SOUTH GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION.
[FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.]
Frankfort, September 23. THERE can be no better place than Frankfort to visit for any one who wishes to make himself acquainted with the force of anti- Prussian feeling in Germany. Here, as nowhere else, can be gauged the practical strength and intensity of this spirit, for here, as nowhere else, is it to be seen in full and unchecked vitality. Also, from geographical position and not yet quite obsolete political connections, there are to be found in Frank- fort men who are the representatives and leaders of such specific political activity as may be proper to the Southern States. Frankfort was a kind of capital .fOr South Germany, and though now dethroned de facto, like all turned-off Sove- reigns in the first season of disappointment, it still retains a following that has not yet dropped away, that has not yet made up its mind to believe in the permanency of the now order of things. These men are intellectual representatives of those Great German ideas which have prevailed in the South all along—the ideas which broke through for a moment in the German Parlia- ment of 1848, and which now would fain order themselves into shape upon some kind of South German States' theory, for the future. But there is yet another point which makes Frankfort worthy of observation. It is the place of all others in which lies concentrated the full force of any material loss that has been incurred by coming under Prussian rule. It is not a moral dethronement, it is pecuniary sacrifice, a woeful decay of wealth, which the Frankfort citizens have to complain of, and which, unfortunately, there appears no possibility of averting, for there can be no disputing the fact that the prodigious expansion of the city in the last year has been due in great part to speculations resting on that aptitude for becoming a seat of government of which it has been deprived by the force of events. The streets on streets that have been built at ground-rents that are monstrous are now becoming untenanted, and even in the main street, the Zeil, I have counted half-a-dozen shops to be let. All this will account for the anti-Prussian sentiment, quite apart from the mortified pride of the burghers, and the deep resentment be- gotten by the treatment to which they were exposed on the first entry into their city of the Prussian forces. I have conversed with a considerable number of Frankforters of all classes and opinions, and I am bound to say that the unanimity of purely civic feeling I have found, exceeds my anticipations. I have failed to meet with a single individual who could speak of the Prussians without excitement. In listening to these, I was always reminded of the state of things that used to exiat between
the Italian's and Austrians in Milan. Undoubtedly it was a grave blunder under the circtamstance,s to make the Frankforters feel so severely the weight of Prussian resentment against their foolish de- monstration. The consequence is that the King of Prussia has now in his dominions one city in which he is positively detested, where he is treated with downright disrespect, as happened when a water hose was turned on him as he visited the burning Cathedral. All this has made of Frankfort a centre of attraction for any ele- ment of opposition, and it is as such that it is an object of interest to any one desirous of ascertaining the practical force of political feelings in South Germany. Well, then, on the score of loyalty to Prussia there is but one voice. The existing state of things is an abomination in the eyes of every Frankiorter out of his teens, to which he will never reconcile himself. The present generation must die off before loyalty can spring up. But the absence of this loyalty can be of practical consequence only by co-operation with other hostile elements. Frankfort, even if it were ten times its size and had ten times its population, would yet by itself remain powerless to fight Prussia or rally disaffection in Germany round it. What is, however, important to know in forecasting the shape of the immediate future, is how far this spirit of dissatisfaction against Prussia, which does exist undoubtedly in South Germany, may be disposed to ally itself with an auxiliary force, either Austrian or French, if ready to come forward, to effect a recon- struction of German Powers on a basis that would deprive Prussia of her present position, while Austria, and especially France, would be raised to greater influence. This is the point on which
I have tried to inform myself. Everything else is, in my opinion, secondary to this question,—whether there be an animosity to any such degree against Prussia in the South German populations 48 will make them accept an alliance with France against their Northern countrymen, in the event of her stepping forward to attack the Confederacy established under Prussia.
I have no hesitation in saying that I do not believe in the exist- ence of any such danger to the Northern Confederacy. I feel all the seeming rashness of this opinion in the teeth of the violent denunciations of Prussia that are heard in the South. In arriving at my conclusion, I can only say that I have not done so from partial data. I have specially sought out those who are the most opposed to Prussia, and after reducing as carefully as I could the substance of what they had to say to its essence, I have come away with the conviction that, in the event of a really national crisis, whatever may be the self-seeking disposition of some princes, the readiness of the old Bavarian aristocracy to throw itaelf into the arms of any one rather than Prussia, and the general unpopularity of the Prussian system in the South, the power of what is here called Particularistic influences will be instantaneously paralysed by the strongly German sentiments of the majority of those who will instinctively exert themselves on such an occasion. Moreover, I hold it to be preposterous to think that the South German States possess, or are likely to possess, military organizations that can enable them to put forth any com- pact force for independent action. The condition of the South German Government at present is that of the sticks in the fable when not bound together into a bundle. There is' no union and no combination amongst them, nor are there any prospects of combination. In Bavaria, the largest and most important of these States, things are in a condition of listlessness that promotes dis- organization. It is impossible to detect any policy here. The fact is, that the King, a mere stripling without interest in State affairs, is led by the whim of the moment, while the Premier, who has a desire to inaugurate a national policy in alliance with Prussia, is without the ascendancy requisite to carry things through with a monarch of this boyish temper and against the opposition of the Princes and of all who constitute the Court life. The practical result has been a vacillating aud trimming attitude. The Army has not been put on a better footing than it was on last year, and about the only thing done has been to found a new official paper, under the able editorship of Herr Frobel, who, from being the comrade of Robert Blum, at Vienna, has grown into a staunch Austrian. This paper has come out with a programme that, if it means anything, implies the wish to create a Triple Directory for Germany, just about the most hopeless idea that could be started. In short, Prince Hohenlohe, evidently checkmated by influences, and unable to manage the King, is manifestly at a loss what to do, and is waiting on events. Now, of the King, it is quite impossible to predict anything. The in- fluence of the hour and its favourite is supreme. It is quite conceivable that in the event of war he might follow the impulses of his family, and aide against Prussia. Even to join France would involve nothing shocking, I apprehend, to the feelings of the arch-Catholic and bitterly anti-Prussian aristocracy, while, in conjunction, even though but tacit, with Austria, such a line would be positively popular in these circles. But Bavaria is not of one mind. It is only in the mother provinces, which are the least important, that such a move would be supported. From Augsburg northwards, the public feeling would be dead against it, while we may feel quite sure that the iiresistible weight of practical necessities, the inability of the State to do without the four millions allotted from the Zollverein fund, and the consciousness of imperfect military organization will inter- vene to make the Bavarian fire-eaters chew the cud of their indig- nation in silence at the critical moments. There will be the desire to strike, but as for the power, I do not believe in it. In Wurtemburg, although there is no reason to assume that the Sove- reign is specially well disposed to the new order of things, the re- organization of the Army in accordance with the military conven- tion with Prussia has made some progress, and as against the French there can be no reason to fear defection from the people. Here there is not, as in Bavaria, an aristocratic faction imbued with strong feelings for the preservation of its Court. Wurtemburg is democratic, and the anti-Prussian spirit is mainly levelled at the supposed despotism ef the Prussian system. But the democratic spirit, however wedded to doctrinaire prejudices against Prussia, has always boiled over with the excess of German sentiment, so that the mere menace of a French war on German soil would make it bubble up vehemently. I myself, however, think that the feel- ing in Bavaria and Wurtemburg is of very secondary importance to what is going on at this moment in the small Duchy of Baden. Whether ifs Sovereign be acting in collusion with Count Bis- marck or not I cannot say, but whoever cares for German politics had better keep his eye fixed on Baden just now. The Grand Duke has opened the datice by demanding admis- sion to the Prussian Bund. The Army is not only Prussian in uniform, but a Prussian General—not out of service, but sent from Berlin—has been named its commander, and the King of Prussia, now ist Baden, reviews the Army, and inspects the citadel of Rastadt, over against Strasburg. But still more pregnant is the open expression, from the Sovereign in his opening speech to the Chambers, of the desire to be fused in the Confederacy, and the yet stronger reiteration of the desire in the debate on the Address. The question of remodelling and expanding the Confederacy, of overriding the Treaty a Prague, has been thus officially broached. It is impossible not to take it up now. Things cannot and will not stay much longer at the point at which they are. When once political questions have got the length of being brought under public and official consideration, they are on the verge of being recognized. The attitude taken up by the Baden Government must lead to the speedy, even imminent re-transformation of the Confederacy ; for however cautious may be the wording of the Address voted in I3erlin it tands to reason that it must be impossible to reject a German population that is clamouring for admission. Diplomacy may rack its brains to find a formula to save mortified pride, but let it rest assured that it has no power to prevent the proposed fusion, or to prevent its effects from reacting with contagious in- fluence on the remainder of South Germany. If, as it has been said, Count Biarnarckintends to eat up Germany leaf by leaf, as an artichoke, you may be assured that Baden is the first leaf of this Southern artichoke which he will despatch, and this without much delay. Will France suffer this practical annexation of Baden, by which Prussia extends her military lines along the famous Black Forest passes, those inlets into Germany France has so often availed herself of? It is a great military position Count Bismarck is thus noiselessly making himself master of, cutting off France from Bavaria. The answers to this inquiry I cannot give, but one thing I can affirm. I have spoken with many persons in South Germany, but have not met one who ventured to hope that war
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