IS IT PEACE ?*

Tins is not a profound book, or an epoch-making book, or indeed, per se, a memorable book in any way. From many points of view, however, it is a very pathetic book. Only a year ago anything that fell from the lips or pen of the author could without exaggeration be said to move the world. Then the opinions, views, explanations and defences of past actions in this book would have been not only of immense interest but of huge importance. Now they matter so very little that one feels almost ashamed to expose their impotence.

Mr. Lloyd George tells us with a breathlessness which is disturbing for the obvious anxiety it displays, why he did or refrained from doing certain things, and what were his motives in both cases. Alas ! the great glacier-hearted public will give no heed. Even the skilled reviewers are cold. As we read their polished comments one sees their attention flag. One thinks of that wonderful passage in Disraeli's first political novel describing how Lord Memoir made a long impassioned speech in the House of Lords elaborately

• Is It Peace I By the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd Oeorge 0,11, M.P London: Hodder and Stoughton, [10s. 4d. aet.l

explaining his motives, and how the House remained quite unmoved because they had forgotten his actions !

The old spell has been completely broken. When Mr. Lloyd George seeks to bind once more the public who were once so willing to be bound, so eager to watch his necromancy, so filled with wonder and sympathy, their only emotion is to wonder how and why they ever let their eyes be dazzled And yet even those who, like ourselves, think that this spell- binding was always dangerous and often worse, cannot help feeling a stab at the heart. It is not the change in the fickle public that is so poignant, but the evident bewilderment which is to be noted in the dethroned and discredited magician. The sense that somehow everything is different, though how or why he cannot make out, is always breaking through the assumed boldness and independence of his words.

Mr. Lloyd George is still trying passionately to persuade himself that all is well, or, at any rate, that all will be well, and that some day the great public will receive him as it used to do. lie dreams how once more the flutes of the great orchestra of the Press will be hushed to meet him as Ile re-enters on the stage. Once more all the lights will be turned upon him. Once more the vast theatre will break into raptures of applause. But it needs no prophet to see that this is a delusion. llis day is over, never to return.

But though we hold this view so strongly, we cannot help feeling that the book has not had quite fair treatment. From many points of view it deserves better notices than it has got. A good deal of the rhetoric is very good. And many of the comments, though they may be arraigned as superficial, or cheap, and so on, are in truth exceedingly shrewd and exceed- ingly well expressed. As popular journalism or popular oratory they could, indeed, hardly be better put. No one who wanted to study how to be taking and popular without falling into absolute claptrap could do better than study this book. Again, though the parade of political and historical learning where there is no real foundation in knowledge or in thought is apt to prove rather a non-conductor, some of the historical analogies are very much on the spot and may be very usefully considered at the present moment. For example, the chapter headed " What is France After ? " and the chapter which has the sub-title " The Rhine " are well worth the consideration not only of our statesmen, but of the statesmen of America, and still more of France herself. Mr.' Lloyd George's imagination has evidently been greatly fired by what he has read or heard of the Rhine's strange place in history and of its baleful influence on European politics. Through these chapters, indeed, the Rhine runs with as commanding a force as it does through that glorious piece of music, the overture to the Rheingold, the great orchestral triumph which opens " The Ring "—the greatest of operatic cycles. Truly, a superstitious student of polities might feel that the Rhine is under the curse of destiny.

If Mr. Lloyd George wants a motto for his Rhine chapter in his next edition, a motto showing how the Rhine has dominated French political thought for two hundred and fifty years, he should look at the Prologue to Racine's Esther —a prologue spoken, of all incredible things, by La PietO (Piety personified). Consider the scene at Port Royal. Piety in a literary, if not an actual periwig, addresses herself directly to the great monarch, for Louis XIV. was one of the few people privileged to hear Racine's first religious play. Even Piety cannot play her part without bringing in the Rhine. The Almighty is asked once more to stretch forth Iiis arm in aid of France as He did when the Rhine so often saw the armies of the nations sworn to accomplish time downfall of Louis XIV., dispersed and sent to their account. Another thing which might interest Mr. Lloyd George is to look at some of the medals of Louis XIV. which deal with the Rhine. The present writer has one before him with a strange and enigmatical reference, both in inscription and in design, to the Rhine and what it meant for France. Then, again, there is the glorious Gobelins Tapestry, which shows Louis in his coach watching " the passage of the Rhine," and, incidentally, disproving Marshal Foch's fond belief that the Rhine is a ditch that cannot be crossed and so is a perfect frontier. Well, indeed, is Mr. Lloyd George justified in speaking of the Rhine as a fateful river. " For unknown centuries it has been fought over and across—a veritable river of blood. If French Chauvinism had achieved its purpose at the Paris Conference the Rhine would, within a

generation, once more overflow its banks and devastate Europe."

Mr. Lloyd George in this chapter goes on to describe how insistent were the French at Versailles in regard to the Rhine and how acute, according to them, was the need of the buffer State. Mr. Lloyd George implies, as is only natural, that he triumphed in inducing the French Govern- ment not to claim the left bank of the Rhine as Marshal Foch wished, and no doubt we owe him gratitude for this ; but, alas ! his good work there was undone by the fatal error he committed in not insisting that the Reparation claims should be settled once and for all, and should not be left a dreadful " hanging-gale " over Germany. Any- thing would have been better for the world and also for France than this indeterminate claim. It poisoned and demoralized the world. We talk about Germany being a tricky, treacherous, faithless debtor. Of course she is.

How could it be possible for her to be anything else when she was simply told that her conquerors would get as much out of her as they possibly could ? In such circumstances, who would not deceive ? Insecurity of tenure is a bad basis for farming, but insecurity in the amount of the rent is infinitely worse. No one, as we are beginning to find out, is going to get the best out of his land if he has the feeling, even though it be quite erroneous, that the better lie does the more he will have to pay to the landlord. Nobody wants to run up a valuation against himself. Everyone who is in another man's power dreams with horror of that man looking over his books and saying, " You seem to have been doing very well this year. You can certainly pay me a good deal more than I calculated you could when we had our last settlement."

Mr. Lloyd George, in his chapter on " What Is France After ? " makes memorable revelations. He begins by telling us that because M. Clemenceau yielded and did not insist upon the left bank of the Rhine for France, he lost what is naturally and rightly the ambition of every French- man—the Presidency. His surrender as to the Rhine could not be forgiven or forgotten ! All that Mr. Lloyd George says on this point is sound and incisive and, we feel sure, sincere. He is less happy in dealing with Reparations. Mr. Lloyd George with an unhappy ingenuity defends the Treaty of Versailles, and proudly boasts of this " much abused and little perused document " because it did not fix " a fabulous indemnity for payment by Germany." " The Treaty may have its defects ; that is not one of them, for it fixed no sum for payment, either great or small." It merely stipulated that a Reparations Commission should be set up in order to see what was the largest amount of money that could be got from Germany. Here, as we have already said, is the source of all our troubles. The amount to be paid by Germany was indeterminate, and therefore the wretched and distracted German Government gave way to the temptation to ruin themselves and destroy their currency in order that they might escape the sword of Damocles which was held over them. Probably the Germans exaggerated the damage that would be inflicted by the fall of the sword ; but that does not greatly matter. What does matter is the fact that they all thought, " It is no good for us to put our house in order. It is no good to get on a sound basis and to renew the blood in our veins. The only result of doing so will be to incite our enemies to bleed us more thoroughly." It is curious that Mr. Lloyd George does not see that by allowing or even suggesting that the claim should be indeterminate he ruined all.

He tells us that the claim for Reparations ought to be considered like any other debt

:- "You must make up your mind whether you wish to ruin the debtor or to recover the cash. If there are no sufficient realizable assets, then, if you want your money, you must keep your debtor alive. If you want beef from your cow you must forgo the milk. If your object is to destroy your debtor, you press for payment of more than he can be reasonably expected to pay, and then seize his house, his lands, and his chattels, whether they can be disposed of or not."

All that, of course, is perfectly sound ; but Mr. Lloyd George seems to forget that before you can act, as he says, " judiciously, patiently, and firmly," your debtor must be told exactly what is expected from him. Here Bismarck 'Was very wise. He settled the exact amount France had to pay at the beginning, and through that fact got his money. It is true that it did not do him much good. Indeed, he is said to have grimly declared two years after the war that in future he should force an indemnity upon the con- quered, not get one out of them. Still, his object being at the moment to get an indemnity, he saw how to achieve it. He did not have a dawdling Reparations Commission, but sent his Jew expert into France, as he brutally said, " to smell the other Jews " and see how much they could pro- duce. The estimate was quickly made and quickly acted upon, and the sum was inserted in the Treaty of Peace.

So much for the Rhine and Reparations. The rest of the book is by no means so noteworthy, with the exception of a curious apologetic chapter on the British elections. This chapter interests us particularly, because in it Mr. Lloyd George goes so extraordinarily near to adopting the Spectator policy of adding to our Constitutional machinery a system which would secure us for all time against minority rule. We want, as our readers know, to add the Referendum or Poll of the People to our institutions, so as to secure that in all matters of importance, or where the will of the people is doubtful, the final " Yes " or " No " on important legisla- tion shall be left to the people themselves. Mr. Lloyd George sets forth all the premises which lead to that con- clusion, though with the timidity of the party politician he cannot quite persuade himself to say, " Therefore I am a convert to the Referendum." He only hints the conclusion and then swings off upon some new subject. All the same, his words in regard to the evils of the Group System and the need for finding a corrective are of no small importance and remain on record.

We must not end without saying a word or two about the preface to the book. It is here that Mr. Lloyd George makes his revelations as to the Reparation proposals which France rejected in August, 1922.

Though we do not want to be harsh on the author, we are bound to record the fact that Mr. Lloyd George makes no defence, and even no plausible apology, for the worst of all his post-War blunders—that which helped to ruin Greece. His terrible mishandling or worse of the problem of Greece and Asia Minor is glossed over or ignored, and no serious attempt is made at justification. All he does on this issue is to abuse the Turks. With his arraignment of them we have a good deal of sympathy ; but this is no justification of his culpable encouragement of the Greeks and his appalling misunderstanding of the essentials of the Turkish situation. Dislike of Turkish tyranny cannot be regarded as a set-on against Mr. Lloyd George's callous willingness to run the risk of war, when for some whim or freak of fancy—we can think of no other reason—he detennined to support Greece in her mad raid into Asia Minor.