nigerian troops, that the Nigerian government was not in- terested in a negotiated settlement but in a military solution and an imposed peace.

I arrived in London on 4 May 1968 and two hours later went into consultation with Mr Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary- General, on the preliminary issues. Chief Enahoro arrived a day later and from that time until 14 May we were engaged on preliminary talks. I think that that was an unusually long time to spend in deciding where the peace talks would be held and the subjects to be included on the agenda. However, we agreed on a two- point agenda on the substantive issues, namely (a) conditions for a cessation of hostilities and (b) arrangements for a permanent settlement.

My delegation was ready to begin talks with- in forty-eight hours, but the Nigerian dele- gation required no fewer than nine days to prepare for the peace talks. We agreed that the talks should begin at 10 a.m. in Kampala on Thursday 23 May. My delegation arrived at Kampala on Wednesday the 22nd. On the morning of the 23rd, we received a message to the effect that Chief Enahoro would not be ready at 10 a.m. and wanted the conference to open at 11 a.m. The conference was duly opened by Dr Milton Obote, President of Uganda, at 11 a.m.

On the question of chairmanship, we main- tained that a chairman was necessary, a point which was borne out by the subsequent course of events. The Nigerian delegation maintained that we did not need one, and, as we could not agree on this issue, we registered a disagree- ment and proceeded to deal with the question of an observer. Here again, contrary to our view, the Nigerian delegation again maintained that independent observers were not necessary. We had proposed three observers, one appointed by each side and one by President Obote. Eventually agreement was reached on the one to be appointed by President Obote. We registered disagreement on the question of whether there should be more than one obser- ver. I was anxious that the conference should not delay or break down over procedural issues.

Two days after the opening of the con- ference, we came to the third item on the agenda—the 'conditions for the cessation of hostilities.' We demanded, and stated our pro- posals for, an immediate cessation of fighting on land, air and sea, and for the immediate lifting of the blockade. Our proposals, briefly, were as follows: (1) immediate cessation of fighting on land, sea and air; (2) immediate removal of the economic blockade mounted by Nigeria against Biafra; and (3) the withdrawal of troops to behind the pre-war boundaries.

With regard to the cessation of fighting, we were willing to agree to the policing of the cease-fire line by an international force, the composition of which must be agreed to by both sides; and to a supervisory body, the composition and power of which were to be agreed, to be stationed in the areas from which troops were withdrawn to ensure that the local population were not in any way victimised.

With regard to the removal of the blockade, we were ready to accept supervision at points of entry into Nigeria and Biafra to ensure that there was no arms build-up by either side while talks on a permanent settlement continued. The aim should be to restore civilian life in the war-ravaged areas as soon as possible.

We concluded outlining our proposals at about noon on the 25th, and, although the pro- posals had been contained in my opening speech two days previously, Chief Enahoro said he wanted more time to consider them.

At 2 p.m. I received a message from Mr Arnold Smith saying that Chief Enahoro was seeing President Obote and would like the meeting to resume at 4 p.m. instead of 2.30 p.m. At 4 p.m. Chief Enahoro said that a secretary attached to his delegation had been missing since Thursday and that, for that reason, he could not state their case that after- noon. He asked for a further postponement till the next day. I demurred and insisted on the meeting going on, but eventually agreed, most reluctantly, to a further adjournment until 3.30 p.m. the next day. At 3 o'clock the next day Chief Enahoro asked for a further adjournment, on this occasion without naming a time. I felt that this was the limit and pro- tested very vigorously. At 5 p.m. I was told that Chief Enahoro would like to see me personally in Mr Arnold Smith's office. I went with two members of my delegation. At that meeting Chief Enahoro read a message which he said he had received from Lagos instructing him to call off (he said 'suspend') the talks until they got a satisfactory report from the Kampala police about the missing typist. He, said he had sent a message to Lagos asking for permission to continue the talks and that he hoped they would agree. We regarded it as odd that Gowon in Lagos should call off the talks in Kampala without seeking first to obtain the view of the leader of the delegation. We felt that it was more likely that he acted on the recommendation of his men on the spot. But even if he did not, whichever way one looks at it, it only showed that the Nigerian government was not serious about the talks. For them the disappearance of a secretary (there is no evidence that he did not disappear of his own free-will) was more im- portant than a cease-fire in a war where bun- -clreds of lives were being lost daily. We thought that that was unreasonable and so decided to go home the next day rather than wait in- definitely in Kampala at the pleasure of the Nigerian delegation. Late that morning, at about 11.35, we received a message that Chief Enahoro had received instructions to resume the talks.

At the intervention of President Obote my delegation agreed to stay and hear the Nigerian proposals. They virtually amounted to offer- ing us terms for a surrender. It was, according to them, a package deal and con- tained in part points relevant to item three and others that properly belonged to item four of the agenda. They were unacceptable to us, but we were willing to explore whether they represented their final words on the question of cease-fire. We wanted to discuss those items of the proposals which were relevant to a cease- fire. Chief Enahoro was reluctant that any item should be discussed separately and sug- gested a private meeting to examine the pro- posals. I agreed. Two days of consultations failed to bring the parties any nearer.

The basic difference was that we wanted a cease-fire before discussing the political arrange- ments which both sides admit would take several weeks or months to work out: Chief Enahoro wanted us to renounce our indepen- dence first before there could be any discussion of a cease-fire. I felt I could not go on wasting time in Kampala making the world believe we were discussing a cease-fire when in actual fact we were making no progress. I demanded a full meeting of the conference to register pro- gress. The positions of the parties were stated and, there being no prospect of reconciling them, the disagreement was noted and the meeting came to an end.

It is not true that the Biafra delegation `walked out' of the meeting or that we 'broke off the talks because of fresh instructions.' It is not true either that the Nigerian• delegation made any concessions; if they intended to do so they had not stated what the concessions were. They insisted that their proposals were a package deal, and that was not acceptable to us. A contributory factor to the failure of the talks was the insistence of the British govern- ment in continuing to supply arms to the Nigerian government. It made the `hawks' be- lieve that they had the backing of Her Majesty's Government in seeking a military solution and made them even less likely to agree to a cease- fire.

As to the future, we Mall continue to defend ourselves as long as Nigerian troops continue to attack us in our homeland. Even if they over- run Biafra, that will not be the end of the struggle. The people of Biafra are so totally committed that they will continue to fight rather than surrender on the terms proposed by Nigeria.

It is a fact that since 30 May 1967 Biafra has existed as a separate political entity from Nigeria, exercising sovereign rights within its territory. Biafra has also been recognised as a sovereign, independent country by four in- dependent African states with prospects of more to follow. Any settlement between Nigeria and Biafra cannot ignore this fact. What Biafra gives of its sovereign rights in the interests of peace and cooperation with Nigeria cannot be incompatible with its sovereignty. It is for this reason that Biafra has offered maximum cooperation in all fields except the, Political. We believe that political separateness provides u. —th the security of life and property which the Federation had denied us in the past. We believe also that a scheme could be worked out by which Biafra and Nigeria could live in peace.