The Army's Part
In his speech on the anniversary of the war Mr. Eden em- broidered with much rhetorical ornament a thesis which had been set forth in a broadcast not many days earlier by General Sir Walter Kirke. He argued that we could only conquer Ger- many by a successful grand-scale military offensive on the con- tinent of Europe, and that it was the present business of our Army to prepare for such an offensive. We believe this to be a profound mistake. Whether or not Mr. Eden contends rightly that in past history sea-victory could not finish a war without land-victory, there is today a new factor wbich not even the war of 1914-18 exemplified fully, viz., air-power. Without our sending a single soldier across the Channel, it is possible for the R.A.F., if we make its strength overwhelming, so to paralyse in Germany every branch not merely of military but of civil life that no choice is left her but to surrender. In that, and not in any direct challenge to Hitler's mammoth army-machine, lies Great Britain's true hope of victory. For what then is our Army required? For two purposes—to guard our island, and to defend our Empire and our Allies overseas. Apart from pro- siding against home invasion, its immediate chief task is now to withhold from the enemy the control of any of the three exits from the Mediterranean—Gibraltar, Suez and Istanbul. We ought already to have reinforced our Command in Egypt to drive the Italians off Africa. Does Mr. Eden's theory explain why we have not? Can one forget what happened in 1915, when the Brass Hats insisted on our losing Gallipoli in order that Sir John French might fight the Battle of—Loos?
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