SIR HENRY GORDON'S LETTER.
THE real question raised afresh by Sir Henry Gordon's letter to the Times, is whether the hour has come, or is near at hand, when England would gain by abandoning her naval and military, and by consequence her political, position in the Mediterranean. He publishes a memorandum written by his brother Charles in August, 1881, upon the inutility of our position in that sea. He not only favours its conclusions, but, so we are tempted to infer, is inclined to carry them still further. The hero of Khartoum thought that the value of the Mediterranean, even including Constantinople, is very much diminished in case of war, holding that "Gibraltar and the Skager Rack" are now the maritime keys ; and that if they, as well as the Red Sea, were "plugged by heavy British fleets, Great Britain would have only to deal with the French, Spanish, and Portuguese coasts on the Channel or on the Atlantic." He would, apparently, have given up Egypt, Cyprus, and Malta, and would have relied on a chain of stations round the world, holding them as coaling-depots, for the protection of trade and the maintenance of power. Sir Henry Gordon throws doubt on the value of Gibraltar, yet would retain it; but he would certainly abandon Malta, and, of course, give up the Mediter-
ranean altogether. These are very large questions, and they deserve full attention from all—not only soldiers and sailors, but statesmen and merchants—who are anxious to uphold an Empire which lies about in detached masses, connected with the centre and each other by the oceans, straits, and seas.
Now, we observe, in the first place, that the Gordons narrow the basis of the problem to trade. " Great Britain," says the General, " is supported by her trade,—this is her only vulnerable side; and to guard that is the main object we should have in view." If the propteition be granted, it surely does not follow that the beat way of guarding trade is one which involves the surrender not only of a large share of actual, but also of traditional power ; still less that our military policy should be restricted to the defensive, which must be the case, more or leas, when the means and the bases of the offensive are given up. No one can Bay what a moral and political loss England would endure were she to adopt the Gordonian advice, and, for the first time since the days of Elizabeth, cease to be a Mediterranean Power. Neither is it likely that, in the long-run and under all circum- stances, a British Fleet at Gibraltar would be able to plug up the Strait ; still less that another squadron could blockade the Skager Rack continuously without the support of any fortress or any ports nearer than those on the British coasts, leaving the hostile Powers alike in the Mediterranean or the Baltic, as the case might be, free to combine and operate against us at their own time. We have no ports in the Baltic, and if we scuttle from the Southern Sea, we shall stand in relation to its waters as we do to those in the North, plus Gibraltar, which, reduced to a purely defensive position, would be weak in pro- portion. If we quit the Mediterranean, we shall relinquish a great deal more than the possession of Malta and Cyprus, for we shall abandon at one stroke not only power, but influence, which rests on power, in all the countries and on all shores washed by the greatest inland sea. The effect of the retreat would be felt at least as far east as Persia, and as far south as Aden. Our authority in the Red Sea, already diminished by the Suez Canal, would suffer further detriment, and the effects of so vast a change would touch not only India, but the farther East. General Gordon was moved by the desire to get rid of diplomatic difficulties, complications, and causes of trouble ; but we should like the question answered, whether the removal of so solid a block as British power in the Mediterranean would not produce, not only unlooked-for results, but a still larger crop of diplomatio difficulties and international quarrels. England is so rooted in the Mediter- ranean, that to pull her up would shake the fabric of the whole European world.
That is a consequence which must be faced if it is held, definitively that we cannot afford to keep up our position ; but when the change is made—if it should ever be made—let it stand on the right basis, and do not let us imagine that we shall be either increasing our power, or taking a step likely to stave off future disturbances, or lessening the desire of those who may think it expedient to attack us, to do so. Should war break out, it cannot be said beforehand, even by the greatest expert, what lines will become important, because he could not foresee the conditions or the opportunities. But it is plain enough that, by abandoning the Mediterranean, we give up actual and potential means of offence, and these are among the best means of defence. We should also give up a political position,—that is, possible alliances ; and if that posi- tion is not worth keeping, and those alliances are not worth Raving, the facts should be demonstrated in clear terms. It is argued that because trade could not safely wing its way along the inland sea, therefore the political and military posi- tion should be surrendered ; but trade could and would follow ocean routes, and its chances of doing so in comparative free- dom would not be lessened by the fact that a large body of possibly hostile force was held at bay in the Mediterranean. If we cannot afford to retain that advantage, and at the same time protect our trade all round the globe, then we must say so boldly, and brace up the nerves of the community to meet the new situation caused by a loss of that credit and renown which have saved us so many millions and conferred so large a measure of security,—a loss which would have to be made good before we stood again in the place among the nations where we now stand. It will be certainly very different from what it is, when England, as advised, abandons the Mediter- ranean, when the Russians occupy Constantinople, and the French are protectors or proprietors of Syria, which would render them masters of Egypt. Such is the real outcome of the suggestions which a nation having a wide Oriental empire is invited to adopt.
Now, the essence of the maritime question is a due provision of coaling-stations which are able to defend themselves. Whether we regard the problem from the trading or the military point of view, we always come back to that fundamental fact. Some invention may dispense with coal, but until the capital discovery has been made, upon coal traders and sailors will depend. That consideration does not so much affect the Mediterranean as it does the ocean highways ; yet it has a direct bearing on the proposal to relinquish the former, since even there we have so large a share of the available steam- fuel. But so far as the great roads round the globe are concerned, the question is almost solely one of coal, for if we are too poor to keep up our Mediterranean position, it cannot be said that our means of building ocean-cruisers are dried up. "We possess the distant strategical positions which modem warfare has rendered important," writes Sir Charles Gordon, and " by them we occupy the world," minus, of course, on his plan, the Mediterranean and all that hangs upon its posses- sion. Now, those strategical positions should be so fortified as not to need a squadron, heavy or light, to protect them. They are placed in commanding spots, like the Cape—or, rather, Simon's Bay—Vancouver's Island, the Mauritius, Aden, and the Australasian ports. If it cost two millions to render them self-protective, and put some of thein in a state to repair and refit cruisers and ironclads, the money would be profitably laid out, and the security cheaply bought. An army feels bound to hold intact its communications. They are temporary, and last for the war or the campaign. England's lines of communication on the ocean should be permanent, and perennially ready in armament, appliances, and stores for whatever may come, whether war arrive in the shape of a foreseen calamity, or like a thief in the night. The line through the Suez Canal would be useless to trade in time of war ; the route by the Cape would be the main one to the Eaet, and therefore any neglect to render Simon's Bay invulnerable would be criminal. From our standpoint, how- ever, all the essential points in the Atlantic and Pacific should be made secure, so that our war-ships might have free play and sure resources, while those of the enemy were deprived of coal and shelter. What we do not see is the necessity or expediency, except on the ground of poverty, of giving up a political and military position in the Mediterranean which has so profound a bearing upon our national status in Europe, as well as in India and the farther East.
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