RUSSIA. AND BRITAIN IN AMITY AND CONFLICT.*
ALTHOUGH the Russian Navy has not "in the past directly helped to build up the Empire," this account of its growth and present condition deserves study, both by strategists and politicians. The historical and technical sides of the subject are well stated by Sir G. S. Clarke, and illuminated throughout by his contention that the Power in which we now see our most dangerous antagonist has removed her neigh- bones landmarks and acquired her seaboard, "in obedience to the dictates of a universal law" as immutable as gravity or the procession of the equinoxes, with which it is idle for us to struggle further on the old terms. "History," says this volume, "is not a strong point with the British people " ; we should like to know the name of any country where that noble domain is not "caviar to the general." Unfriendly criticism might illustrate the indictment just quoted by the author's curious assertion that our own Empire was created "wholly by the brilliant achievements of the Royal Navy." The same might be said of his narrative of Catharine's first collision with Turkey, which hardly shows accurate knowledge of the European situation of the time. In 1769 the Czarina was meditating the schemes of Ottoman dismem- berment which were afterwards revealed, but she was not ready to pull the trigger. Having then Poland on her hands, she did not attack the Turks, as our author alleges. The declaration of war came from Sultan Mustapha, who, having provocations of his own, was driven by France to inter- pose in the affairs of Poland. Describing the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji of 1771, for which a wrong date is given, Sir G. S. Clarke details the acquisitions of Turkish territory made by Catharine, but ignores the stipulations concerning religion whereby the Ottoman Empire became, as Thugut expressed it, "a kind of Russian province." Curious, but perhaps intentional, is the suppression of the important incidents of 1833. In that year a body of Russian troops was suddenly landed opposite Constantinople, and a Treaty signed at Unkiar-Skelessi, whereby the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were almost converted, for the time, into Russian outposts. Of the conflict of twenty years later, the reader is told that "no war has ever arisen out of causes so complex or so obscure," and yet is reminded neither of Prince Menzikoff's mission to the Golden Horn, nor of the proposals for the virtual partition of Turkey made by Nicolas when in London in 1814, nor of the more elaborate overtures in an identical sense made by the Czar to Sir H. Seymour in 1853. For a high-class specialist the author is very discursive, and his syllabus of the war of 1854-55 is disappointing. He is misinformed when he roundly alleges that our Government was "absolutely ignorant" of the mili- tary requirements of the allied adventure in the Black Sea and the Baltic. In the fifties, it is true, we had no Military Attaches, • _Russia's Bea•Power, Past and Present ; or, The Rise of the Russian Navy. By Colonel Sir George Sydenhans Clarke. With Naps and Illustrations. London : John Murray. no Intelligence Department, our Secret Service funds were absurdly insufficient, and our officials had received no technical instruction in the science of corruption. Still, at the date in question, our authorities were fairly well informed regarding both Sebastopol and Cronstadt, and they had a sufficient know- ledge of the Czar's means of defence by land and sea. As to the "extreme nervousness" exhibited by Sir Charles Napier during his Baltic command, the author might have added that the Admiral's professional fitness for his post was called in question, and that co-operation with the French was utterly repugnant to his feelings. Perhaps he inherited something of the ancient sentiment which made Lord Chatham call himself "quite a Russ," and so deeply tinctured our foreign policy during the period that followed the Seven Years' War, especially when, in 1769, Catharine sent from the Baltic to the Mediterranean the fleet with which, after it had been duly piloted and refitted at Portsmouth, we forbade the French to interfere. How Great Britain acted as wet-nurse to the infant maritime Power of Russia in other ways is well told in various pages of this book :— "The great naval enterprise of Catharine II. had spent itself, and such success as it had obtained was entirely due to Great Britain. By the aid of British ports and British officers the Russian squadron reached the Levant. To British officers was due the destruction of the Turkish fleet. The name of Tchesme is now borne by a Russian battleship ; but the fact that the vie. tory thus commemorated was due to Elphinstone, Grey, Lugdale, and Mackenzie is altogether forgotten. Whether originating in the friendship of Peter the Great with Sir John Norris, or sug. gested by the prestige of the British Navy, the practice of obtaining officers from this country had steadily grown. Under Catharine II., the number of such officers, largely of Scotch descent, was considerable ; and when in 1788 Paul Jones was ap. pointed a Rear-Admiral in the Russian service, sixty are said to have resigned their commissions. In 1788 Captain Sir Frederick Thesiger became a Russian officer, and won laurels in fighting the Swedes, who were assisted by Sir Sidney Smith. The roll is a long one, and the Russian Navy may almost be said to be the creation of British seamen."
Unanswerable is the author's demonstration that the pro. visions of the Treaty of Berlin, whereby Lord Beaconsfield thought to close the mountain barrier of the Golden Horn against the Czar's intrusive influence, have proved to be altogether illusory. No less futile, he thinks, is " the policy —persistently followed—of attempting to stem the Russian advance in Central Asia by diplomatic notes." When we annexed the Punjab no remonstrance was addressed to us by Russia. Yet when she occupied Krasnovodsk, a port on the Caspian twelve hundred miles from Peshawar, we forthwith demanded explanations. For more than thirty years we have indulged in "a copious use of paper," while the Cossack has pursued the undisturbed tenour of his way (1) from the mouths of the Syr Dania on to the Pamirs, whence he menaces Gilgit and Chitral; (2) from the Sea of Aral, vil/ the Oxus and the adjacent regions of Khiva and Samarkand, to the slopes of the Hindu Kush (3) from the Caspian, along the frontier of Khorassan, Mery and to a point south of Penjdeh within a gallop of Herat, which will shortly be within‘drive of a Russian railway station in direct ticket communication with Tiflis and St. Petersburg, and eventually with Port Arthur and Pekin. This altered state of things inspires Sir G. S. Clarke with no apprehensions. Comforting himself with the belief that India has "the strongest frontier in the world," be la persuaded that so long as the Sepoy sticks to his colours and Hindoos and Sikhs are loyal to their Empress the march of a Russian invader to the banks of the " fabulosus Hydaspes is unthinkable. Here the author's optimism is in conflict with the conclusions of authorities quite as competent as himself. When he urges that no one has yet made "a reasoned study of the means and the methods by which invasion could be attempted," he forgets that he does not vindicate his own position by a single word of argument, and that it is not the business of British experts to
publish detailed essays on the military value of "the Roof of the World," or map out the approaches of Quetta, for the enlightenment of the Russian Staff. His ipse dot on the invulnerability of India is somewhat invalidate by his neglect of various new factors of the problem. He ignores, for instance the fact that there is a Part of Burmah where, except for a mere river boundary, our possessions run contiguous to those of France. Then, as to Persia, he does not recognise the unpleasant truth that the Czar's influence in Azerbijan and Khorassan has become paramount, and that the Shah appears to be gradually sinking to the condition of a vassal of Russia.
The author opines that "the Franco-Russian understanding must necessarily be regarded as an attempt to create a counterpoise to British sea-power," and not as a reply to the Triple Alliance, "now fallen into decrepitude (sic !)." However that may be, the said " counterpoise " has been called into existence, and Russia contributes largely thereto. Sir G. S. Clarke's figures for the battleships, which run higher than some other calculations, are these :—afloat, sixteen; in an advanced state, four ; additional ordered, seven; the cruisers number sixty-two. When the author rates the "Volunteer Fleet" at thirteen, he is surely under the mark. The vessels of that category (which were built in England) can pass the Bosphorus and Dardanelles without restriction, and have therefore been available for the transport of the troops and materials of war which the Czar's Govern- ment desired to send to Port Arthur and Talienwan. Russia is now practically independent of foreign help as regards naval equipment. The works of Abuhoff, on the Neva, are producing naval artillery of first-rate excellence; they have lately turned out a 12-inch gun which is fully equal to the similar weapons of Krupp and Armstrong. It should, however, be observed that "grave structural defects have appeared in vessels built in Russian dockyards," so that as the crews exhibit a low standard of intelligence, and are without the traditions or inherited aptitudes of French and English bluejackets, the test of war alone can show if, in the words of Peter the Great, the Muscovite sailor has been able "to conquer the art of the sea." As to size, Russia has no Formidables ' or Magnificents '; but in design her ship- builders have shown much originality. Their Rai*: launched in 1894 (see the diagram), which gave us the idea of the 'Powerful' and Terrible,' and also of the 'Diadem' class of armoured cruisers, was a new departure in naval construction. According to Sir G. S. Clarke, Russia has twenty - seven battleships, afloat, building, and projected (we are uncertain whether this total includes the vessels foreshadowed in the Ukase that preceded the publication of the Czar's recent message of peace). The Parliamentary Return of last May gave Russia twenty - two battleships, France thirty-five, and England sixty-eight; on which show- ing, our sea-power in first-class armour-clads would be fairly ahead of "the counterpoise"; but all such computations of rival navies must be taken cum grano.
In the author's very ingenious elucidation of the political and diplomatic aspects of his topic there is much that Count Mnravieff and Mr. Stead would willingly sign. Holy Russia's expansion at the cost of weak neighbours is, we learn, the simple result of the operation of a natural law which must always assert itself in spite of Foreign Offices. We have no grievance whatever against Russia! She "has not occupied a square yard of territory which is now, or ever has been, desired by Great Britain," yet we have never ceased to combat her in a manner without parallel in our dealings with France, Ger- many, or the United States. While she "could not occupy Mery without arousing great irritation, France might annex Tunis and Madagascar without even exciting surprise." (? ?) From first to last this policy has proved an absolute failure; in no instance has it checked Russia's Asiatic advance, and it has brought us numerous rebuffs. Fortunately, the long- standing antagonism of the two nations can be easily brushed aside if Lord Salisbury will make it his mission to adopt Sir G. S. Clarke's plain and short recipe. The new formula is this. Great Britain has merely to come to a direct under- standing with Russia on the matters in dispute between London and St. Petersburg, by substituting " agreement " for " disagreement " ! Unhappily, the author's prescrip. tion includes, if we read it rightly, an ingredient likely to neutralise its healing powers. Our rival is to be shown such and such territorial spheres within which we mean to main- tain, at whatever cost, our supremacy and influence. We do not see it. Of the hypothesis that Russia, intimidated by a few scratches on a map of Asia, would thereupon repeal her natural law, the present volume, from first to last, furnishes the refutation.
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