Spain and the Axis
Spain in Eclipse. By E. Allison Peers. (Methuen. iss.) IN this book Professor Allison Peers has written the sequel to his well-known Spanish Tragedy. The first 8o pages- describe the Civil War from April, 5937, to its end in March, 1939. The remain- ing 15o pages describe the regime of General Franco up to the autumn of 1942.
These two parts are, in my opinion, of unequal value. The account of the Civil War is perfunctory: its political issues are not clearly brought out, and to make up Professor Peers takes refuge in a rather dreary account of the military operations. He is impartial in the sense of giving the versions put out by both sides, but the historians' task is surely to decide whenever possible which of the various versions is correct and not to shirk conclusions. Thus Pro- fessor Peers has not even now been able to make - up his mind whether the Germans bombed or did not bomb Guernica. Then, on the question of foreign help, he avoids the real issue. There were, he says, more Germans and Italians on the Nationalist side than on the Republican, but not so many as to make much differ- ence. That is true enough, for most of Franco's foreigners were Italians, but what about foreign war material? During almost the whole of the war the superiority of the Nationalists in tanks, planes and machine-guns was very great. Towards the end of the war, when Russia was pulling out, it was overwhelming. Finally he skates over the repression carried out by Franco after his victory; the Law of Political Responsibilities is not mentioned.
The second and longer part of this book, which is devoted to the period after the Civil War, is very much better. Here Professor Peers is not dealing with the turmoil of revolutionary politics which he does not understand, but (for the most part) with the acts of a Government as reported in the daily Press. His account of Franco's foreign policy is most interesting and his final chapter on the future of Spain contains much that is admirable. Anyone interested in contemporary Spain should therefore read this book in conjunction with T. J. Hamilton's Appeasement's Child.
One of the matters of greatest interest for us today, but which Professor Peers does not sufficiently go into, is the attitude of the Communist Party during the Civil War. Up to 1936 it had been a party of the extreme Left which aimed at a complete socialisation of property. During the Civil war, however, it allied itself with the Right-Wing Socialists and Republicans, opposed all socialisation of land or factories and fought a bitter war with the left-wing Socialists and Anarcho-syndicalists. It was even anxious to reopen the churches. But it combined this extremely moderate and plastic attitude with strong totalitarian impulses, and with a determination to overcome all resistance to its views, that did not bode well for the democratic character of the Spanish Republic had it won the war. What is one to make of this startling volte face?
The Communists in Spain fought with all the courage and de- votion -of Crusaders who believe that a better world will follow from their victory. But this better world was a world of " order." They saw in their imaginations the Dnieper Dam and the monster factories of Stalingrad and the Urals, but they also saw the State- controlled trade unions, the G.P.U. and a society strictly disciplined to attain certain ends. They took an engineer's view of the world, not a humanist's. But they had also learned from the enormous wastage of the Russian Revolution and (though they were probably not aware of it) from the more subtle methods of the Nazis. They no longer believed in wholesale expropriations and in the destruction of the old middle classes to form a new middle class out of the workers. The world they wanted could be brought in much more easily by attracting the middle and technical classes to the new idea. Little or no class warfare would then be necessary. But as this conception demanded a great increase in the powers of the State, they found themselves at variance with every party that believed in liberty. In a country lilm Spain such a policy was pretty certain to fail and in fact Communist influence lasted only so long as Russia provided war materials.
Behind the Communists stood Russia. Everyone can see today that the object of Russian intervention in Spain was not to spread Communism (such a notion is pure Trotskyism), but to further Russian foreign policy. The Kremlin was afraid that the appease- ment policy of the Democracies would lead to Russia being attacked by Germany. It therefore intervened on ground where it thought that the interests of England and France were at stake. Had Hitler behaved less cautiously, had the Democracies been less backward, the war would have broken out over Spain instead of, as it did a few months later, over Poland. Germany would then have had to fight on two fronts. It was the failure of this policy that led Stalin in disgust to make a pact with Hitler. But the action of the Com- munist Party in Spain has a special interest all the same. Just as Hitler used Spain to try out his tanks and aircraft, so Russia- used Spain to try out its new political policy. We may expect to see a, let us hope, more tactful, version of this policy applied after the war in Eastern Europe.
Another point of interest raised by Professor Peers' book is— what prevented Spain from following Italy into the war? On July ath, 1940, Franco made a very significant speech. In it he referred to Spain's duty and mission, to achieve territorial expansion in Africa. Eight weeks later came Serrano Sutler's visit to Berlin, his interviews with Hitler and Mussolini and a spate of diplomatic activity. But no declaration of war followed. I would suggest that at that time Franco was, in spite of the famine in Spain, ready to enter the war on condition that Gibraltar, Morocco and Oran were offered him, but that these terms were too high for Hitler to accept. For Germany then to have invaded North Africa would have meant that the arrangement with Petain would have fallen through and that the French fleet, which it was hoped to bring over, would join the British. Perhaps we owe more to Vichy than we know. Then when, in the spring of 1941, the question came up again, Germany could not spare the forces to occupy Africa because the Russian campaign was about to begin. After that Franco learned caution. When in November, 1942, the Allies landed in North Africa; it is probable that Franco told Hitler he Would oppose a German march through Spain. We were saved by the German losses at Stalingrad from having. an embarrassing ally. As to the future of Spain, I agree with Professor Peers that another swing of the pendulum to the extreme Left would be disastrous. But the trouble about Centre parties in Spain is that they only keep themselves in power by doing nothing.. And there are cer- tain fundamental reforms—agrarian, educational and, as Senor .Madariaga says, in the Civil Service—which need to be carried through. Who is going to do this? Who is going to want to do it? I offer no opinions, for this is. a matter for Spaniards alone, but I would point out that, if the Left return to power again, I believe that they have learned much in adversity and would not show a spirit either of revenge or of over-optimism. Further, the best elements among the Falange would join them. GERALD BRENAN.
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