, TOPICS .. OF THE DAY.
THE OUTLOOK IN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
THE Government's latest diplomatic triumph—i.e., the agreement with Russia—affords a good oppor- tunity for taking stock of the state of Europe. We believe that if the present position of international affairs is care- fully reviewed, and if it is compared with that of the first years of the present Administration, it will be seen that the Government has managed to place the nation in a state of strength and security which it has seldom reached in history. Regarded from whatever point of view one will, the foreign outlook is eminently satisfactory. Let us recall for a moment the vicissitudes of our foreign relations during the last five years, and note how circumstances have again and again produced a situation of peril, and yet how again and again we have contrived not only to surmount our diffi- culties, but actually to turn them into the pivots of success. The Government was no sooner installed in Downing Street than the storm produced by the Cleveland Message burst upon this country. A less cool-tempered and clear-sighted Premier would almost certainly have let us drift into war over Vene- zuela. Next came the difficulty caused by the Emperor William's telegram, and the serious friction that arose between us and Germany. It was then that the nation realised that "splendid isolation" was not a phrase, but a fact, and that there was not a single Great Power, except perhaps Italy, with which we were on really friendly terms. After that came the complications caused by the Greek War,—complications which might at any moment have set all Europe by the ears, and which lasted till Crete was made independent. Then came the troubles in China, and the struggle with Russia over the concessions and the "spheres of influence," and before these were settled we had two sets of negotiations with France, the Niger delimitation and the Fashoda incident, either of which was capable of producing war. A body of rash men or of muddle-headed men would probably have declared that the tangle was too complicated to be undone by anything but the sword, and out of a kind of impatient despair the Cabinet would have plunged into war. Instead, in every case they held on doggedly to the hope of peace, and with the results that we see. Instead of being on the verge of a rupture with Germany, we have placed our relations with that country on a firm and equitable basis. With Russia we have come to an agreement which removes all the chief causes of friction in China, and may lead to an understanding between the great sea-Power and the great land- Power which will end in the development of Russia's vast natural resources by means of English capital. Next, we have faced the. great problem of dividing Northern and Central and Western Africa between ourselves and the French, and have faced it in such away that it has practically given us security of tenure in Egypt. The moment that France aban- doned her Fashoda claims all further risk of a serious attempt on the part of France to get us out of Egypt must be admitted to have passed away. But though we have gained so much, we have, at the same time, made so many conces- sions to France that both countries can regard themselves as gainers by the Niger and Fashoda agreements. Next, look at the position of Turkey. At one time it looked as if Turkey, owing to her victory over Greece, was to have a new lease of life. Yet the net result of the Concert, to which our Government clung so tenaciously, has been the emancipation of Crete and a decline of Turkish prestige. Lastly, consider what our relations now are with America. Without showing any fussy patronage of the United States, we have been able to convince her people of the goodwill of this country and of an essential community of interest, based partly on material considerations but still more on the tie of race. Thus, instead of isolation, we find ourselves placed in such a posi- tion of strength and security that there is not a nation in the world which is not glad to come to terms with us. A sounder and better international position than we have thus secured it would be difficult to imagine. The only Power which must still, we fear, be counted as hostile—i.e., France —has deliberately renounced the idea of getting her own way by means of the sword. But if this achievement is a source of national- satis- faction, so also are the means by which it was obtained. It may be remembered that during the period of isolation many voices were raised in favour of the formation of alliances. We were told that it was impossible to keep .out - of the Continental system, and that if we did not choose:a side we should find that all the rest of the Powers would combine against us. -Fortunately, the Govern- ment did not listen to this advice, but steadily pur- sued the policy, not of making binding alliances, but of negotiating separate agreements with each Power. . As a result we have entirely emerged from our isolation, and yet no Power can ask us to imperil our own interests while fighting its battles with a third party. We remain absolute masters of our own fate, and are as free from all entangle- ments as when we were most isolated. No doubt in order to attain this result we have been obliged to make certain sacrifices. Had we formed regular alliances we might have been able to keep other Powers in check. For example, if we had pledged ourselves to Japan, Germany, and the United States, we might possibly have been able to check Russia's advance in China.. Again, a strict engage- ment with the Triple Alliance might have helped us to make better terms with France in regard to the parti- tion of Africa. We do not doubt, however, that it was infinitely better to keep out of the alliances and to deal separately with each Power, although occasionally such separate negotiations placed us at an apparent disadvantage. It is far better that Germany, France, and Russia should get better bargains in regard to Africa and China than that our freedom of action should be limited. And, after all, what really enabled us to come to terms with the three Powers just named was our evident abandonment of the dog-in-the-manger policy. We did not attempt to regard acquisitions of territory or of influence by other Powers as necessarily hostile to us. We showed clearly, that is, that we did not hold, because another State occupied pieces of Africa or China, that we were being attacked and injured. During the past two years we may indeed be said to have shown the world that it is not fair to regard England as showing that kind of political and commercial jealousy which was shown by Spain and Holland during the eighteenth century.
But not only is the European outlook favourable to England, it is also for the present favourable to the maintenance of peace. We do not believe that' Russia. or the Triple Alliance Wants to fight, nor is France, as long as she is ruled by her present rulers, likely to venture on war. The only risk is a revolution in France. If France placed herself under a military Dictator there would be a chance of war, but then it is not very likely that France will now choose a General to rule her. Who would wish for a Gonse, or a Boisdeffre, or a Billot as supreme head of the State ? Still, stranger things have happened, and thus France now, as always, is the disturbing element in the European State-system. There remains one word more to be said. Magnificently as our foreign affairs have been managed, the Government could not have placed us in the secure and commanding position which they have placed us ' in, unless our Fleet had been, and was known to have been, supreme at sea. In spite of our sea-power, we might have drifted into war had we played a jealous and irresolute game. When, however, while we were always willing to make concessions and build golden bridges, we could point to an invincible Navy, our arguments and proposals gained enormously in weight. A well-armed bully may create opposition by always pointing to his weapons ; but when a man is reasonable and fair in all his talk, and is yet known to be well equipped for attack and defence, he is sure to be listened to. We must, then, not merely rely upon the fact that we have come to terms with Germany and Russia, have eliminated our points of difference in the case of France, and have at last made America understand that-in her case, at any rate, we are never to be classed as enemies. We must also maintain our predominance at sea. Without that the excellent diplomatic structure which we have raised would soon crumble to dust. No doubt a strong Fleet is-of little use without a clear and consistent foreignpolicy, but it is equally true that a clear, and consistent .foreign policy cannot be maintained without a basis of physical force.
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