6 NOVEMBER 1926, Page 4

Reform of the House of Lords

PRESSURE is being put upon the Government to deal with House of Lords reform as quickly as possible, and a very useful series of articles on the subject has appeared in the Morning Post. There is an unanswerable ease for making the House of Lords conform much more strictly to democratic needs. But this is not to say that the reform should take precedence over other matters which may prove, when the time comes, to be more urgent and may require long and anxious consideration. For example, if the coal dispute comes to an end soon, as it probably will even if the " settlement " is only a collapse, there will be a series of very difficult problems to tackle at once. As industrial peace will largely depend upon the character of the reconstruction in the coalfields, one is bound to say that this reconstruction is likely to be the most important subject of the near future. For nothing can conceivably be more important than industrial peace. It is the incessant strife in industry, and nothing else, that is preventing the country from enjoying a rapid rise in fortune.

The more discussion there is, however, about the House of Lords reform the better. And the sooner, within reason, that the reform comes the better. The House of Lords cannot stay as it is, because it is out of date. Our withers are unwrung when we are told that House of Lords reform is only a pseudonym for thwarting the desires of the people. As a matter of fact, it—or, at all events, the kind of reform we desire— is exactly the contrary. It is a reform designed to secure that the will of the people shall in every case prevail. The Parliament Act, as we think, does not need to be altered at all. In spite of the great outcry against it when Mr. Asquith was carrying it through Parliament (with dire threats to the House of Lords of making a swamping nomination of Peers in order to get his way), it has left the House of Lords with as much prestige as ever. Most judicious observers, indeed, would admit that if there has been any change in the relative positions of the two Houses, it is the House of Lords that has earned increased esteem and the House of Commons that has rather lost esteem. The Parliament Act is not so terrible as it seemed. When you write down on paper the fact that the House of Commons by passing any measure three times in two years can carry it over the heads of the Lords, it looks as though the Constitution has been reduced to a single-chamber system. In practice, however, a great deal happens in two years ; - enthusiasm for a particular measure cannot be maintained, and the original support of it may turn into doubt, if not into hostility.

Still, it must be admitted that if a Labour Govern- ment made up its mind to pass a Bill for, say, the nationalization of the Bank of -England, it would probably have enough continuity of purpose to pass it three times within- two • years. And the House of Lords would be -helpless. What is needed, then, is some means of referring doubtful legislation to the whole electorate. The electors are our ultimate .masters, and those Ni ho disagree with the majority must-obey its will till they can persuade it to think more wisely.

For many years the House of Lords has not attempted to thwart the obvious will of the electors ; it has acted only as a delaying or as a moderately revising force. . The Parliament Act could safely be left as it is if it were reinforced by the prOvision that there should be a reference to the electors. Some reformers suggest a special General Election to test public opinion ; otb suggest a Referendum on the particular Bill und discussion. The Referendum seems to us to be by the better device, since a General Election campaign to raise only one objection—can never be confined a single issue. A Referendum on a particular B cannot possibly be extended to any other issue. T Referendum is the one perfectly logical and neces means of consummating democracy. The Labour Part is hotly opposed to it, for the simple reason that Referendum has been found in countries where it exi to act as a brake upon rash legislation. This is no dou a. disagreeable fact from the Socialist point of view, b it does not answer the argument that in a democracy t only honest rule is that what the majority desires oug to be accepted. Socialists are really terrified of t final judgment of the people. They say, in extenuati of their fear, that the electorate as a whole is incompete to pass judgment upon Bills, and is competent only delegate its authority to Members of Parliament. T days when Burke admirably defined the functions of Member of Parliament are, however, long past. T definition is obsolete. If an "elector of to-day is unfit answer the simple question, " Will you have this B which has passed through all its stages—Yes or No ?. he is surely unfit to choose a Member of Parliament.

The next point is that the House of Lords must considerably changed in its composition. It would entirely unfair to the Labour Party that it sho continue in its present. form. Labour is scarcely rep sented there, and it is desirable that when Labo comes into office again it should find the Upper Ho a reasonably balanced part of the Constitution and not a hostile assembly. Many schemes have been I forward, but we -like as well as any one that bears strong resemblance to a plan which we have frequentl suggested in the Spectator. It is the scheme of Sir Joh Ross, formerly Lord Chancellor of Ireland. He wish' as we do, that the House of Lords should be as unlit the House of Commons as possible. Directly the electii principle, whether direct or indirect, was introduced into the House of Lords a cause of jealously and friction would instantly appear between the two Houses. T House of Commons would regard an Upper Hon which was largely elected as a rival too much like itse to be tolerated. It is proposed that the right to should be retained in regard to a certain number Peers, say 150 out of the present number, which nearly 750. For this purpose the Peers wool'' choose from among themselves those who had had n experience in public life or in one of the Serrie6 Bishops could be chosen ; Peeresses in their own right would be eligible ; and a certain number of high Ad' and ex-officials would sit by right. Then, a hundred temporary members of the House might be nominate . by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister. Th1.1 would be fair, as every Prime Minister, whether s Unionist, a Socialist or a. Liberal, would have .the soll$ right of nomination. Next, about forty members rug'' be nominated by the Dominions and _Dependencies.. The votes of these members might be confined to ImPer14 affairs, but their presence in the Upper House would another useful bond in holding the Empire together their advice on Imperial affairs would be invaluab Incidentally, it may be remarked that these J,111 representatives would probably be the reverse reactionary in their views. Others have proposed that the House of Commons ould elect temporary members of the House of Lords r that such members should be elected by the' County d Borough Councils. Indirect election would be ter than direct election, but it would be safer to do lhout the elective principle altogether. Ah Upper hamber such as Sir John Ross proposes would be a kind of Grand Council of the Empire. Unlike any other Upper House in the world, it would undoubtedly have great prestige. It would be listened to with the utmost respect, and yet it would have no power of its own to defeat the will of the people. The ultimate verdict would rest with the people themselves.