A Word in Season
THERE is a danger that this important and extremely timely book may be neglected. For some years past Captain Liddell Hart has been regarded as the expositor of the doctrine that defence is the best policy. He may justly complain that the modifications with which he surrounded his doctrine were neglected, that his historical examples were misunderstood. But the fault is not merely that of the man who, running, reads too hastily. Captain Liddell Hart as a controversialist belongs much more to the Kingsley than to the Newman school. He does not prepare his flank and rear to resist attack, and even in this book, which shows some signs of consciousness that public opinion has hastily decided that the Hart line, like the Maginot line, has been turned, there are historical allusions that do not clarify counsel and dogmatic statements that make even the sympathetic reader wonder a little.
So much for the reasons why this book may be neglected. The reasons why it should be read and pondered are many. Whatever may have been reasonably said for the policy of send- ing a great army to the Continent before the collapse of France must now be recast if not recanted. Captain Liddell Hart has, in the past, used arguments that conspicuously neglected the political side of the question, but events have made much of the contrary argument irrelevant.
We cannot, in fact, create as large an army as the Germans. Surely we should concentrate on creating a better army? Captain Liddell Hart argues with overwhelming force that we should aim at producing a highly specialised, mobile, mechanised army. He illustrates from the distressing history of the post 1918 period the penalisation of originality, the premium put on conformity. He rightly condemns the absurd decision to add to the vast Continental pool of ordinary divisions more ordinary divisions, instead of the highly specialised striking force which our long-service system plus our industrial resources and wealth made it easy and wise to provide.
Captain Liddell Hart argues that the Germans won because they appreciated the importance of a corps d'ilite ; it was not numbers as such that enabled them to destroy France in six weeks. This is true and highly important today. Many points are too briefly stated ; there are allusions that suggest that, for all his disclaimers, Captain Liddell Hart has a bias against
offensive tactics if not against offensive strategy. There is more in common between the doctrine attributed in the phst to Maurice de Saxe by Captain Liddell Hart and the doctrine attributed to General Gamelin by journalists in the period of the "phoney war." But these defects are trifling. This book ought to be read by all citizens who wish to take an intelligent interest in our present military policy. It is to be hoped that among them will be found the Secretary of State for War.
D. W. BROGAN.
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