The Ghost of Hollybush
RUSSIA DEV MURARKA
Moscow—Glassboro seems here not a week but aeons ago, and it is not the spirit of Holly- bush but its ghost which seems to haunt Soviet- American relations. The negative vote of the General Assembly on the Soviet as well as the non-aligned resolutions on the Middle East has demonstrated to the Russians how great is the hold of the United States and other western powers on the smaller nations. The Middle East crisis therefore continues to affect the Russians' political stature.
It is true that by hurrying to re-establish direct contacts with the Arab leaders through the visit of President Podgorny the Russians have succeeded in retaining their friendship; and the quick supply of arms from the Soviet Union has restored their sense of security. But the failure of the UN General Assembly to recommend an unconditional withdrawal could have serious consequences. The immediate problem for the Soviet Union is therefore to cope with this new political situation rather than to worry about relations with America.
The situation is not an easy one for the Russians. They may even have already come to regret having allowed the summit at Glass- boro to take place at all. Their own allies were never convinced of its necessity, and they are critical of the undesirable boost it has provided for Johnson in his crucial pre-presidential elec- tion manoeuvres for the favour of American voters. Some of the East Europeans argue that the Kosygin-Johnson summit took the heat out of the General Assembly debate, and that Washington once again smartly out- manoeuvred the Russians by playing upon Leis fascination with the United States. To be fair to the Russians, they themselves did not lend much public importance to Glass- boro. There was a remarkable lack of Soviet press comment, and during the later part of Kosygin's stay in New York and Havana greater attention was paid to Podgorny's visits to the Middle East.
Certainly, there is little sign of Soviet- American rapprochement on the substantive issues. Politically, therefore, the Russians may not see any great utility in continuing a dialogue with the Americans which only suc- ceeds in arousing the suspicions of their allies. There is, on the contrary, evidence to suggest that the two powers will drift further apart under the compulsion of events, if not of their own choice.
What next in the Middle East? This is the question which everybody is asking here. No one has the answer, but there are some straws in the wind. A phrase which has constantly occurred in Soviet public pronouncements and in communiqués after the Middle Eastern visits of Podgorny refers to the need to 'liquidate the consequences of Israel's aggression.' The greatest consequence is, of course, the Israeli occupation of new Arab territories. Since the United Nations has failed the Arabs in securing this it can be surmised that the Arabs as well as the Russians will now be thinking of fresh ways of bringing pressure upon Israel. The Russians can only try political approaches. The Arabs could try by border raids to make the position of Israel untenable. They have got fresh arms, including aircraft, to provide cover.
In other words, we could be in for a long war of attrition. The Russians would not be happy about such a situation, involving the risk of a greater confrontation; but it is difficult to see how they can either object to it or fail to sup- port the Arabs. Besides there is the hope that such a slow and bitter war would soon begin to hurt the Americans and other western countries if as a result Arab oil supplies were further tightened up. The fresh flare-up in the Suez Canal Zone since the cease-fire is a pointer to what may now be taking place on a bigger scale than ever all over the Middle East.
If the outlook on the Middle East is thus gloomy, the outlook on Vietnam is no less so. The Kosygin-Johnson summit failed to reach any, agreement, however narrow, on this either. So the Russians are now saddled with two war fronts against America simultaneously. Of these, the Middle East is the more difficult since it is being carried on by proxy on the American side and the Soviet allies in the area have been considerably weakened as well as demoralised once already.
Soviet attention is now also diverted to Cyprus, where the possibility of ,a coup d'etal seems to be looming up: a coup which would not only affect Soviet relations with Turkey, which have been friendly enough lately, but also aggravate strained relations with Greece. Worse still, if, as the Russians fear, Cyprus becomes a base for American or NATO forces, the Soviet position in the Middle East generally will be affected adversely.
So the Russians are facing a long hot summer of political adversity abroad. It will not be an easy task for them.
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