Political Commentary
Tories and the unions
Patrick Cosgrave
In considering the Conservative Party's latest opening to the trade unions one old rule should be remembered—that nothing is party policy except what the Leader says. There has been a tendency, in analysis and criticism of the two major speeches of last weekend, to conflate Mrs Thatcher's and Mr Prior's texts. Many Conservatives—and not just those on the right—have been dismayed by what appears to be a supplicant posture towards the unions; and puzzled by what was certainly little more than a lack of exact taste in Mr Prior's curious combination of aggression and abasement. All Mrs Thatcher said, though, was that a future Conservative government would hope to work efficiently with the unions; that it would not attempt any major legislation on the relationship between the unions and society; but that it would not, either, abandon or eschew forever, legislation upon the one or two principles—like that of the closed shop— on which Conservatives feel strongly.
There seems to me very little that is remarkable, or difficult to swallow, in that. The weekend exercise appears, indeed, to be little more than a clearing of the ground; and the sweeping away of some of the recent history of Conservative policy on the unions, with all its good and bad, but mainly sad, elements.
It is worth remembering some of that recent history, in particular the problems and difficulties which the Conservative Government elected in June 1970 faced. When Mr Heath came to power he was committed to two things—a major piece of legislation which would end the longestablished special privileges enjoyed by the unions; and an economic policy which, however sensible, would cause some friction between the unions and government. In retrospect, it is clear that Mr Heath and his colleagues made one strategic and one tactical mistake.
The strategic mistake was to imagine that the Industrial Relations Act and the—we might as well call it Selsdon—economic policy could be implemented at the same time. The tactical mistake was deliberately to abandon personal relations with union leaders. In looking back on the experiences of the Heath government one is, of course, tempted above all to remember the desperate efforts Mr Heath made to reach an accommodation with union leaders towards the end of his time in office. It is difficult to recall—so long ago does it seem —that two of the major six union leaders were if anything over-anxious to co-operate with Mr Heath in the summer of 1970. Interviews with the Prime Minister, who was so anxious for discussions before his electoral victory, were, however, unobtainable between June 1970 and his 1972 defeat by the miners. Like the great majority of Conservative politicians at the time, Mr Heath was convinced that the Industrial Relations Act, once through Parliament, would be obeyed; and that—in spite of the fact that, given the Government's economic policy, it would provide a rallying point for trade union dissent—diplomacy could be forgotten.
We now know that an economic policy based on the principles enunciated at Selsdon Park cannot be implemented at the same time as legislation restrictive of trade union privileges. It is interesting—since we are indulging in creative reminiscence—to recall that Mr Powell was one of the few people who saw this: hence his extremely conciliatory attitude to the trade unions throughout 1969 and 1970. (Pure as the driven snow', he called them, a remark which ought to be drawn to the attention of the Selsdon Group, run in the main by admirers of Mr Powell, but intensely hostile to Mrs Thatcher's weekend speech.) However, even given the extremely difficult double objective Mr Heath set himself, more might have been achieved had diplomacy not been abandoned: one senior trade union figure at least was prepared to accept the Industrial Relations Act and work with the government however much he disliked it. But, having kept his union on the register for an almost intolerably long period, and having received not a single overture from Downing Street, he succumbed to pressure from his militant colleagues. Thus was a great tactical opportunity lost.
The most significant political fact to which the Conservative Opposition has now to address itself is that, in spite of 1972 and the confrontation of 1973-4, and in spite of public implications to the contrary, the great majority of trade union leaders take the same constructive attitude to the prospect of a Conservative government as they did in 1970. Of course, compared either to 1970 or 1974 the unions are in an unimaginably weak position. Mr Heath's government—like the Labour Opposition of the time and, indeed, most commentators —regarded a rising rate of unemployment as the one intolerable political development; so intolerable that it had to be countered by government activity, at whatever cost to philosophy, policy, or commitments. Mr Wilson, presiding over a Cabinet containing an emasculated Mr Michael Foot, has found it perfectly possible, if a trifle uncomfortable, to live with steadily rising unemployment. It is impossible to imagine that, with the ground prepared, a government run by Mrs Thatcher would find much difficulty in doing the same. Paradoxically, it is union weakness and not strength which dictates a conciliatory policy on the part of Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues.
But the paradox is easily explicable. Supposing Mrs Thatcher wins the next general election—as I fully expect her to do —her main problem will be the implementation of an extremely difficult economic and industrial policy. Like every Prime Minister since 1956 she will face unimaginable pressures to move away from her central course; and to adopt that curious policy of muddle and control into which Mr Macmillan, Lord Home, Mr Wilson and Mr Heath all, in the end, drifted. Looking at the matter from her point of view it would be folly indeed to enter office with more than the bare minimum of irreducible commitments; or more than the bare minimum of hostages already given to fortune. In particular it would be foolish to give even a hint that she or her ministers would—to adopt Mr Prior's terminology— be keen to wreak vengeance on the unions for their opposition to Mr Heath. Any such hint would, of course, give the steadilY weakening union militants a rallying point.
The Conservative Party has, then, made its gesture to the unions. It is an important gesture, and may well prove to be a useful one—but it is a gesture for all that. The impulses, and the philosophy, which govern Mrs Thatcher's approach are to be seen more clearly from her speech to the last party conference than from her address to Tory trade unionists. There was, you will remember, a good deal about trade unions in the Blackpool speech as well ; Mr Prior has faithfully reflected the directive then uttered.
And, in any event, it is always foolish for a Conservative government to beconie embroiled in quarrels with trade unionists. It remains true that any government--of whatever colour—which seeks to govern Britain well will have to destroy the excessive power of the trade unions; and break their labour monopoly as thoroughlY as it will have to break the monopolies of big business. But there are more ways than one to skin a cat. And it is just possible that the trade unionists of 1976 and 1977, for all that they will squeeze the last conceivable drop of concession out of a Labour government which they, understandablY, feel closer to than they ever could to the Tories, will be more than happy to Work with a Conservative government which seems to promise economic recovery. After all, if I am right in saying that the dying screams of ideology in the trade union movement are merely the echoes ot unemployment, then a sensible union leader will, in the pragmatic interests of his members, want to see a government that can make the economy go again. And if, Mrs Thatcher cannot do that she cannot, 01 course, do anything.
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