THE AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS. T HE negotiations which the British Government are
conducting for the purpose of acquiring Delagoa Bay from the Portuguese, deserve the closest attention on the part of Parliament and of the public at large. Un- doubtedly, England must have Delagoa Bay. As long as the Transvaal was a semi-independent State of no special commercial importance to England, it was not to our interest to take any particular trouble to obtain for the Boers ready and convenient access to the sea. Now, however, that the whole South African problem has been changed by the dis- covery of gold in the territory in which the settlers of Dutch blood were once supreme, the question of the road to the coast has taken a completely new complexion. The Transvaal may in name remain the " South African Republic." In fact, it is becoming an English Colony. The rush of English gold-diggers, English diamond-seekers, and English settlers has almost swamped the Boer popu- lation, and if at this moment a poll were taken of the inhabitants on the question of annexation to England, the British party might be found to be in a majority. This being the case, and therefore the actual incorporation of the Boer Republic with the rest of our South African dominions being nothing but a question of time, it is obviously important that we should use every possible means in our power to obtain Delagoa Bay, which is as much the natural port of the Transvaal as the Mersey is of Lancashire. While thus admitting that it is essential to the proper development of the English possessions in South Africa to obtain Delagoa Bay, we must not' be taken to give an un- qualified assent to the means by which our Government proposes to effect its object. What our objections to the proposed means are we intend to state briefly here. In the first place, however, it will be as well to set forth what is the arrangement which at present seems to be contemplated. Without question, the easiest way of acquiring Delagoa Bay would be by the simple expedient of purchase. To such a scheme, however, the Portuguese Government would refuse to agree,—feeling, perhaps, that unless it obtains an equivalent in territory, the national pride will have received a check. We must, then, besides giving Portugal a sum down, find her territorial compensation elsewhere. From the mouths of the Zambesi to Cape Delgado, the Eastern coast-line of Africa is in the hands of the Portu- guese. How far their " sphere of influence " extends inland, it is difficult to estimate ; but they undoubtedly are anxious to push their claims in this respect to the farthest possible limit. At first sight, it may seem as if to admit these claims would be a wise and reasonable way of effecting our desired object. We have no recognised political right to the district in question, and we should only be making the Portuguese a present of something which we do not our- selves lay claim to. Without desiring in any way to declare that they are necessarily final, we should like to set forth what seem to us certain grave reasons against accepting this view. In the first place, to recognise Portugal's claim to the territory stretching inland from her coast possessions would be to hand over to her the whole valley of the Zambesi, and of its great tributary the Shire, and the larger portion of the basin of Lake Nyassa. Now, these regions, though not within the sphere of England's political influence, are connected with her by moral ties almost as strong. The Zambesi was the scene of some of Livingstone's greatest exploits as an explorer. It was described by him as " the road into Africa," and its waters were first navigated by English steamers. The shores of Lake Nyassa and the surrounding districts have still closer English associations, for throughout them are scattered a large number of prosperous mission-stations belonging to various Scotch and English Churches. In addition, there are in this region a considerable number of trading posts belonging to the African Lakes Company ; while on the waters of the Shire and of the great narrow lake, float steamers belonging both to the missionaries and to the Company. We have thus acquired in the country which it is proposed to hand over to Portugal, very con- siderable rights and responsibilities. It might be con- ceivable that if we withdrew, in favour of Portugal, our claim to interfere directly, we might still make such an agreement as would effectually secure the work now being done by the missionaries and the Company from destruction. The matter, however, is not so simple as this. It is more than probable that no such guarantees, even if given by the Portuguese Government, would be effectual. To understand why this is so, it is necessary, however, to describe the curious changes which have come over Eastern Equatorial and South-Eastern Africa in the last five years. Up to the beginning of that period, the slave-trade was declining in Central Africa, and the raids of the Arab slave-catchers were constantly on the decrease. About five years ago, however, owing to causes which cannot be considered here, an Arab reaction set in, and the slave-hunters gradually pushed into country before untouched by them. Though the adroitness and diplomatic skill of Mr. Stanley were able to ward off the attacks of the Arabs from the Congo State, they have fallen with increased violence further south. First, the country round Lake Tanganyika was ravaged, and then, at the close of last year, the attack described in our columns last week upon the mission- station of Karong,a, at the north end of Lake Nyassa, took place, an event which ultimately led to the abandon- ment of the post. What the extension of the power of the Arab slave-hunters means, may be gathered from the account of their attacks upon districts lying around the head of Lake Nyassa, described in two in- teresting letters which appeared in the Manchester Guardian of February 25th last. One incident of the raid is typical of the whole. Some of the natives, flying before the Arabs as the first settlers of the mudbanks of Rialto fled before the armies of Attila, took refuge in the reed-beds of a neigh- bouring lagoon. The Arabs, however, hunted their prey to covert, and determined to dislodge them. The reeds were fired, and the terror-stricken men and women were given such a choice of deaths as never fell to mortal lot before. Some, as they fled from the flames into the open, were shot and speared, some stayed to be burnt alive among the blazing reeds, whilst others, seeking refuge in the waters of the lagoon, were dragged down and eaten by the crocodiles " that infest its waters in hundreds." It is probable that if things remain as they are at present, the missionaries, with the aid of the African Lakes Company and its steamers, may be able to organise such a force among the natives that the Arabs will in the end be driven back, and the occurrence of such horrors as these may be put a stop to. One condition necessary to success is, however, that Portugal shall not become supreme in these regions. Rightly or wrongly, the Arabs believe that the Portuguese have no objection to the slave-trade and its profits, and the transfer of the Nyassa districts to that Power would, it can hardly be doubted, have the effect of encouraging the Arabs to believe that a rich preserve had been thrown open for their hunting. At present they have always in the background a certain fear of English influence. That fear withdrawn, the tide of Arab conquest would sweep over the whole of that thickly populated region which our missionaries have done so much to civilise. Another objection to recognising the inland claims of Portugal is to be found in the fact that to do so would practically be to allow that Power, by extending her influence from both East and West, to cut Africa across the middle with a belt of territory which would exclude England from all northward intercourse with the interior from her South African possessions. The immediate effect, no doubt, might be small. Some day, however, it could hardly help proving extremely disastrous. Portuguese rule would be more than likely to alarm and harry the native tribes which it would embrace, and to force them to fly southward into our territory, thus em- phasising that pressure of African tribes upon our Northern boundaries which we have already found so troublesome.
We trust, therefore, that on account of considerations such as we have urged, the Government will find some means of obtaining what we are quite willing to recognise as absolutely necessary—the cession of Delagoa Bay—without the sacrifice of our rights in the Nyassa country. Would it not be possible, for instance, to obtain compensation for Portugal elsewhere, say on the West Coast of Africa, which geographically is far more the natural sphere of her in- fluence than the East ? If this were not manageable, might it not, again, be possible to arrange a money-price for Delagoa Bay large enough to get over the difficulty, but yet accompanied by a sufficient portion of territory to save Portuguese honour ? No doubt the diplomatists have a very difficult task to manage, for Portugal is far too weak a Power to be bullied or threatened. Still, she could surely be made to remember that, though England did so much for her in the past, and is still willing to remain the European protector of her rights, that attitude can only be continued if Portugal shows herself willing to oblige England in the matter of Delagoa Bay.
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