A.B.C.
THIS is not an easy book to discuss, for it has to be regarded from many widely separated points of view. Though it is written as autobiography and includes an account of the author's early days and of his service as a destroyer-officer in the Dardanelles, it is altogether different from the ordinary jog-trot memoirs which admirals and generals so often piece together at the end of their careers. The fates have given to Lord Cunningham such a subject as might make any writee_s ink boil in the pot. As Commander- in-Chief, Mediterranean, during the dark days when Greece and Crete had to be supplied and then evacuated, as the victor of Matapan, as the officer primarily responsible for the naval aspects of the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, as the First Sea Lord at the time of the invasion of Normandy and of the fateful meetings at Teheran and Yalta, he has had experience which makes an autobiography of his a historical document. As a very famous admiral, known to the Navy and the world as A.B.C. (but not nearly as simple as that), he has qualities of originality and energy which might easily have given a dangerously autobiographical twist to history's tale. There is, then, a certain conflict inherent in the book, and we have to consider its effects. Two of its effects are themselves conflicting: the narrative is admirably clear, it holds the reader and leads him on, and yet the page does not glow. The great operations, quite rightly, are not treated in detail ; the complexities of planning are indicated rather than analysed and the author, with a careful avoidance of both egotism and false modesty, has forbidden himself wide political excursions and has held fast to his own experience. This strict self- discipline has many advantages. It keeps the outlines firm ; in the earlier of the chapters concerned with the war of 1939 it gives a Mediterranean point of view to those whose attention may be too much concentrated on the Atlantic • and in later chapters, when the author hipself is at the heart of things and is entangled in the difficulties of Inter-Service and Inter-Allied relationships, it passes over these difficulties with a summary discretion which, though it
gives to serious historians little to bite on, prevents the narrative from being lost in fog. Neither in this context nor in his account of battles does the Admiral lay down mysterious smoke-screens between himself and his readers. If there is something that he thinks it unwise to say, he jumps on to the next paragraph. He knows almost too well how to simplify. As a result, a general reader is never lost. The story goes steadily on, never failing, if for a moment detail threatens to become embarrassing, to clear itself with an illuminating paragraph of forward looking or of summary.
For these advantages a price has been paid. The style is a little flat. Order and lucidity are there, and these are much, but, though the events are recounted, the instants and the moods are not re-imagined and communicated : the selective intensity and visual power necessary to great autobiography are wanting. Both por- traiture and self-portraiture are strangely weak in the treatment of so splendid a theme, and one wishes often that Lord Cunningham had told more of the look and the feel of things. But it has to be admitted that the curbed style produces by contrast a startling effect now and then.
For example, in July, 1940, when he was plunged in the harassing negotiations which resulted in the successful neutralisation in Alexandria of the French ships under Vice-Admiral Godfroy, he
"received a signal from the Admiralty indicating that they were most dissatisfied with the efforts we had made up to date. It read: 'Admiralty note that oil fuel is being discharged by French ships. Reduction of crews, especially by ratings, should, however, begin at once by landing or transfer to merchant ships, before dark tonight. Do not, repeat not. fail.'"
Lord Cunningham continues:
" It is a perfect example of the type of signal which should neves. be made. Apart from being quite unhelpful, it showed no com- prehension whatever of the explosive atmosphere at Alexandria or the difficult conditions in which we were working. It filled me with indignation. Moreover, while ordering us to take action before dark, it was sent off from the Admiralty at a time which was after sunset in Alexandria. As it was impossible to implement it we ignored it completely. At the time I did not believe that the signal emanated from the Admiralty and do not believe it now." On the rare occasions when Lord Cunningham hits as hard as that, his target is never a man smaller than himself.
What is more, his indignations are never of a kind to fester. Though he can be critical, particularly on the subject of inadequate air-cover, his criticism does not develop into grievance, and every reverse of fortune, every strain upon resources, is regarded by him as an occasion for a renewal of energy in himself and in his subordinates. In the Royal Naval College at Osborne there used to be a brass-lettered motto which read: "There is nothing the Navy cannot do." To the heathen who thought it a trifle arrogant it was explained as meaning: In the Navy there is no such word as "can't." It might well have been an epigraph to this formidable book. Though its author was clearly not always in agreement with Mr. Churchill, it has the Churchillian spirit. Again and again, at Malta, at Tobruk and in Crete, the impossible is seen to have been made possible by the Service's unswerving refusal to regard it as being otherwise. One cannot read without admiration and respect, and certainly one cannot cease to read.
CHARLES MORGAN.
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