FROM LAME DUCK TO DEAD TURKEY

President Reagan is trapped by the Iran crisis.

Andrew Manderstam searches for

possible escape routes

Washington TM NOT ending up the turkey, Mr Donald Regan, the White House chief of staff, was overheard to mutter as he was jostled by a huge crowd of reporters, all eager to secure a bit part in the newly acclaimed 'off Pennsylvania Avenue' pro- duction of the `Irangate' scandal. Mr Re- gan, who appeared to have aged by ten years for the purposes of the role, went through the now well rehearsed repertoire of denials. 'I'm not the turkey,' he repe- ated, deflecting questions about any possi- ble responsibility for authorising the bizar- re scenario which had both thrilled and horrified audiences around the world.

The use of `turkey' in the phrase proclaiming President Reagan's closest adviser's inno- cence may not have been a mere coinci- dence of timing. Amer- ica had, it is true, re- cently been celebrating Thanksgiving Day with its traditional fare of the bird, but turkey may have been firmly implanted in Donald Regan's subconscious for another reason. That very morning, the journalist Jack Ander- son, still remembered for his Watergate expose, had published a letter from the former Republican Representative George Hansen. Congressman Hansen is at pre- sent serving up to 15 months in jail for breaching the 1978 Ethics in Government Act. The former politician was writing to Mr Anderson to complain about the excess of turkey being served in the federal prison which was now his home. He noted that inmates were faced with turkey hams, turkey sausage, turkey rolls and whole turkey which had a grey and spongy quality. But for now the only official who should seriously be considering developing a craving for the gobbler is Lieutenant- Colonel Oliver North, the sacked member of the National Security Council, who, if the White House is to be believed, is the sole culprit of the piece.

The problem is that neither the Con- gress, the media nor the general public believe the authorised presidential script. This credibility gap is, as is becoming more apparent daily, not just a major embarrass- ment but is likely to shape the future composition of the Reagan administration, its policies and those of subsequent Amer- ican governments. It is ironic that, in an administration headed by the so-called `great communicator', the President's men are making such a meal out of communi- cating their 'guiltlessness'. Mr George Shultz, who is noted not so much for his lack of vernacular as for his boring delivery and the scarcity of content in his rhetoric, was able to signal early on that he did not support the Iran weapons scheme, and by so doing seems to have secured for himself the part of Mr Clean. Those who have grave reservations ab- out George Shultz's loyalty to his boss, and there has been much gnashing of teeth in the 'Californian kitchen', may yet have cause to be grateful to the sombre State Department head. By being the generous fellow that he is, and agreeing to stay on at what the right-wing Washington Times described as the 'People's Republic of Foggy Bottom', he has at least ensured some semblance of continuity at a time when more heads are bound to roll. Some see in Shultz's survival a parallel to the role played by Dr Henry Kissinger during the Watergate scandal. The problem is that Schultz is no Kissinger. Having been hand- ed what by all accounts is a monopoly in foreign policy-making, he now faces furth- er clashes with both the White House and the Congress over a wide range of issues. Whether the Secretary of State will be able to limp on will depend to a great degree on the future shape of the National Security Council. The review of its role — forced on the adminis- tration by the grangate' disclosures is unpre- cedented in the 40-year history of the body, formed under President Harry Truman. The council's original pur- pose was to replace the personalised foreign policy-making charac- teristic of early pres- idencies, which often went over the heads of other government de- partments. However, under President Reagan the NSC never had a clear role. A quick succession of Security Council chiefs left the body in disarray and at one point resembling Presi- dent Kennedy's NSC, in which a small group of experts and academics would pass on information drawn from other agencies and simply add their own input. More recently, frustrated by constant press leaks, the Reagan NSC reverted to a role undertaken by Richard Nixon's Security Council: that of being put in charge of secret and often high-risk operations, like the Iran weapons affair.

That the Congress will now institute guidelines which will put an end to this type of activity seems almost inevitable. In the shorter term there remains the ques- tion of how Admiral Poindexter's succes- sor as National Security chief will conduct business, and how he will relate to the new mandarin of US foreign policy, Mr Shultz. Assuming that the NSC is neutralised for the duration of the various investigations, will President Reagan be content to act on advice from a State Department he dis- trusts, in the knowledge that seeking coun- sel from other sources would alienate Shultz, the surviving member of the team, or will Mr Reagan, as many believe, simply put off any major decisions?

If the 75-year-old President runs true to form, the latter is the most likely outcome.

Only once before in his political career has Ronald Reagan faced a crisis of this magnitude. In the first year of his term as Governor of California a scandal broke involving two trusted assistants accused of homosexual conduct. Governor Reagan, deeply upset and disappointed, withdrew from day-to-day decision-making. One close associate said at the time, 'The Governorship went into receivership.' Europe's liberal press may well relish portraying President Reagan as a cross between Attila the Hun and the devilish Chinaman, Fu Manchu, bent on the world's destruction, but the reality is that Mr Reagan is by nature passive, believing that his cabinet members, and even, in some instances, his adversaries are honour- able and well intentioned.

The principal concern, shared by sup- porters and critics alike, is therefore that, faced with this latest crisis, Ronald Reagan will not take decisive action and sweep the board clean enough. The result, in terms of the future course of this administration, could be disastrous, irrespective of whether it is proved that President Reagan was awake and in full possession of his senses when the Iran scheme was discussed in the Oval Office, as surely it must have been under some guise or other. At best one can expect paralysis of the White House machine, at worst a complete breakdown.

As the affliction progresses, under the supervision of a less than sympathetic Congress bent on administering the strongest of remedies regardless of, indeed no doubt relishing, any side effects, the first visible symptom will be an even greater degree of confusion in the rem- nants of US foreign policy. Notwithstand- ing Mr Clean Shultz's hand at the helm, the new Senate will certainly want to prescribe a radical amputation of all American aid to the Contra 'freedom fighters' in Nicaragua.

Even without the surgery, the administra- tion would hardly have a leg to stand on, in view of mounting evidence that it defied an earlier congressional ban on military assist- ance by using the Iran connection.

The scandal could have an even more catastrophic impact on overall East/West relations. It is interesting to note that the very afternoon that a sheepish and grim- looking President Reagan faced the camer- as to announce the resignation of his National Security chief, he held a special review at which it was decided deliberately to exceed the limit on strategic forces agreed with the Soviets under the 1979 Salt 2 Accord. Mr Reagan had made known his decision to scrap Salt back in May, but the implementation of the plan on the very day that the transfer of funds from Iran to the Contras was revealed could well have been a clumsy attempt to precipitate a crisis calculated to distract public attention from `Irangate' and lead to a new dialogue with Moscow.

The choice of a permanent replacement for Poindexter was at the centre of a bitter political wrangle in the days immediately following his demise. President Reagan's `conservative' friends were determined to use the affair to fuel their contention that what had really gone wrong with the administration was the fact that President Reagan had surrounded himself with a `bunch of wets'. The old guard suggested that the most effective way to remedy this would be to appoint a true believer, such as the former UN ambassador Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, as the new NSC chief. Shultz's opposition to the move led to the tentative choice of a more conciliatory appointment, that of America's Nato representative, Mr William Abshire. But the CIA director Mr William Casey, citing Abshire's previous hostility to the agency, hotly contested the choice, after which Mr Frank Carlucci, a former deputy director of the CIA, was appointed.

The trouble with the 'instant fix' ap- proach to matters of state, made by an ad- ministration rent by internal strife, is that it has a nasty habit of playing straight into the hands of the Russians. The ill-prepared Reykjavik summit is often cited as a prime example. With his presidency in the home stretch, and just two years left, Mr Reagan, who would no doubt like to go down in history as the author of a new era of detente, as opposed to the culprit of the Iran saga, may well be tempted into seeking an agreement with the Soviets regardless of cost. Furthermore, if it could be demonstrated to Congress that the President was pursuing in earnest a mam- moth arms control agreement, even his most radical political opponents would be loath to pull the rug from under his feet because of some miscalculation over a weapons deal with Iran.

Then there is the Middle. East. Amer- ica's Arab allies will need to be given a large dose of tender loving care if they are to forgive and forget Uncle Sam's treacher- ous advances to Ayatollah Khomeini. That is not without its difficulties, with the next US election campaign dawning and the Jewish lobby up in arms over the way Israel was let down by the White House disclo- sures. As for terrorism, one senior member of the State Department put it like this: `There is no way I can go to any foreign government and ask them to toe the line on Washington's fight against terrorism.' This must come as a particular blow to the Vice-President Mr George Bush. Re- member him? The former CIA director would surely rather you did not at this particular time. But it so happens that George Bush is in charge of the President's anti-terrorist task force. He is also a member of the National Security Council. Mr Bush could turn out to be the prime victim of this escapade, because not only was he particularly well placed to know what was going on, but also even if he manages to extricate himself from the affair he faces an even more serious problem. George Bush has tied himself so closely to the President, implying that he will be another Reagan, that anything that tarnishes Reagan will rub off on him. The only salvation for Bush now would be for Reagan to be forced out of office.

So what are the prospects that Mr Reagan will take a not so early retirement? Insiders contend that it is very unlikely. Those close to the President remain confi- dent that, given time, Ronald Reagan will be able to regain his credibility. But these are the very same advisers who led their leader to believe that his personal popular- ity was so high, his Teflon non-stick shield in such good shape, that he could be protected from the antics of his minions, however ludicrous they turned out to be.

The belief was, until now, well founded. The President remained untainted despite the fact that, at the last count, 115 mem- bers of his administration, at varying levels of seniority, had either left or been the subject of allegations or investigations, an unprecedented total for any US adminis- tration. But in the weeks to come Mr Reagan will have to grapple not only with a potentially widening credibility gap, but with constant fighting inside the White House, as officials try to rebuild their shattered empires. If that were not bad enough, his staff are bound to revise their earlier practice of filtering information to President Reagan on a 'need to know' basis. Fearing that omissions could lead to further Iran-style misunderstandings, Ronald Reagan could find himself swept under a sea of documents he neither understands or is able to act on, because of a hostile Congress. He could, of course, fall back on his time-honoured formula of appealing to the American public over the heads of the legislature, assuming the television cameras can force a way through the mountains of briefing papers into the presidential presence. But while one is obliged to reserve judgment on just how successful such an appeal might be, for the present the prosecutors have taken over from the policy-makers. A blanket of governmental paralysis has descended on a still incredulous Washington.

Andrew Manderstam is the Washington correspondent of Independent Radio News.