THE BEST-KNOWN OBJECTION TO THE REFERENDUM. T HE rumours as to
the solutions of the Constitutional crisis which may be suggested by the Conference, since they include the Referendum, have brought to the front the customary crop of objections to that proposal. Very often the objectors take, not such proposals for a Referendum as have been made by any sane person, but a Referendum of their own creation, which they find exceedingly easy to demolish. Those who delight in the game of putting up a man of straw and knocking him over had perhaps better be left to play it with- out interruption. We should like, however, to deal with a reasonable and bona.-fide objection which un- doubtedly occurs to the minds of many persons who desire to discuss the question without prejudice, but who are not prepared to dismiss the Referendum merely because it is thought that it would have a bad effect on the prospects of the Liberal Party, or might prevent legis- lation which the country as a whole does not want, but which the projectors of that legislation think would be good for the country.
The best-known objection is this :—" How will it be possible for the ordinary elector to vote upon a com- plicated measure containing quantities of clauses, sections, and subsections, and couched in legal jargon' ?" It might, go on the objectors, be possible to ask the opinion of the electors on a plain question, such as whether they are in favour of women having votes, but to put such a plain question is not the proposal of the Spectator. The Spectator wants to submit a whole Act of Parliament to the people, and to ask them whether they want it to come into operation or not. Surely such a Referendum as that is not possible. Our answer to the " complicated measure " objection is threefold. In the first place, the thing is constantly done in a large area of the world's surface. It is done in Switzerland, where very often a complete and complicated measure is voted on by the people after it has been passed by the Legislature. For example, the Swiss Legislature some eight or nine years ago passed a Bill very much increasing the obligations of military service in Switzerland. This measure, which involved a great many details, was submitted to the people, and, to the eternal credit of the Swiss democracy, they voluntarily doubled their burden because theii military advisers considered this step was necessary for national independence. That was a noble act, but the Swiss peasant, as also the Swiss man of light and leading, would have laughed at the objector who told him that it was quite impossible for the ordinary elector to vote on so complicated a measure. Again, the thing is repeatedly done in America, for it is part of the political machinery of almost every State to submit changes in the State Constitution, and also Acts of the Legislature touching certain specified questions, to the vote of the electors. Thus measures of a very complicated kind are submitted to the direct vote of the people, and not, as is popularly supposed here, merely abstract questions. For example, a poll of the people often takes place in America on a new State Con- stitution as a whole,—the most extreme instance conceivable of referring a complicated measure. Indeed, so far has the system been developed in America that in most States of the• Union a poll of the people can be taken in all of the five following ways :—(1) On Constitutions as a whole. (2) On. strict Constitutional amendments. (3) On alterations in laws which are not strictly Constitutional, but which have been made parts of the Constitution in order to secure a popular vote on their amendment or abrogation. (4) On laws dealing with subjects in regard to which the Legislature is bound by the Constitution to institute a reference to the people. (5) On laws which a Legislature, for reasons of its own, determines shall be referred. to a popular vote. In America, then, little attention is paid to the bogy of the complicated measure.
An even stronger proof that the thing can be done is to be found in the fact that it was carried out, though no doubt in a very rough-and-ready way, in this country only last January. Parliament was dissolved and an appeal made to the people on the question whether they would or would not have the Budget of 1909,—a complicated measure with a vengeance. Theoretically, of course, the voters were not voting on the Budget ; but nevertheless the great majority of them did vote on that issue. That they did so is in a sense proved by the fact that after the General Election the Lords gave way and passed the Budget without any amendment, their ground for such action being that the Budget had been referred to the country, and that since the new House of Commons had passed it by a majority they must assume that it had been accepted by the popular vote. No one. however, believes that all the electors, or indeed any considerable portion of them, had read the Finance Bill. Yet surely it would be the height of pedantry to assume that therefore it was impossible for them to pro- nounce an opinion upon the subject. They had, according to their several abilities, listened to the arguments adduced in favour of or against the Budget, and, rightly or wrongly, had formed opinions thereon. They voted as the weight of argument inclined in their minds.
But is not this the way in which we all of us make up our minds upon any complicated subject or measure ? Not otherwise does the ordinary Member of Parliament act. It is just possible that he may have read all the clauses of a Bill when he votes for its third reading, but we venture to say that in most cases Members of Parlia- ment have done nothing of the kind, or if they have done it have not got the clauses in their minds when they vote. They vote on their general impression whether the Bill is a good Bill or a bad Bill, though they have quite forgotten whether Section 5, Subsection (a) remains or does not remain as originally introduced. They like some things in the Bill and dislike others, and, balancing one consideration against the other, vote in obedience to the result of such balancing. To say that the elector cannot do the same, or be guided, as the Member of Parliament is to a great extent, by the expression of opinion of the leaders in whom he trusts, is a piece of political Pecksniffism. Perhaps, after all, the best and strongest proof of the absurdity of the " complicated measure " argument is that we all expect the voter to perform an infinitely more difficult task at an ordinary election. There he has to vote, not for a com- plicated measure, but for what is much more perplexing, a complicated man. In the matter of complication we would back Mr. Balfour, Mr. Winston Churchill, or even Mr. Asquith or Mr. Walter Long, against any Bill that was ever framed. Let us take, however, the case not of such prominent men, but of the pedestrian Member of Parliament. It may well happen that many electors detest his views about woman suffrage, though they strongly sympathise with his opinions on the problem of national defence. They may have grave doubts as to his fiscal principles, but admire his Constitutional views. Again, if the candidate is a man of subtle intellect, a large section of the electors may be quite incapable of fathoming that mental subtlety, or of appreciating the nice political and legal distinctions which he draws as to the measures before the country. They may be with him in his final conclusions, but for a totally different body of reasons from those which influenced him. Yet in spite of all this, and in spite of the still further complication that though they may dislike the candidate personally, they like the leader he follows, or the party to which he is attached, they manage, in defiance of•all cross-influences, to strike a balance. When they enter the polling-booth they are willing and able to determine whether they can vote for him or not. And they vote accordingly. In the same way, when a Bill is submitted to them, they can, like the Swiss peasant, say -whether they want the law changed in the way proposed, or desire that it shall be left alone. To say that the ordinary elector cannot perform the simple act of saying " Yes " or " No "—that is what he is really doing when an Act of Parliament is presented to him, and he is asked whether it shall or shall not come into operation—is pure sophistry. If the elector cannot exercise this right of veto, then he is incapable of exercising any political rights whatever, and the sooner he is disfranchised the better. In fact, the objection to the Referendum on the ground that the elector is unfit to say whether he approves a measure or not is an arraignment of our whole democratic system.
We would advise, then, all persons who are inclined to the Referendum, but are in danger of being confused by this argument of the " complicated measure," simply to remember what they actually do when they go to the poll to vote for candidate Smith or candidate Jones. We venture to say that if they examine the merits of the two candidates impartially, the complications are infinitely greater than will arise if, say, such a question as this is put to them : "Are you in favour or not in favour of an Act entitled ' An Act to oblige all lads between the ages of seventeen and eighteen to undergo three months' military training' ? "
We have no desire to reargue here the general question of the Referendum and its advantages. We should like, however, before leaving the subject to put once more on record our belief that in the Referendum is to be found the true solution of the problem of how to get over fundamental differences of view between the two Houses of the Legisla- ture. There ought to be a veto power in every Constitution. The inexpediency of giving such powers absolutely to an hereditary Assembly has for the present almost deprived us of anything in the shape of a veto in our Constitution. By the use of the Referendum we may place the veto power over the unlimited will of the House of Commons in the best possible hands,—in the hands of the people themselves. It would of course be extremely inconvenient to have every measure submitted to the people. Such submission should be confined to important measures. Therefore when both Houses of the Legislature are agreed there is no reason why Bills should be submitted to the popular vote. Again, annual Money Bills, which are in the nature of acts of administration, should very properly be exempted from reference. It should become the custom of the Con- stitution for the House of Lords to pass bond-fide annual Money Bills without alteration. All that is necessary to enable this to become the custom without danger to the commonwealth is the proper definition of an annual Money Bill, and the creation of an impartial tribunal to interpret the definition.
We do not of course suppose that the country is going to alter its habits and introduce so great a change as the direct vote of the people without a period of experiment.
For this reason we have always thought that the proper procedure is for an Act of Parliament to be experimentally submitted to a poll of the people. This can easily be done by the House of Lords adding a Referendum clause to some measure of the utility of which it is doubtful,—a clause declaring that the Act shall not come into operation till a poll of the people has been taken thereon. The House of Commons has merely to accept that clause, with the schedule setting forth the machinery under which the poll is to take place, and the experiment can be tried. In conclusion we may mention one other point. People often talk as if the proper way to conduct a Referendum were through the medium of the post. That, in our opinion, is a capital error. It might lead to all sorts of fraudulent and corrupt acts. The proper way to conduct a Referendum is by means of the well-tried machinery of the Ballot Act and Corrupt Practices Act. Polling-places should be set up just as now at an election, and to those places the elector who wishes to record his vote should go, and mark his ballot-paper under exactly similar restrictions as to bribery, intimidation, corruption, and secrecy. If a man will not take the trouble to go to a polling-place and record. his vote, he cannot be very keen on exercising the chief privilege of citizenship.
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