THE RECALL OF SIR BARTLE FRERE.
THE Government have recalled Sir Bartle Frere, because " there has never existed between themselves and Sir Bartle Frere that harmony on the various and important questions connected with South Africa, which alone would make it desirable that he should be retained at the Cape, after the special reason for which he was sent out had ceased to exist." This is the statement which was made, in identical terms, by Lord Kimberley in the House of Lords, and by Lord Hartington, in Mr. Gladstone's unavoidable absence, in the House of Commons. From this we infer that the Government never really had any intention of retaining the contumacious Governor at his post longer than was necessary to test his influence on that policy of Confederation which was the primary object of his mission to South Africa. It will be remembered that Mr. Gladstone was pressed on this very point when the recall of Sir Bartle Frere first became a Parlia- mentary question. His reply was necessarily guarded, for to say then that Sir Bartle Frere would be recalled as soon as the question of Confederation was decided one way or the other, would have so discredited Sir Bartle as to destroy what- ever influence he might have possessed. Controversially, there- fore, the Government were at a disadvantage. The course they were adopting seemed weak and vacillating, because they could not speak out frankly without doing mischief. It is now clear that it was their intention all the time to recall Sir Bartle Frere as soon as they could do so without im- perilling any chance which the scheme of Confederation might derive from his presence. The sequel has shown that when the High Commissioner's policy ran counter to the prejudices of the colonists his influence was nowhere. Having used him as the instrument of their aggressiveness and unreasonable fears, they declined to follow him a step beyond the frontier of their selfishness. The soundness of his judgment could not be too highly extolled while he waged war on well-organised natives and annexed their territories. It could not be too lightly esteemed when he recommended the colonists to adopt
a policy which would relieve the mother-country of some part of the burden of protecting them. But the Government could not have known this beforehand, and if they had recalled Sir Bartle Frere the moment they came into office, it would now be difficult to meet the accusation of having thwarted the policy of Confederation by the premature withdrawal of the one man who could have made it a success. This is the de- fence of the Government, and we admit its cogency. It seemed to us at the time, and we expressed that opinion strongly, that those who condemned the non-recall of Sir Bartle Frere should, having delivered their protest, repose con- fidence in the Government, and leave the matter in abeyance till the question of Confederation was brought to-an issue. It is much to the credit of the Radicals that they followed this course, for their case was a very strong one. Here was a man who, in open defiance of his instructions, had made war upon a neighbouring people, and with such precipitancy as to court a military disaster. The leaders of the Opposition had demanded his recall, both as a lesson to future "prancing Proconsuls," and as the least reparation that the nation could make for a signal wrong. That the retention of such a man at his post, even temporarily, by the men who had passed such stern judgment upon him should rouse keen dis- appointment, and even some degree of resentment, was inevitable ; nor is it to be regretted that so healthy a feeling should find expression. The event has shown that the Ministry deserved the confidence which was reposed in them ; but it has also justified those who believed that nothing would come of Sir Bartle Frere's boasted influence with the colonists. It is well, however, that he has had his opportunity. No one can now say that he has been unfairly dealt with, and he re- turns with a reputation so discredited that there is little danger of his being able to do any more mischief. We regret to be obliged to write thus of a man whose private worth is acknow- ledged even by those who have pronounced the severest judg- ment on his public conduct. It is, in fact, the excellence of his private character that has enabled Sir Bartle Frere to be so influential for evil in public affairs. People have found it hard to believe that so good a man should be the author of an utterly immoral policy. Is this language too strong ? Let it be tested by the facts.
We do not know whether Sir Bartle Frere would gravely maintain that in politics the end justifies the means, but he has certainly acted on that theory in South Africa. His con- duct towards Cetewayo is one long illustration of it. A tract of valuable land was claimed alike by the Zulu King and by the Boers of the Transvaal. Confiding in English justice, Cetewayo submitted his claim to the arbitration of English officials. These decided in his favour, evidently to the sur- prise and chagrin of Sir Bartle Frere, who made some in- effectual attempts to get the award altered. Failing in this, he communicated the award to Cetewayo after a delay of six months, but clogged with conditions which made it worse than valueless. The Boers were to retain possession of the land which, according to the award, they had unjustly seized, and Cetewayo was to rest satisfied with a mere nominal owner- ship. If this were all, it would be bad enough. But it was not all. As in Afghanistan, so in Zululand, the native Ruler was required to receive a British Resident, who should exer- cise over him and his people "a potential influence on all national questions." Nor did Sir Bartle Frere's demands end even here. Together with the award and the demand for a British Resident, Cetewayo received an ultimatum which, whatever its motive, was admirably calculated to produce war. -Among the extraordinary terms offered in this ultimatum were the following :—That Cetewayo should disband his army; that he should never call his troops together without the permission of the British Government ; that he should allow every man to marry on arriving at manhood ; and that he should permit Missionaries to settle in his territory. Thirty days were granted for compliance with this ultimatum with a threat of war at the end of that time, in the event of non-compliance. The Zulu King begged for an extension of the period of grace,—no unreasonable request, when he was required to disband his army within thirty days, and revolu- tionise his whole system of government. His demand was re- fused, and a British army invaded his land, with the results which we all know. Sir Bartle Frere's plea is that he did but anticipate the invasion of British territory by a Zulu army. But this is a surmise, which rests on no evidence, and which is emphatically disputed by those most competent to form an unbiassed judgment. The opinion of Bishop Colenso is well known ; but not less emphatic is the testimony of Dean
Green, in a letter to Mr. Gladstone, which was published in the Guardian last winter. Dean Green, it may be added, is ecclesiastically opposed to Bishop Colenso. He has been resident thirty years in Natal, and he bears witness that Cetewayo never committed and never meditated any aggres- sion on British territory or on British subjects. Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, is another witness on the same side. The truth is that Sir Bartle Frere was very anxious to carry the policy of Confederation. He found the Cape Colonists at the same time anxious to crush the Zulu nation and alarmed, perhaps natin ally, at the strength of the Zulu army ; and he persuaded himself that by humouring them in their aggressive policy he should be able to convert them to his policy of Confedera-
tion. Similarly, in the case of the Pondos, Sir Bartle Frere's distempered imagination conjured up a vision of a Pondo invasion, and he applied to Sir Garnet Wolseley for troops wherewith to make war upon an unoffend- ing tribe. Sir Garnet Wolseley, on the other hand, denied that the Pondos had any sinister intentions, and posi- tively refused to permit any attack upon them. Sir Bartle Frere remonstrated, but Sir Garnet Wolseley remained firm. And what is the result ? The Pondos have remained perfectly quiet and friendly, as the Zulus also might have done under similar treatment.
These are specimens of Sir Bartle Frere's South-African policy. Is it too harsh a criticism to say of it that it is practically a negation of political morality ? Sir Bartle Frere acts as if he believed that a Christian nation is not under any obligation to keep good faith with a barbarous or semi-barbarous people. Let him persuade himself that some desirable object of British policy is even remotely in question, and he will not hesitate to wage a ruthless war against people who have excited his fears, provided, of course, that they are not Christians. He, more than any other man, is primarily responsible for the present state of affairs in Afghanistan. It was his specious sophistry that converted Lord Salisbury to a reversal of the traditional policy of England towards that unhappy country. As we read over again those fatal Memoranda of his, we hardly know which to reprobate most, their reckless folly or their hideous immor- ality. Because Sir Bartle Frere succeeded in persuading himself that Russia might, in some dim and indefinite future, invade India through Afghanistan, he coolly recommended the British Government to violate its plighted faith to the Ruler of Afghanistan, and to insist on the residence of British officers as Agents in Cabul, Kandahar, Herat, Meshed, " and possibly at other places, such as Balkh, and some point be- tween that and the Thibet frontier of Cashmere." " But what if the Ameer should object to follow our advice ?" perti- nently asks Sir Bartle Frere. In that case, we should " clear for action," bully him, make overtures' to his rebellious son, and bestow upon him a share of his father's dominions. " This, no doubt, in the present state of affairs, would give umbrage to the Ameer of Cabul ; but I would let him clearly understand that we could not sit by while he quarrelled with the ablest and most popular of his relations, and possibly successors,"—in fact, the unfortunate Yakoob, who, by the irony of fate, is now a captive on British soil, as the reward of his trust in British honour. But it was objected that " our Envoy and his attaches would not be safe from attacks on their lives by fanatical or ill-disposed persons, and that the Ruler of the country could not guarantee their safety. I have never believed in the validity of this objection," which Sir Bartle Frere accordingly dismisses as " quite chimerical." Such were the dangerous and evil counsels which sent Cavagnari to his doom, which subverted the policy of a whole generation of illustrious states- men, and which has involved India in a war equally ruinous and iniquitous. And all the while, Sir Bartle Frere, like the dupes whom he converted to his policy, prattled about the necessity of making Afghanistan "strong, friendly, and inde- pendent I"
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