THE WEST IN THE MIDDLE EAST
WHAT is happening to the position of the Western Powers in the Middle East ? Some people describe the process as ' the opening of a new chapter in our relations with the Arab world '; others denounce what they call ' the great scuttle.' Neither group can deny, however, that one part of what is happening at this moment in the Middle East involves withdrawal : the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone, and British administrators from the Sudan, the withdrawal of the French from the internal administration of Tunisia, the withdrawal of the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company from Abadan (now to be made de jure after three years de facto).
There is nothing inherently wrong with withdrawal; in most of these instances it was the better course. But it is not com- Plete policy, nor can it be regarded as in itself a solution, in an area like the Middle East where Western interest and responsibility has not declined pari passu with Western influence. In fact, what ought to be happening in the Middle East is neither scuttle nor the ' opening of a new chapter' but the exchange of one kind of influence -for another better adapted to modern conditions. For the new chapter is not going to open itself and if withdrawal continues to be inter- preted as a sign of weakness it will certainly not be opened at all. Nothing fails like weakness in the Middle East.
The frame of mind in which great nations bring themselves to make withdrawals is rarely conducive to their constructing something else. Both France and Britain are becoming increasingly skilful (sometimes even graceful) at the act of Withdrawing, but increasingly shy of the technique of power and increasingly clumsy in their employment of it. Yet some- body (if it is not Britain and France then it must be the United States, and if it is not the United States it will certainly be Soviet Russia) has to develop a new, positive technique of Power for the Middle East. With this, the current withdrawals may really have cleared the way for the construction of a new strong tie between the Western and the Arab worlds. With- Out it, they may indeed be little more than ' scuttle,' a mere selection from a dreary series of evacuations under pressure Which leave behind them internal unrest and external vulnerability.
It can be argued that the Arab world needs now to be left alone to work out its own salvation. But this is to ignore three major factors in the situation. The first and most impor- tant is that Russia has a frontier on the Middle East and experience has shown that wherever the Communist world has n frontier, its neighbours will only be safe if they, too, succeed In building themselves a common front. In Europe with many qualifications this has been done; in Asia it was not done, and the better half of Indo-China fell to the Communists; in the Middle East a small beginning has been made, but a much larger development will be necessary before the margin of safety is reached. For this development, the West must main- tain its influence in the Middle East. The second factor lies in the need for Western advice and assistance which is recog- nised in varying degrees by the progressive Arab leaders. The` late Imperial Powers have a tendency, once they have made their physical withdrawal, to make an unnecessarily complete spiritual withdrawal at the same time. Yet this is often not even desired by the local governments. The story is told of how Colonel Nasser, at the height of the Anglo-Egyptian discord when the situation did not permit of any public liaison, sought the advice of Transport House through a British journalist in . Cairo on how he should create an Egyptian welfare state. The third reason why the West must maintain its influence in the Middle East is to keep peace and stability within the area. It is easy, when talking about the Arab world, to forget that most of the present Arab States are artificial creations and none of them existed independently thirty-five years ago. Self-rule for the Tunisians may be this week's novelty, but self-rule for the Iraqis is a comparatively modern development. The result is that both within their own territories and between themselves there pis a continual friction, quite apart from the greater friction between the Arab League and the Jews. It is not suggested that these frictions may result in open war or that the West can do anything directly to remove them. But by maintaining an influence in and around the Middle East, by supplying arms here and dollars there and a secretary- general in the other place, the Western Powers can help the Middle East to surmount them, and could by the same means still exercise a powerful influence on the area if they set about it in the right way.
In the case of the greater friction between the Arabs and the Jews, the presence of the West is necessary to ,prevent an open war. If this was true before the Anglo-Egyptian agree- ment on the Canal Zone, it is now imperative. For the transfer of the British installations to Egypt combined with the American decision to grant arms to all the Arab States who will receive them, does drastically alter the balance of power as between the Arab countries who, whether they mean it or not, are sworn to eradicate Israel, and the Jews who undoubtedly do mean it when they say that they will do whatever may be necessary to ensure their survival as a Middle Eastern State. And this new development comes when nerves are already frayed by the growing tension along Israel's frontiers.
Admittedly, none of these arguments for a positive Western policy in the Middle East alters the fact that, the old basis of power—trusteeships, colonies, concessions and other forms of dependence—will no longer do. So long as they remained to bring out the worst in the local nationalists, the construction of any alternative basis of power was greatly hindered. So long, for instance, as Iraq was bound to support Egypt in her struggle' against Britain, it was difficult to persuade Iraq to join the Turko-Pakistan military alliance. Now that some of these obstacles have been removed, there is a new oppor- tunity, which must be exploited soon or not at all, for building an alternative basis of power.
One of the most obvious methods is the new type of alliance, of which the military pact between Turkey and Pakistan, based on American arms and with its indirect link with NATO. pro- vides the nucleus. This will be greatly strengthened by the signature of the military pact between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, which is now finally set for August 6. It would also be strengthened by the adherence of Iraq and Persia, two countries that lie directly across Russia's approach to the Middle East, which may now be possible with the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Canal Zone and the Anglo-Persian agreement on the Abadan oil industry.
Another direction in which the West must assert its influence is, in Arab-Jewish relations. It has been argued that an oppor- tunity has been wickedly wasted by the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement without any reference to the Israeli situation. In fact, it would probably have confused both issues to have attempted to negotiate the two simultaneously but this is no reason why the British and American Governments should not briskly open that famous new chapter' with negotiations on the future of the Suez Canal which should include an Egyptian guarantee to respect its obligation to allow the free passage of all shipping. By the same token, while it may well be impossible at this stage to make any progress on an Arab-Israeli peace settlement: it must surely be possible for Britain (which finances Jordan) and the United States (which finances Israel) to do something more effective to reduce border tension that the recent eleven point suggestions' that were tentatively proffered in Amman and Jerusalem. The appointment of a forceful successor to General Bennike, the chairman of the UN Palestine Truce Commission, could also help to restore the shaken authority of the United Nations in that part of the world. The United States has, right,ly, embarked on a programme of arming the Arab States; the international situation demands it. But to do so without simultaneously using the influence that American money and Anglo-Saxon experience can still exercise for peace within the area as well as without would be not anti, imperialist but irresponsible.
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